

DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE
FACULTY OF PHILOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE, SERBIA

**BELGRADE
ENGLISH
LANGUAGE &
LITERATURE
STUDIES**

VOLUME 1
2009



Belgrade, 2009

Belgrade English Language and Literature Studies (Belgrade BELLS)

2009 – Volume 1

Editor-in-Chief:

Gordana Korać (University of Belgrade)

Editors of Volume 1:

Aleksandra Jovanović (University of Belgrade)

Katarina Rasulić (University of Belgrade)

Ivana Trbojević-Milošević (University of Belgrade)

Editorial Board:

Boris Hlebec (University of Belgrade)

Radojka Vukčević (University of Belgrade)

Zoran Paunović (University of Belgrade)

Jelisaveta Milojević (University of Belgrade)

Biljana Đorić-Francuski (University of Belgrade)

Jelena Vujić (University of Belgrade)

Geoffrey Leech (Lancaster University, UK)

Stephen Regan (Durham University, UK)

Reviewed by:

Slavica Perović (University of Montenegro)

John Gery (University of New Orleans, USA)

Proofread by:

Christine Prickett

Published by:

Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade

Graphic design:

Atelje RA, Belgrade

Printed by:

Studio LINE, Belgrade

Belgrade, Serbia

2009

ISSN: 1821-3138

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	5
-------------------	---

THEORETICAL AND APPLIED LINGUISTICS

<i>Ronald W. Langacker</i> REFLECTIONS ON THE FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERIZATION OF SPATIAL PREPOSITIONS.....	9
<i>Kasia M. Jaszczolt</i> VARIETIES OF DEFAULTS	35
<i>Marek Kuźniak</i> SOME CRITICAL REMARKS ON ASPECT AS A SITUATION TYPE.....	69
<i>Zoltán Kövecses</i> ASPECTS OF METAPHOR IN DISCOURSE	81
<i>Snežana Bilbija</i> WHAT WILL THE OHR DISCOURSE BE REMEMBERED BY?	97
<i>Ranko Bugarski</i> ENGLISH IN EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS: SOME OBSERVATIONS	109
<i>Anne Katz</i> LINKING LEARNING AND ASSESSMENT IN CLASSROOM PRACTICE	119

LITERARY AND CULTURAL STUDIES

Lee Clark Mitchell

DOES READING GOOD BOOKS MAKE US BETTER? 133

Stephen Regan

AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND MEMOIR IN MODERN IRELAND 151

Veselin Kostić

SHAKESPEARE'S BORROWINGS 171

Vladislava Gordić Petković

THE HOME OF THE CHARACTER: REMARKABLE HEROINES
WITHIN THEIR FICTIONAL SETTINGS..... 191

Zoran Paunović

LEOPOLD BLOOM'S MEAGRE MEAL: FOOD AS METAPHOR IN
JOYCE'S *ULYSSES*..... 205

Vesna Lopičić

GTA IV: BREAKING OR MAKING A STEREOTYPE? VIDEO GAME
AS PROPAGANDA 211

Elżbieta Klimek-Dominiak

'*THEY CAME LIKE A LION*' – SARAH WINNEMUCCA HOPKINS'S
LIFE AMONG THE PIUTES: THEIR WRONGS AND CLAIMS AS A
PERSONAL AND TRIBAL ACCOUNT OF NATIVE AMERICAN AND
EURO AMERICAN CONTACTS 221

BELGRADE BELLS INTERVIEW

DAVID CRYSTAL

"A NATION WITHOUT A LANGUAGE IS A NATION WITHOUT A HEART"
by Katarina Rasulić..... 231

INTRODUCTION

The English Department of the Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade, marks its 80th anniversary in December 2009 by organizing the international conference *English Language and Literature studies: Image, Identity, Reality* (ELLSIIR) and issuing the first volume of what we believe is going to become yet another standard activity of the Department, a new scholarly journal entitled *Belgrade English Language and Literature Studies* (*Belgrade BELLS*).

The journal is to be published annually in an endeavour to offer an international forum for current investigations in English theoretical and applied linguistics, as well as Anglophone literary and cultural studies, and to intensify the already existing dynamic exchange of ideas among scholars of diverse linguistic and literary orientations.

In the first issue of *Belgrade BELLS*, we are pleased to present fourteen articles by distinguished scholars from Serbia and abroad. We mention with pride that some of these scholars significantly contributed to the academic exchange at the international conferences previously organized by the English Department in Belgrade. Our warmest thanks go undividedly to all *Belgrade BELLS* contributors, whom we mention following the order of the Table of Contents in the first issue.

The *Theoretical and Applied Linguistics* section of this volume consists of the following seven articles: Ronald Langacker (University of California, San Diego, USA) looks into the interrelatedness of spatial and functional aspects of prepositional meaning and argues in favour of the relative primacy of the former over the latter within a broader context of grammar viewed as a product and instrument of embodied cognition. Kasia Jaszczołt (University of Cambridge, UK) examines different default views of utterance interpretation and provides a possible typology of default meanings based on the source of the salient interpretation. Marek Kuźniak (University of Wrocław, Poland) tackles some controversies in the treatment of aspect from the perspective of cognitive linguistics and presents a critical review of Radden and Dirven's account of aspect as situation type. Zoltán Kövecses (Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary) reveals the powerful and creative role of metaphors in real discourse, which becomes apparent once metaphors stop being viewed solely as entrenched conceptual correspondences manifested by highly conventionalized linguistic expressions. Snežana

Bilbija (University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina) analyses specific morphological, syntactic and semantic properties of the political discourse produced by the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ranko Bugarski (University of Belgrade, Serbia) presents a brief discussion of the status and use of English in the European Union and the Council of Europe, offers a linguistic profile of 'Euro-English' and assesses the status of native as against non-native English in the European institutions. Anne Katz (Education Design Group, USA) focuses on the fact recently brought to the attention of teaching specialists that assessment and learning can be integrated in the foreign language classroom in such a way as to promote student achievement.

The *Literary and Cultural Studies* section of this volume consists of the following seven articles: Lee Clark Mitchell (Princeton University, USA) explores the path trodden by the reader of great literature, a path that leads from the aesthetic to the ethical and back. Stephen Regan's (University of Durham, UK) topic is autobiography and memoir in modern Irish literature, with its distinctive and specific traits breathing out Irish identity. Writing about Shakespeare's borrowings, Veselin Kostić (University of Belgrade, Serbia) explains and illustrates the principle of imitation (in the sense of *imitatio*, not *mimesis*) that worked throughout and after the Renaissance. Vladislava Gordić Petković (University of Novi Sad, Serbia) chose works of fiction from various epochs to examine the diverse narrative strategies used to represent female characters within a variety of settings. Zoran Paunović (University of Belgrade, Serbia) explores complex metaphorical meanings of food in Joyce's *Ulysses*, thus providing a refined analysis of Leopold Bloom's most intricate feelings. Vesna Lopičić (University of Niš, Serbia) examines the effects of character profiling based on the ethnic stereotype in a globally sold videogame. Elżbieta Klimek-Dominiak's (University of Wrocław, Poland) article presents the autobiography of Sarah Winnemucca Hopkins, the author of the first personal and communal narrative written by a Native American woman.

This issue concludes with an extensive interview with David Crystal, renowned professor and linguistic celebrity, conducted by Katarina Rasulić during his visit to the Faculty of Philology, Belgrade in November 2008.

We believe that *Belgrade BELLS* will reflect and contribute to the rich and variable experience of individual and team research by presenting the theoretical and methodological developments in the fields of linguistic, literary and cultural explorations. We sincerely hope that this first volume sparkles up and motivates future contributions.

Belgrade, October 2009

The Editors

***Theoretical and
Applied Linguistics***

Ronald W. Langacker
University of California, San Diego, USA

REFLECTIONS ON THE FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERIZATION OF SPATIAL PREPOSITIONS

Abstract. In his research on spatial prepositions, Vandeloise raised the basic question of whether they are really spatial in nature. He clearly established the importance – if not the predominance – of functional considerations. In the case of *in*, for example, the container function is at least as important as spatial inclusion; likewise, the support function is central to the meaning of *on*. Accepting the validity of this insight leaves certain issues unresolved, such as the relative weight of spatial and functional factors and how they relate to one another. And more specifically, if the functions in question are really fundamental, why is the containing or supporting element expressed grammatically as the preposition's object (in contrast to verbs like *contain* and *support*, which choose it as their subject)? These matters are addressed in the context of a broader examination of grammar viewed as a product and instrument of embodied cognition and thus reflective of how we apprehend and interact with the world.

1. The basic question

As a unifying theme of his research, Claude Vandeloise probed deeply into the rudiments of human cognition as evidenced by the semantic analysis of linguistic elements. His multifaceted investigations centered on elements naïvely and traditionally regarded as “spatial” in nature, starting from his classic work on French prepositions (Vandeloise 1984, 1986, 1991). More than anyone else, he was responsible for exposing the conceptual complexity of such elements, showing conclusively that they cannot be characterized solely in terms of spatial configuration. Indeed, he raised the basic question of whether they are properly regarded as spatial at all,

or whether a **functional** characterization might be more fundamental and descriptively more adequate (Vandeloise 1985). The essential validity of this insight is now generally accepted in cognitive linguistics. The need is thus recognized for an integrated account along the lines proposed by Vandeloise himself (2006), in which both spatial and functional factors are accommodated and related to one another. Here my examination of these matters will be framed by a broader consideration of how grammar relates to embodied cognition.

Along with Herskovits (1986, 1988), Vandeloise established the basic point that a preposition cannot be consistently characterized in terms of a single spatial configuration, even allowing for geometric idealization. The meaning of *in* is not just a matter of spatial inclusion, as shown by *the flower in that vase*, where most of the flower protrudes. Nor even partial inclusion, as witnessed by the now well-known example of a pear, resting on a pile of apples, that is *in* a bowl despite being totally outside the bowl's spatial confines. Likewise, *on* cannot be consistently described as indicating contact with an upper surface (note *the painting on the wall*), contact with a surface (*a fish on a hook*), or even contact (*the book on the table* may be resting on a stack of magazines).

These and many other problematic cases are neatly handled by a characterization in terms of function: for *in*, the **container** function (a container holds its contents); and for *on*, the **support** function (a bearer supports its burden). Yet function alone is insufficient. The intuition that prepositions specify "locative" relationships cannot just be dismissed. There are uses where spatial location is the primary if not the exclusive motivating factor. In examples like *the smile on his face* and *the shadow on the wall*, the notion of support is either very tenuous or absent altogether. Spatial configuration alone is enough to motivate expressions like *the dot in the circle*. As noted by Vandeloise (1991: 219-220), full spatial inclusion contributes to the felicity of *the brain in his head*, for in general *in* is not used for constitutive parts (cf. **the nose in his face*). Moreover, an account based solely on the support and container functions fails to explain why the supporting or containing entity is coded by the prepositional landmark (or object), in contrast to verbs like *support*, *contain*, or *hold*, which code it as the trajector (or subject).

Hence the meaning of a preposition cannot be captured by a single semantic specification pertaining to either function or configuration. Instead, according to the view now prevailing in cognitive linguistics, prepositional meanings are complex in two respects. First, an element exhibits a range of conventional senses or established uses, usually

anchored by a central case with respect to which the others can be seen as motivated extensions. The central case goes by various names, such as **prototype** (Lakoff 1987), **spatial scene** (Tyler and Evans 2003), **conceptual schema** (Navarro i Ferrando 1998), and for Vandeloise, **(logical) impetus** (*impulsion*). While these notions are not necessarily equivalent, the differences can largely be ignored for present purposes. Second, a given value – especially the central one – is complex in that its characterization involves multiple, coexisting factors. For instance, Deane (1993, 2005) posits a “multimodal” description comprising visual, motor, and force-dynamic images. Navarro i Ferrando proposes a similar scheme whose factors include the topology of objects, the motion and force involved in interacting with them, and their function.

The term **function** works well for *in* and *on*. The function of a container is to hold its contents, and a pedestal has the function of supporting a statue. Vandeloise points out, however, that in its usual sense the term is a bit too narrow: “La nature de ces primitifs diffère et le terme *fonctionnel* ne s’applique exactement qu’à certains d’entre eux comme les relations porteur/porté et contenant/contenu. D’autres sont plutôt de caractère anthropomorphique, liés à la forme du corps humain ou à son système perceptif” (1985: 119). Among the additional factors he cites are physical and perceptual access (*sous, derrière*), order of potential encounter (*avant*), and direction based on general and lateral orientation (*devant, à gauche*). His term **anthropomorphic** would seem to capture the essential unity of these various notions, which pertain to human interaction with the world at the physical, perceptual, and purposive levels. It is roughly comparable to what cognitive linguists refer to as **embodiment** (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Ziemke, Zlatev, and Frank 2007; Frank, Dirven, Ziemke, and Bernárdez 2008).

As an overall characterization, Vandeloise (2006) arrived at the following formulation. The central value of a spatial element (its impetus) consists in a **complex primitive**. This is a primitive in the sense of being pre-linguistic, and complex in the sense that numerous propositions are needed to describe it exhaustively. Despite their complexity, these primitives are readily grasped as wholes due to their anthropomorphic nature; they are “unified by their function in our survival in the world” (150). Thus in a complex primitive the multiple factors relevant for describing an element are all present simultaneously. For example, the primitive for *in front of* – “general orientation” – is defined by the coincidence of line of sight, direction of motion, and frontal orientation defined anatomically. The primitive for *in* combines configurational

properties (concavity, spatial inclusion) with the interactive properties they afford (storage, protection, multidirectional control).

2. Grammar and human experience

This characterization by Vandeloise meshes well with some basic ideas of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987a, 1991a, 2008a). Among these, naturally, are general notions of cognitive linguistics like embodiment (the anthropomorphic principle) and polysemy (whereby a lexical meaning consists in a range of values centered on a prototype). A more specific point is the importance ascribed in Cognitive Grammar (henceforth CG) to **conceptual archetypes**, which seem quite comparable to complex primitives. Conceptual archetypes are experientially grounded concepts so frequent and fundamental in our everyday life that we tend to invoke them as anchors in constructing our mental world with all its richness and levels of abstraction. Since they pertain to many different aspects of experience, and archetypal status is a matter of degree, there is no fixed inventory. For sake of concreteness, I will cite just a few examples: a physical object, an object moving through space, a person, the human face, a whole and its parts, maintaining a posture, walking, seeing something, saying something, holding something, handing something to someone. Also qualifying as archetypes are the functions of containment and support, as well as the factors involved in general orientation.

As noted by Vandeloise for complex primitives, archetypes are basic conceptual units readily grasped in gestalt-like fashion, even though explicit descriptions are hard to formulate, seem less than revealing, and require numerous statements. For instance, we are clearly disposed to apprehend physical objects, which are fundamental to the construction of our mental world, but it is not at all easy to devise a satisfactory definition of the notion. Likewise, walking is very basic to our experience, and seems quite simple once we learn to do it, but actually describing the activity (e.g. in enough detail to model it) is very difficult. Conceptual archetypes represent salient, essentially universal aspects of everyday experience, as determined by the interplay of biological and environmental factors. Their emergence is a natural consequence of how we interact with the physical and social world, having evolved to cope with it successfully.

It should come as no surprise that conceptual archetypes play a significant role in language. More specific archetypes are strong candidates

for lexical expression. We would expect most any language encountered to have lexemes roughly comparable, say, to *person, face, sit, go, see, hold, give, in, and on*. Such expressions tend to be extended metaphorically to abstract uses (e.g. 'face' > 'in front of', 'see' > 'understand', 'hold' > 'have') and commonly serve as lexical sources for grammaticization (e.g. 'sit' > stative, 'go' > future, 'give' > benefactive). At a more schematic level, certain archetypes have evident grammatical significance even in the absence of lexical expression. Examples of this sort are basic semantic roles like agent, patient, instrument, and experiencer. Moreover, archetypes at this level of abstraction function as the central values of grammatical categories – for instance, agent as the prototype for subjects, and physical object for nouns.

This leads to a basic claim of CG that is controversial but nonetheless both natural and a source of conceptual unification. It pertains to certain grammatical notions reasonably considered both fundamental and universal; while there is no definite inventory (this being a matter of degree), a minimal list includes noun, verb, subject, object, and possessive. Such notions, it is claimed, are susceptible to semantic characterization at two different levels: the prototype level (for central instances) and the schema level (for all instances). In each case the prototype is an experientially grounded conceptual archetype. By contrast, the schemas have no specific conceptual content, residing instead in basic cognitive abilities (or mental operations). These abilities are **immanent** in the corresponding archetypes, i.e. they “lie within them”, being inherent in their conception. In developmental terms, the abilities are initially manifested in the archetypes – they provide the basis for structured experience and are thus responsible for the archetypes emerging in the first place. Subsequently, the same operations are applied to other sorts of conceptions, in which they are not inherent, thus extending the category they define to non-central instances.

Physical object is the archetype serving as the prototype for nouns. Their schematic characterization consists in cognitive abilities inherent in the very conception of an object: conceptual **grouping** and **reification**, by which a group is apprehended as a unitary entity for higher-level purposes (Langacker 1991b, 2008a: ch. 4). For physical objects themselves, these operations proceed automatically below the level of conscious awareness. They become more evident when extended to other circumstances, giving rise to non-prototypical nouns such as those designating groups (e.g. *herd*), abstract things (*month*), or reified events (*birth*). The prototype for verbs is an agent-patient interaction. The schema – ascribed to verbs in general – consists in apprehending a relationship and tracking its development

through time. The two participant roles in the verb archetype, agent and patient, function respectively as the prototypes for subject and object. As their schematic import, subject and object are characterized as **primary** and **secondary focal elements** in a relationship, reflecting our mental ability to direct and focus attention within a scene (Langacker 1999a). A number of archetypes are prototypical for possessives, including ownership, kinship, and whole-part relations (Langacker 1995a, 2004a; Taylor 1996). Proposed as the schema for possessives is our capacity for invoking one conceived entity as a **reference point** in order to mentally access another (Langacker 1993a).

These notions are central to a unified account of the development and relationship of conceptual and linguistic structure. At all stages and levels of organization, structure is seen as **dynamic**, residing in patterns of processing activity. The account begins with conceptions that emerge through embodied experience as we interact with our surroundings in the manner afforded by basic cognitive abilities. From this basis, some very general processes – occurring repeatedly, over a long period of time, at many successive levels – make possible the construction of our mental world in all its richness and complexity. Through recurrence, common experiences are progressively **entrenched**, coalescing into established cognitive routines readily activated and executed as prepackaged wholes. Of course, since every experience is unique at the level of fine-grained detail, any commonality that is reinforced and established as a routine is bound to be coarse-grained relative to the specific conceptions giving rise to it. The **abstraction** (or **schematization**) which thus occurs can in principle be carried to any degree. Another general process is **simulation** (or **disengagement**), whereby abstracted routines are executed independently of the circumstances in which they originated.

Conceptions emerge at different levels of specificity. For example, we can apprehend a particular cup with distinguishing features; being directly tied to immediate experience, conceptions of this sort are readily accessible to conscious awareness. Also quite accessible, representing the usual level of lexical expression, is the abstracted conception of a *cup* as a prototype or a more inclusive type. More schematic notions like container and physical object, which neutralize many types of this sort, are less likely to be coded by basic vocabulary. As specific and more general archetypes, they nonetheless have conceptual and linguistic significance, e.g. physical object as the prototype for nouns. This more general archetype, while abstracting away from all specific detail, can still be characterized as the manifestation of basic cognitive abilities (grouping and reification) in their

primary domain of application (the physical realm of space and material substance). A further degree of abstraction consists in the disengagement of these abilities, i.e. their application outside the physical realm. Being devoid of specific content, these abilities are not per se subject to conscious awareness. They do however constitute the schematic import of nouns, inhering in the archetype that serves as the category prototype, and providing the basis for its extension to non-prototypical members.

Mental simulation, involving conceptions at various levels of abstraction, has a number of basic functions in cognition. We recall events we experience by partially simulating that experience. In the guise of perceptual, motor, and kinesthetic imagery, simulation is an important aspect of lexical meaning. Part of the meaning of *cup*, for example, are schematized images representing what one looks like and what it feels like to use one. At higher levels of abstraction, the disengaged application of mental operations figures in **imaginative** phenomena like metaphor, blending, and fictivity (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Langacker 1999b). In metaphor, conceptions abstracted from a **source domain** are applied in the apprehension of a **target domain**; e.g. a set and its members are apprehended in terms of a container and its contents (Lakoff 1987). The container and content invoked are not of any specific sort, but are rather general archetypes. According to the **invariance hypothesis** (Lakoff 1990), what is projected onto the target is the source domain's **image schematic structure**. However, it is not made very explicit what level of abstraction this represents (cf. Hampe 2005). One interpretation – consistent with Johnson (1987), who emphasizes the dynamic nature of image schemas – is that the mental operations inherent in conceiving and reasoning about the source are manifested in the target (Langacker 2006; cf. Grady 2005, 2008).

Slightly different from metaphor is the phenomenon known as **fictive motion** (Langacker 1986, 2005; Matsumoto 1996; Talmy 1996; Matlock 2001, 2004), as in the following: *A thin crack runs from the corner of the window to the ceiling*. In their primary sense, expressions like *run* and *from X to Y* pertain to motion along a spatial path. Here, though, they describe a static situation. What happens is that mental operations inherent in the conception of spatial motion are disengaged from such motion and applied for a different purpose. Specifically, the conceptualizer traces a mental path through space not by way of tracking an object's movement, but rather as a dynamic means of apprehending its configuration. The path registered by this scanning operation is not traversed by a moving object,

but solely by the conceptualizer, who traces along the object in building up to a full conception of its spatial extension.

In the final analysis, all conceptions are dynamic, residing in processing activity that unfolds through time. But as they become more schematic, abstracting away from any specific content, their dynamic nature becomes more evident and it seems more reasonable to regard them as mental operations or cognitive abilities. This is so for a number of fundamental notions that are independent of any particular domain, such as path, group, continuity, and change. It makes no real difference whether we view these as elemental concepts or as basic mental capacities: scanning, grouping, registration of sameness, detection of a difference. In various combinations, moreover, such notions form general cognitive models which, despite their schematicity, are significant by virtue of being ubiquitous and manifested in many realms of experience. One such model is the abstract conception of a bounded event, where scanning through time registers continuity interrupted by an episode of change. At a higher level of organization, the recurrence of events figures in the notion of a cycle (Grady 2005). I have argued that a very general cyclic conception (the “control cycle”) is inherent in many aspects of human experience and is relevant to the characterization of numerous linguistic phenomena (Langacker 2004b, 2008b, 2008c). For instance, successive phases of this cycle are reflected in sets of verbs like *want* > *get* > *have* or *suspect* > *learn* > *know*.

An overall picture thus emerges in which conceptions at different levels of abstraction tend to have certain roles in language structure. While they are not necessarily discrete or well-delimited, three levels are especially relevant for present purposes. At the first level are fairly specific concepts of the sort coded by lexical items that are simple, frequent, and acquired early, such as *cup*. These roughly correspond to concepts representing **basic level categories** (Rosch 1978). Though schematic relative to the conception of particular instances or subtypes, the notion *cup* still incorporates a recognizable shape specification (visual image) and mode of interaction (motor image). Depending on their cognitive and cultural salience, notions of this sort might be considered archetypal. At the second level are more schematic conceptions whose archetypal status is perhaps more evident, e.g. the generalized notion of a container, or more abstractly, of a physical object. Such archetypes are more directly relevant for grammar owing to their greater generality: while still pertaining to physical entities, they abstract away from any particular shape or motor routine. Instead, their configurational and interactive properties are constituted by elemental, domain-independent concepts (or mental

operations) like grouping, bounding, inclusion, access, and control. These represent a third level of abstraction. And being independent of any specific content, they are not limited to the physical realm – resulting, for instance, in certain container-like properties being ascribed to abstract entities such as sets or mental states (e.g. *in love*).

These levels figure in the CG claim that certain fundamental grammatical notions can be characterized semantically in terms of both a prototype and a schema: serving as the former are general archetypes (e.g. physical object, in the case of nouns), and as the latter, basic cognitive abilities inherent in their conception (grouping and reification). The levels also have diachronic import. Lexical items representing archetypes most commonly function as source expressions for grammaticization. And to the extent that this process entails the loss of specific conceptual content, mental operations immanent in the archetypes are left to operate independently, thereby emerging as the essential semantic import of grammaticized elements. For example, when a verb like *sit*, *stand*, or *lie* grammaticizes into a general marker of stativity, specifications of shape and posture gradually fade away. Its remaining conceptual import consists in mental operations: the registration of sameness while scanning through time. Likewise, general possessive predicates evolve from verbs of physical control, such as *hold*, *grab*, or *carry* (Heine 1997). This comes about as they are extended to non-physical domains and the notion of control is progressively attenuated (Langacker 1999c). At the extreme, all that remains is the reference point ability: that of invoking one conceived entity as a basis for accessing or interpreting another (Langacker 1993a, 1995a, 1999c, 2004a). This represents the schematic characterization of possessives, immanent in the prototypes of ownership, kinship, and whole-part relations.

3. Clausal organization

The overall scheme just outlined concerns the conceptual basis of lexicon and grammar, which are seen in CG as forming a continuum. In accordance with this view, prepositions appear to be intermediate – they are sometimes regarded as lexical, sometimes as grammatical, and sometimes both. They prove to be intermediate in other ways as well. To see this, we must first examine the conceptual basis for certain aspects of clause structure.

A key to understanding grammar lies in the recognition that particular conceptual archetypes – especially salient due to their prevalence in moment-to-moment experience – provide the prototypical values of basic categories and canonical constructions. These are, of course, extended beyond their central values to accommodate the immensely varied array of conceptions requiring linguistic expression. Their extension relies on mental operations inherent in the archetype, and for categories with a wide enough range of members, a schematic characterization consists in just these operations (rather than any specific content). Nonetheless, it is in the experientially grounded archetypes that we find the rationale for canonical aspects of grammatical organization.

A constant feature of our experience is that we, as well as the entities we directly interact with, are small and compact relative to the far greater extensionality of our spatial surroundings. This is reflected in the archetypal distinction **participant** vs. **setting**, which has numerous grammatical ramifications even when covert (Langacker 1987b, 1990: 230-234). Although these notions are flexibly construed, typical sorts of participants include people, animals, and physical objects, while some typical settings are rooms, buildings, cities, and nations. A **location** is any portion of a setting delimited for some purpose (e.g. as the place where a certain participant can be found). An important dimension of this archetypal conception is that participants are conceived as **interacting** with one another, but merely **occupy** settings and locations. For instance, I can interact in many ways with an object, say a pencil: by picking it up, writing with it, breaking it, putting it somewhere, etc. These are all force-dynamic interactions that affect the object in some manner. But under normal circumstances there is little I can do by way of forcefully interacting with my global surroundings – I merely inhabit the North American continent, having relatively little impact on it.

Viewed through the eyes of modern science, the physical entities that populate our world range from the unimaginably small (atoms, subatomic particles) to the unimaginably large (the universe or multiverse). What counts for language, however, are conceptual archetypes deriving from normal human experience. On a human scale, and from the human perspective, physical entities are more naturally viewed in terms of a spectrum ranging from canonical participants to the most global spatial settings. The most canonical of participants is a person. Based on a number of salient properties – size being only one – we can observe a maximal opposition between the entities at the endpoints of the spectrum. In contrast to an all-encompassing setting, a person is small,

clearly bounded, mobile, energetic, alive, and sentient. Extending from either extreme is a range of entities whose status as participant or setting is equally canonical: non-human participants like animals and easily manipulated objects; and bounded settings, like a continent, a valley, or a field. Of course, many sorts of entities are intermediate, seeming more participant-like or more setting-like depending on the circumstances. A chair and a bench both qualify as participants, being objects that we interact with in various ways, but the latter, due to its greater size and lesser movability, is more readily conceived as a location (a place that people merely occupy).

The two ends of the spectrum represent fundamental and complementary aspects (or “realms”) of human experience. The **active** realm is that of action, change, and force, where mobile creatures – the paragon being a volitional human agent – act on the world. By contrast, the **circumstantial** realm is that of settings, locations, and static situations, where objects with stable properties are arranged in particular ways. These two aspects of our experience are of course not separate but interdependent: on the one hand, circumstances define the potential for activity and provide the stage on which it unfolds; on the other hand, activity alters the circumstances and thus the potential for subsequent activity. But despite their complementarity and indissociability, the realms are quite unequal from the human standpoint. The special status of people, as both the paragon for actors and the center of their own mental universe, imposes an asymmetry wherein the active realm is central, the circumstantial realm peripheral. Hence the spectrum leading from canonical participant to canonical setting is not apprehended in neutral fashion, but egocentrically, from our position at one extremity. From this perspective it amounts to an abstract scale of “distance”, based on such factors as likeness to people, the potential for interaction, and the possibility of empathy.

We have so far considered these archetypal conceptions in their own terms, independently of language. They do however have many linguistic manifestations. For example, the scale of distance (sometimes called the “empathy hierarchy”) plays a role in English possessives. As noted by Deane (1987), possessors representing successive positions along this scale (e.g. person > animal > object > setting) are increasingly less likely to be expressed by a pre-nominal genitive, and more likely to be expressed by a post-nominal *of*-phrase: *the baby’s head* vs. *??the head of the baby*; *the cat’s tail* vs. *?the tail of the cat*; *?the table’s leg* vs. *the leg of the table*; *??the valley’s floor* vs. *the floor of the valley*. Also, and more relevant

for present purposes, the archetypes discussed have a significant role in clausal organization.

The labels for the two realms allude to the distinction drawn by Tesnière (1965) between **actant** and **circonstant**, reflecting a basic asymmetry among the nominal elements in a clause. It is seen most clearly in the differences between subject and object nominals, on the one hand, and those with adverbial function, on the other. In grammatical terms, the former are usually obligatory in a clause, the latter optional. Also, the former are normally expressed by bare nominals or marked by “grammatical” cases, whereas the latter are introduced periphrastically (by adpositions) or marked by cases with more evident semantic content. Conceptually, of course, subjects and objects are generally participants, while the specification of settings and locations is typical for adverbials.

Thus the maximal conceptual opposition between archetypes at the two ends of the spectrum – a volitional human agent and an all-compassing setting – is mirrored by the very different grammatical properties of subjects and adverbial expressions. Now it is typical for a maximal opposition to be exhibited by elements with the greatest salience. For example, the distinction between two categories is generally most evident in their prototypes (peripheral members may be quite similar). And if we consider the range of grammatical categories, the two most prominent – nouns and verbs – are polar opposites with respect to both their prototypes and their schematic characterizations (Langacker 1991a, 2008a). Due to their maximal opposition, it might therefore be expected that the archetypes human agent and global setting would canonically be associated with the two most salient elements in a clause. This is not the case, however. In the CG analysis, the two most salient elements of a clause are the subject and object, characterized as the primary and secondary focal elements in the relationship it designates. But while the subject is canonically an agent, the global setting is certainly not a typical object.

Why not? The evident reason is that the archetypes are arranged not only in terms of a maximal opposition, but also a center and a periphery. From the perspective of human agents, the active realm is central, the circumstantial realm peripheral. It stands to reason, then, that clauses should be primarily concerned with actions and events, and only secondarily with static circumstances. So for purposes of clause structure, what counts as a maximal opposition is the one observed within the active realm, between the participants in an interaction. The role archetypes exhibiting this maximal contrast are agent and patient. In a canonical agent-patient interaction (e.g. *She sliced the cake*), the

agent is a person who acts intentionally, functions as the energy source, and is unchanged by the event. The patient is the polar opposite in each respect: it is inanimate (hence non-volitional), absorbs the energy, and is changed as a consequence. It is thus to be expected that subject and object, characterized schematically in terms of primary and secondary focal prominence, would have agent and patient as their prototypes.

To be sure, not every sentence has an agent for its subject and a patient for its object. The most one can say is that this arrangement has some claim to being both optimal and canonical: optimal in that the two most prominent grammatical roles are co-aligned with the two most salient participant archetypes; and canonical by virtue of representing the default coding for a type of occurrence both ubiquitous and of prime importance from our egocentric perspective. But obviously, there are many departures from this canon, as many other factors play a role in shaping language structure. Even a canonical agent-patient interaction may, for discourse reasons, be coded with non-default alignment (with a passive, for example). The most general, factor, however, is simply the vast and varied range of occurrences that need to be described. As the basic pattern of a two-participant clause is extended to more and more kinds of interactions, subject and object are extended beyond the agent and patient prototypes to other participant roles. In *She recognized it*, the subject is an experiencer rather than an agent, and the object is a non-patient, being quite unaffected by the interaction.

An additional factor is that agentive interactions are not the only sort of occurrence sufficiently prevalent and important to motivate a basic clause type. For one thing, we engage the world not just physically but also mentally, interacting with other entities through perception and thought. It is quite common (as just illustrated) for such occurrences to be expressed in the same manner as physical interactions. But many languages accommodate this archetype by means of a distinct clausal pattern, generally involving a dative-marked element which is either the subject or has certain subject-like properties. Furthermore, not every occurrence is interactive. Few aspects of our experience are more frequent and fundamental than the activity of moving around in space. While this usually has an interactive purpose, it does not per se constitute an interaction (since we merely **occupy** locations). For describing spatial motion, probably every language has a basic type of clause consisting of a subject, a motion verb, and a locational complement serving to specify the path or goal (e.g. *She walked into the room*). And finally, since our concerns extend beyond the active realm, we need ways of describing stable

circumstances. This is often accomplished through clauses consisting of a subject, a *be*-type verb, and a complement specifying a property or static location (e.g. *She is {clever / in her study}*).

It is crucial to bear in mind that conceptual archetypes are not intrinsic to the world but are rather a matter of how we apprehend it. A limited inventory cannot do justice to the complexity and variability of our experience, which is hardly susceptible to rigid categorization. A given entity can thus be viewed and categorized in alternate ways depending on the situation and how we choose to construe it for linguistic purposes. A room is usually just a setting, but we can also engage it in an interaction (e.g. by cleaning, painting, or merely examining it), in which case it counts as a participant. A cat is agentive in regard to catching mice, but may only be a location if we are talking about the travels of a flea. Through their flexible application, archetypes grounded in basic experience provide a basis for apprehending and describing any aspect of our real or mentally constructed world.

4. The place of prepositions

It is usual for languages to have a basic clause type canonically used for describing stable situations in the circumstantial realm. In one common pattern, this type of clause employs a *be*-type predicate whose complement specifies a property of the subject (*It is heavy*) or its spatial location (*It is on the counter*). The latter represents one primary use of prepositions and comparable elements. Yet even these core circumstantial expressions have close connections with the active realm. The properties ascribed to objects generally have some kind of interactive basis (Langacker 1995b); something *heavy* is hard to lift. In describing something as being *on the counter*, we would normally also entertain some conception of movement or activity involving it: how it got there, or how to reach it in order to use it.

The point is a general one: even if we focus on the purely spatial import of prepositions, the active realm is important for understanding their semantics and grammar. Spatial relationships are prime components of the circumstantial realm (that of settings, locations, and stable arrangements), but we are most concerned with this realm as a stage for human action. This is reflected in the sorts of entities most commonly chosen as the primary and secondary focal elements in the relationship designated by a preposition. In CG, these elements are referred to as the

trajector and the **landmark**. Now one might expect that, for describing stable spatial arrangements, setting-like entities would tend to function in both capacities. But while this is certainly possible, e.g. *Canada is in North America*, it is hardly canonical (except in geography lessons). More typical are expressions like *Jill is in the garage*, in which the trajector is a participant and the landmark is a local setting (or location) rather than a global one. With respect to the distance scale, ranging from a human agent at one extreme to an all-encompassing setting at the other, the trajector tends to lie toward the former pole, and the landmark toward the middle—not the opposite extreme. The center of gravity is thus in the active realm.

In clauses that specify static location, the trajector is canonically either a person or a movable physical object: *She's on the porch*; *It's in that drawer*. In each case the participant role it instantiates is a mere shadow of the role it has in the agent-patient archetype central to the active realm. I suggest, however, that this archetype does indeed cast its shadow—although the trajector's role approximates zero in regard to action, change, and force, these notions are still relevant to its characterization.

The role of a person who merely occupies a location represents the extreme case of **attenuation** (Langacker 1999c) vis-à-vis the archetype of a volitional human agent. Starting from a canonical agent-patient interaction (e.g. *She smashed the vase*), we can note several steps along this path, each resulting in another archetypal conception associated with a basic clause type. There is first a single-participant event coded by a simple intransitive clause (e.g. *She stood up*). While this is an **action** rather than an **interaction**, the subject is still a volitional actor exerting energy. A particular kind of action, one having great importance and cognitive salience, is that of moving around in space. Corresponding to such events are intransitive clauses containing a movement verb and a complement describing the path of motion (e.g. *She walked along the river*). While movement requires the expenditure of energy, its force-dynamic aspect is usually of lesser interest than the trajector's changing location. Motion events are thus ambivalent, lending themselves to construal either as actions or simply as occurrences in which the trajector occupies a series of positions through time. (This distinction may be marked overtly, e.g. by a *have*-type vs. a *be*-type auxiliary in the perfect, as argued for Dutch by Beliën [2008: §5.5].) Static location can then be regarded as the degenerate case of such movement, where the trajector occupies the same position throughout. But even here we have the shadow of interaction. Being in a particular place makes it possible to perform certain actions, which normally provide the reason for moving

there. And a common reason to specify a person's location is that it bears on the possibility of interacting with her.

Likewise, an inanimate object that merely occupies a location represents an extreme case of attenuation vis-à-vis the archetypal role of patient. In a sentence like *She broke it*, the object is affected in the strong sense of undergoing an internal change of state; in *She put it on the desk* it is affected only in the weaker sense of undergoing a change in location; and it is not affected at all in descriptions of static location, e.g. *It is on the desk*. Once again, interaction casts its shadow on such expressions. If an object occupies a particular location, it is usually because someone put it there for a certain purpose. And we commonly specify its location so that someone will be able to use it.

The landmark of a spatial preposition tends to be intermediate on the scale of distance. Though presumably accurate, it is generally not very useful to be informed that *Jill is in the solar system* or that *Your keys are in North America*. Several kinds of entities canonically serve as spatial landmarks. The first consists of entities such as enclosures, bounded areas, and geographical regions of limited extent: *Jill is in {her room / the house / the back yard / Chicago}*. These are naturally viewed as locations, being characterized more by spatial expanse than by material substance. Next are material objects which, due to size and relative immobility, lend themselves to being construed as locations rather than participants: *She is {in the bathtub / at her desk / on that bench}*. But it is not at all unusual for entities normally construed as participants to function as landmark: *It is {in my wallet / under that magazine / beside the vase / behind the paint cans}*.

We can observe in these examples a general trend for a wider range of prepositions to occur with landmarks more readily viewed as participants. The reason, evidently, is that the landmark's function is to specify a location, and landmarks which are not inherently locational fail to do so with any precision. The landmark entity is thus invoked, not as a location in and of itself, but rather as a point of reference for defining one. It is defined by the preposition. As the distinctive aspect of its meaning, each spatial preposition specifies a region in space, characterized in relation to the landmark object, within which the trajector can be found: its interior (*in*), the region adjacent to it (*beside*), its general neighborhood (*near*), etc. In this way a set of prepositions provides a highly flexible means of using an object to locate another entity.

How can multiple spatial regions be characterized in terms of a single reference object? A natural strategy is to base the definitions on

parts of the object, or – by metaphorical projection – on parts of the human body (MacLaury 1989; Langacker 2002). This strategy is evident in complex prepositional locutions: *by the side of the river; at the top of the stairs; in the back of the room*. It is further evident in complex prepositions at various stages of grammaticization (*in front of, in back of, on top of, ahead of, alongside, atop*) and in the vestigial analyzability of certain simple prepositions (*beside, behind, before*). To the extent that prepositional expressions are analyzable, they manifest overtly the conceptual distinction between a reference object and a spatial region defined in relation to it.

Thus three major entities, each with a different function, figure in the conceptual characterization of a spatial preposition. The trajector (translated by Vandeloise as *cible*) functions as the **target** of search, the entity one is trying to locate. The landmark functions as a **reference point** for purposes of finding it. Defined in relation to this reference point – hence mentally accessible through it – is a limited region within which the target can be found. This is called the **search domain** (Hawkins 1984; Langacker 1993b, 2004a). It should be noted that terms like “search”, “find”, and “reference point” are not just metaphorical. A common reason for using a locative expression, e.g. *The brushes are behind the paint cans*, is precisely so that the interlocutor can find the trajector, employing the landmark as a point of reference in order to do so. The “finding” may be purely mental, with no intent of actually reaching the target and interacting with it, but in either case the conceptualizer traces the same mental path (from reference point to search domain to target) by way of apprehending the locative relationship. The mental operation of scanning along this path is immanent in the conception of someone actually following it to the target, and possibly also in the conception of the target moving to its current position.

This conceptual characterization of prepositions is indicative of their intermediate status, which has several dimensions. First, as noted earlier, they are intermediate in regard to the lexicon-grammar continuum. Second, they are intermediate in terms of grammatical category, where noun and verb represent a maximal opposition. Finally, prepositions have intermediate status with respect to the distance scale and the active vs. circumstantial realms.

Talmy (1983, 1988) groups prepositions with grammatical elements on the basis of their being limited in number (“closed-class” forms) as well as the nature of their meanings (“topological”). I think he would agree, however, that we are not faced here with a sharp dichotomy,

and that prepositions are not the best examples of closed-class elements. If one considers not just the core set of fully grammaticized prepositions (*in, on, under, beside, etc.*), but the entire range of conventional prepositional locutions (including *by the side of, at the top of, in the bottom of, etc.*), it is not at all clear that the class is really closed. The continuous process of new prepositions arising through grammaticization is itself an indication that the distinction is a matter of degree. And while they may not have the rich content of typical lexical items, prepositions have definite conceptual meanings that are sometimes fairly elaborate. Indeed, spatial prepositions are themselves subject to grammaticization involving semantic attenuation, giving rise to uses that are indisputably “grammatical” (Genetti 1986).

With respect to grammatical category, prepositions are intermediate between the two most fundamental classes, noun and verb, whose conceptual characterizations are polar opposites. Characterized schematically, a noun designates a thing (i.e. a grouping apprehended holistically as a unitary entity), whereas a verb designates a process (a relationship scanned sequentially in its evolution through time). Prepositions lie in between: they resemble verbs because they designate relationships; they resemble nouns because this relationship is apprehended holistically rather than sequentially (Langacker 2008d). As with adjectives (with which they form a larger class), their holistic nature allows their use as noun modifiers: *that pretty vase; the vase on my desk*. At the same time, their relational nature allows their use as clausal heads; to function in this capacity, they combine with *be* – which designates a schematic process – to form a complex verb that follows their evolution through time: *That vase is pretty; The vase is on my desk*.

Though it may be extended in various ways, in its basic sense a *be*-type verb designates a stable relationship. It is thus a hallmark of the circumstantial realm. I have noted that the best examples of relationships in this realm – “best” by virtue of being the most stable, being maximally distinct from actions, and involving setting-like elements – can hardly be regarded as typical. While expressions like *Belgium is in Europe* certainly have their place, we more commonly say things like *The cat is under your bed*. In uses reasonably considered canonical, a preposition designates the relationship between a participant and a location toward the middle of the distance scale. Often, in fact, the location is defined in reference to another participant, e.g. *The remote is under that pillow*. In this respect spatial prepositions straddle the active and circumstantial realms. They are also intermediate in that canonical spatial relationships are stable yet contingent: though static at least momentarily, hence part of the current

layout, they are generally construed in relation to movement or interaction. The relationship designated by *The cat is under your bed* is stable only in local terms; it would normally be conceived as resulting from the cat having moved there, probably for some purpose (e.g. to escape the rowdy children), or as raising the question of how to get it out. Likewise, *The remote is under that pillow* implies that someone put it and left it there, and specifies where to find it in order to use it.

So even when left implicit, movement and interaction cast their shadow on the circumstantial realm. The evocation of these active-realm phenomena animates the description of spatial location, with the consequence that even the most stable relationships are conceived as having a dynamic character rather than being purely static. This bears on two issues raised at the outset: the **basic question** and the **alignment question**.

The basic question is whether spatial prepositions should in fact be regarded as spatial in nature, or whether a functional characterization might be more fundamental and descriptively adequate. I suggest, however, that a definite choice between these options may not be essential for analyzing prepositions. More important is to recognize that spatial and interactive considerations are closely bound up with one another, even to the point of being indissociable. An entity's location makes possible a certain range of interactions involving it (e.g. contact with an upper surface allows support). Conversely, interactions provide a basis for characterizing spatial relationships (e.g. order of encounter for *avant*). It is thus to be expected that interactive and configurational properties might be bundled in a single morphological package. They constitute related aspects of prepositional meaning whose importance varies depending on the preposition and how it is used. Still, it does not necessarily follow that their spatial and functional aspects are exactly equal in status. There are grounds for suspecting that the former may have some degree of primacy.

The alignment question pertains to the entities focused as trajector and landmark. It involves a seeming disparity, at two different levels, between the alignment actually observed and the one that might be anticipated on other grounds. Let's take a canonical example: *The kitten is in the box*. One disparity concerns the specific function associated with the preposition. For *in*, this function is containment, with the container serving as landmark (secondary focal element), and the content as trajector (primary focal element). The kitten and the box are thus its trajector and its landmark, respectively. Observe, however, that verbs describing the containment function – verbs like *hold, contain, enclose, protect, control*

– exhibit the reverse alignment: if the kitten is *in* the box, then the box *contains* the kitten. If function were predominant, the trajector/landmark alignment of prepositions would at best be unanticipated.

A comparable disparity can be noted even considering prepositions in purely spatial terms. As the schematic description of spatial prepositions, I have offered a conceptual characterization based on reference point relationships (which also provide the schematic import of possessives – hence the close connection between possessive and locative constructions [Langacker 2002, 2004a]). Abstracting away from all specific content, the schema consists in cognitive operations immanent in the conception of any particular spatial relationship: the conceptualizer traces a mental path that leads from a reference point, to a search domain defined in terms of it, to a target found in that location. Since these same operations are inherent in the conception of someone searching for the target and finding it, they amount to a partial simulation of that process. However, while the target is the trajector of a preposition, it represents the landmark (or object) of verbs like *seek* and *find*. If *the kitten is in the box*, one can *find the kitten* by searching there.

What these disparities suggest is that the trajector of a spatial preposition is conceived primarily as a **mover**. I am not claiming that it always actually moves, nor denying the importance (and in some uses the predominance) of interactive functions. I am merely saying that the archetype of moving around in space represents the optimal point of departure for describing the trajector's semantic role – what Vandeloise might refer to as its **logical impetus**. In canonical uses of path prepositions, e.g. *The kitten crawled into the box*, the trajector actually is a mover: *into the box* specifies the path followed by the kitten while crawling. In various ways, moreover, movement has at least a shadow presence in simple descriptions of location, like *The kitten is in the box*. For one thing, stable location represents the limiting (degenerate) case of movement, that where change in position through time falls to zero. More concretely, the trajector's position typically results from prior motion, whether self-induced or effected by another agent (either the kitten crawled into the box or someone put it there). What about expressions like *Cleveland is in Ohio*, where the trajector never moves at all? Though static, the trajector is still the entity whose location is at issue, to be distinguished from other conceivable locations. Apprehending a locative specification must to some extent involve the conception of alternatives, in each of which the trajector occupies a candidate location. However tenuous it may be, this evocation

of the trajector in multiple locations bears a faint resemblance to – in fact, is immanent in – the conception of actual motion.

Despite the importance of interactive functions, the trajector/landmark alignment of spatial prepositions has its impetus in movement (be it actual, prior, potential, virtual, or vestigial). The trajector's role as mover is even reflected in the basic functions: support, containment, seeking and finding. If *X is on Y*, the support afforded by Y keeps X from falling. If *X is in Y*, the containment effected by Y keeps X from moving in any direction. In descriptions of stable location, the trajector's potential for being in different locations creates the need to seek and find it. So while interaction and spatial configuration are closely bound up with one another, and are both essential to the characterization of prepositions, the latter has a certain claim to primacy. The term **spatial preposition**, although it represents a considerable oversimplification, is not a complete misnomer.

References

- Beliën, Maaike (2008). *Constructions, Constraints, and Construal: Adpositions in Dutch*. Utrecht: Netherlands Graduate School of Linguistics.
- Deane, Paul D. (1987). English possessives, topicality, and the Silverstein hierarchy. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society* 13: 65-76.
- Deane, Paul D. (1993). *At, by, to, and past: An essay in multimodal image theory*. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society* 19: 112-124.
- Deane, Paul D. (2005). Multimodal spatial representation: On the semantic unity of *over*. In: Beate Hampe (ed.), *From Perception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. *Cognitive Linguistics Research* 29, 235-282.
- Fauconnier, Gilles, and Mark Turner (2002). *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities*. New York: Basic Books.
- Frank, Roslyn M., René Dirven, Tom Ziemke, and Enrique Bernárdez (eds.) (2008). *Body, Language and Mind*, vol. 2, *Sociocultural Situatedness*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. *Cognitive Linguistics Research* 35.2.

- Genetti, Carol (1986). The development of subordinators from postpositions in Bodic languages. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society* 12: 387-400.
- Grady, Joseph E. (2005). Image schemas and perception: Refining a definition. In: Beate Hampe (ed.), *From Perception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. *Cognitive Linguistics Research* 29, 35-55.
- Grady, Joseph E. (2008). 'Superschemas' and the grammar of metaphorical mappings. In: Andrea Tyler, Yiyoun Kim, and Mari Takada (eds.), *Language in the Context of Use: Discourse and Cognitive Approaches to Language*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. *Cognitive Linguistics Research* 37, 339-360.
- Hampe, Beate (ed.) (2005). *From Perception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. *Cognitive Linguistics Research* 29.
- Hawkins, Bruce W. (1984). *The Semantics of English Spatial Prepositions*. San Diego: University of California doctoral dissertation.
- Heine, Bernd (1997). *Cognitive Foundations of Grammar*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Herskovits, Annette H. (1986). *Language and Spatial Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Study of the Prepositions in English*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Herskovits, Annette H. (1988). Spatial expressions and the plasticity of meaning. In: Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.), *Topics in Cognitive Linguistics*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. *Current Issues in Linguistic Theory* 50, 271-297.
- Johnson, Mark (1987). *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, George (1987). *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, George (1990). The invariance hypothesis: Is abstract reason based on image-schemas? *Cognitive Linguistics* 1: 39-74.
- Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson (1980). *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

- Langacker, Ronald W. (1986). Abstract motion. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society* 12: 455-471.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1987a). *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar*, vol. 1, *Theoretical Prerequisites*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1987b). Grammatical ramifications of the setting/participant distinction. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society* 13: 383-394.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1990). *Concept, Image, and Symbol: The Cognitive Basis of Grammar*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Cognitive Linguistics Research 1.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1991a). *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar*, vol. 2, *Descriptive Application*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1991b). Noms et verbes. In: Claude Vandeloise (ed.), *Sémantique Cognitive*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Communications 53, 103-153.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1993a). Reference-point constructions. *Cognitive Linguistics* 4: 1-38.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1993b). Grammatical traces of some "invisible" semantic constructs. *Language Sciences* 15: 323-355.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1995a). Possession and possessive constructions. In: John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury (eds.), *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Trends in Linguistics Studies and Monographs 82, 51-79.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1995b). Raising and transparency. *Language* 71: 1-62.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1999a). Assessing the cognitive linguistic enterprise. In: Theo Janssen and Gisela Redeker (eds.), *Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, Scope, and Methodology*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Cognitive Linguistics Research 15, 13-59.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1999b). Virtual reality. *Studies in the Linguistic Sciences* 29 (2): 77-103.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1999c). Losing control: Grammaticization, subjectification, and transparency. In: Andreas Blank and Peter Koch (eds.), *Historical Semantics and Cognition*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Cognitive Linguistics Research 13, 147-175.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (2002). A study in unified diversity: English and Mixtec locatives. In: N. J. Enfield (ed.), *Ethnosyntax: Explorations in*

- Grammar and Culture*. Oxford and London: Oxford University Press. 138-161.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (2004a). Possession, location, and existence. In: Augusto Soares da Silva, Amadeu Torres, and Miguel Gonçalves (eds.), *Linguagem, Cultura e Cognição: Estudos de Linguística Cognitiva*, vol. I. Coimbra: Almedina. 85-120.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (2004b). Aspects of the grammar of finite clauses. In: Michel Achard and Suzanne Kemmer (eds.), *Language, Culture and Mind*. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 535-577.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (2005). Dynamicity, fictivity, and scanning: The imaginative basis of logic and linguistic meaning. In: Diane Pecher and Rolf A. Zwaan (eds.), *Grounding Cognition: The Role of Perception and Action in Memory, Language and Thinking*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 164-197.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (2006). Subjectification, grammaticization, and conceptual archetypes. In: Angeliki Athanasiadou, Costas Canakis, and Bert Cornillie (eds.), *Subjectification: Various Paths to Subjectivity*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. *Cognitive Linguistics Research* 31, 17-40.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (2008a). *Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (2008b). Finite complements in English. *Journal of Foreign Languages* 31: 2-35.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (2008c). Enunciating the parallelism of nominal and clausal grounding. In: Jean-Rémi Lapaire, Guillaume Desagulier, and Jean-Baptiste Guignard (eds.), *Du Fait Grammatical au Fait Cognitif [From Gram to Mind: Grammar as Cognition]*, vol. 1. Pessac: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux. 17-65.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (2008d). Sequential and summary scanning: A reply. *Cognitive Linguistics* 19: 571-584.
- MacLaury, Robert E. (1989). Zapotec body-part locatives: Prototypes and metaphoric extensions. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 55: 119-154.
- Matlock, Teenie (2001). *How Real is Fictive Motion?* Santa Cruz: University of California doctoral dissertation.
- Matlock, Teenie (2004). Fictive motion as cognitive simulation. *Memory and Cognition* 32: 1389-1400.

- Matsumoto, Yo (1996). How abstract is subjective motion? A comparison of coverage path expressions and access path expressions. In: Adele E. Goldberg (ed.), *Conceptual Structure, Discourse and Language*. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 359-373.
- Navarro i Ferrando, Ignasi (1998). A multimodal system for the description of spatial semantics: The preposition *on*. In: José Luis Cifuentes Honrubia (ed.), *Estudios de Lingüística Cognitiva II*. Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Filología Española, Lingüística General y Teoría de la Literatura. 767-787.
- Rosch, Eleanor (1978). Principles of categorization. In: Eleanor Rosch and Barbara B. Lloyd (eds.), *Cognition and Categorization*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 27-47.
- Talmy, Leonard (1983). How language structures space. In: Herbert Pick and Linda Acredolo (eds.), *Spatial Orientation: Theory, Research, and Application*. New York: Plenum Press. 225-282.
- Talmy, Leonard (1988). The relation of grammar to cognition. In: Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.), *Topics in Cognitive Linguistics*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 50, 165-205.
- Talmy, Leonard (1996). Fictive motion in language and "ception". In: Paul Bloom, et al. (eds.), *Language and Space*. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press/Bradford. 211-276.
- Taylor, John R. (1996). *Possessives in English: An Exploration in Cognitive Grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press/Clarendon.
- Tesnière, Lucien (1965). *Éléments de Syntaxe Structurale*. Paris: Klincksieck.
- Tyler, Andrea, and Vyvyan Evans (2003). *The Semantics of English Prepositions: Spatial Scenes, Embodied Meaning and Cognition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vandeloise, Claude (1984). *Description of Space in French*. San Diego: University of California doctoral dissertation.
- Vandeloise, Claude (1985). Au-delà des descriptions géométriques et logiques de l'espace: Une description fonctionnelle. *Lingvisticae Investigationes* 9: 109-129.
- Vandeloise, Claude (1986). *L'Espace en Français*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Vandeloise, Claude (1991). *Spatial Prepositions: A Case Study from French*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Vandeloise, Claude (2006). Are there spatial prepositions? In: Maya Hickmann and Stéphane Robert (eds.), *Space in Languages: Linguistic Systems and Cognitive Categories*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. *Typological Studies in Language* 66, 139-154.

Ziemke, Tom, Jordan Zlatev, and Roslyn M. Frank (eds.) (2007). *Body, Language and Mind*, vol. 1, *Embodiment*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. *Cognitive Linguistics Research* 35.1.

Kasia M. Jaszczolt
University of Cambridge, UK

VARIETIES OF DEFAULTS

Abstract. It can hardly be contested that in the process of utterance interpretation some readings are more salient than others. The problem arises when the relative salience of these readings is to be accounted for by means of such concepts as 'pragmatic inference' or 'default meaning'. In this paper I discuss various versions of the so-called 'default model' of utterance interpretation and identify characteristic features of defaults that are shared by some of the default views but rejected by others. Next, I propose a classification of 'default meanings' founded on the name of the source of the salient interpretation and suggest a semantic/pragmatic framework in which such types of defaults can be utilised. I conclude that, seen in the light of the concept of default meaning arrived at in this paper, the polarisation of the debate into the supporters and critics of defaults is largely terminological.

0. Introduction

It can hardly be contested that when the speaker utters (1), the inference in (2) normally follows.

(1) Ned Kelly lived in Australia or New Zealand.

(2) The speaker does not know for certain that Ned Kelly lived in Australia.

But the process through which the hearer arrives at meanings such as that in (2) has been the subject of an ongoing controversy between those who remain closer to Grice's (1975) concept of a generalized conversational implicature and defend them as salient, unmarked, 'presumed' meanings (Horn, e.g. 1984, 1988, 2004; Levinson 1987, 1995, 2000, also more recently Recanati 2003, 2004; Jaszczolt, e.g. 1999a, b, 2002, 2005, 2006), and those who attempt to classify them with context-dependent inferences

(Sperber and Wilson 1995; Carston, e.g. 1988, 1998a, 2002a). However, the following contrast is evidently present:

Whatever the theoretical status of the distinction, it is apparent that some implicatures are induced *only* in a special context (...), while others go through *unless* a special context is present (...).

Horn (2004: 4-5)

This paper takes as its point of departure the first of the two orientations mentioned above. I reassess arguments in favour of such 'normal', 'typical' inferences and suggest that in order to obtain a coherent and cognitively adequate theory of salient interpretations, one has to postulate various types of 'default interpretations', each governed by its own principles and each contributing to the communicated information in its own particular way. As a by-product of this classification, the notion of 'default' will emerge considerably weakened. It is argued that the role of inference and context-dependence have to be reassessed in order to arrive at a plausible notion of salient interpretation. By way of a detailed reassessment of the types and properties of defaults, I will offer a proposal that falls mid-way between the radical defaults stance of presumptive meanings (Levinson 1995, 2000) and the accounts on which there are no such defeasible, presumed meanings, such as relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995).

Before attempting a typology of default meanings, it is necessary to establish what exactly is meant by a default interpretation. There is considerable confusion in the literature concerning this term. In a nutshell, the differences in understanding of the term 'default' pertain to the acceptance, or the lack thereof, of the following properties: (i) cancellability (defeasibility) of default interpretations, (ii) their availability prior to *any* conscious inference; and (iii) the shorter time required for their arrival as compared with interpretations arrived at through inference. In Section 1 I present a brief overview of the ways in which default interpretations are approached in the current mainstream semantics and pragmatics. I include there both post-Gricean pragmatics and some more formal approaches to utterance meaning such as Segmented Discourse Representation Theory and Optimality-Theory Pragmatics. In Section 2, I discuss the question at what stage of utterance interpretation defaults arise. In brief, this amounts to the investigation as to whether, in addition to defaults that arise when the whole proposition has been processed, there

are also 'local', pre-propositional defaults that arise on the basis of the processing of a smaller unit such as a word or a phrase. Section 3 follows with specifying the sources of default interpretation that give rise to two types of defaults: cognitive and social-cultural. In Section 4, I combine the results of the preceding two sections and suggest a more elaborate account of the compositionality of utterance meaning, incorporating the types of default interpretations. I also mention the direction in which this account could be developed. In the concluding remarks in Section 5 I point out the benefits of departing from the polarization of the 'default' – 'non-default' models, moving in the direction of the middle ground.

1. Default interpretations in semantics and pragmatics: An overview

1.1. Default reasoning

Bach (1984) advocates 'default reasoning' or 'jumping to conclusions' because we 'know when to think twice'. Default reasoning is an 'inference to the first unchallenged alternative'. It is defeasible, the hearer assumes that such a step in reasoning is compatible with what the speaker intended:

...default reasoning is reasoning that contains at least one defeasible step, and what that is can be described intuitively as follows. When you take such a step you do not think, 'Everything is OK, so I'll take this step'. Rather, you just take it unless you think something might not be OK.

Bach (1984: 40)

Bach's defaults are founded on the assumption that belief and intention come in various degrees of strength (see Bach 1987a, b). They have never been developed into a full theory of default interpretations, although Bach gave the general direction by emphasizing the role of standardization, going beyond the literal meaning which is facilitated by precedents of similar use of the particular expression. Standardization *shortcircuits* the inference process in that the hearer performs the inference without realizing it (see e.g. Bach 1995: 683; 1998: 713).¹

¹ For an account of how such interpretations produce meanings that are implicit in what is said (implicatures) see Bach 1994 and a discussion in Horn 2006.

1.2. Presumptive meanings

Levinson's (1995, 2000) default interpretations, called by him 'presumptive meanings', are generalized conversational implicata (GCIs) and do not reduce to semantics or pragmatics. They "sit midway, systematically influencing grammar and semantics on the one hand and speaker-meaning on the other." (Levinson 2000: 25). His heuristics 'What isn't said, isn't' (Q-heuristic), 'What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified' (I-heuristic), and 'What's said in an abnormal way isn't normal' (M-heuristic), summarise the rational communicative behaviour that produces such default inferences.² They explain the assumption that the hearer does not always have to go through the process of recovering the speaker's intentions but instead can take a 'shortcut', on the assumption that the interlocutors are co-operative. Default interpretations arise for various reasons, they come from various properties of thought and environment, and, according to Levinson, they come at various stages of the processing of the sentence. They are defeasible: they can be cancelled.

These features of presumptive meanings signal that while Levinson's account may neatly capture the generalizations about what is uttered and what is added by the addressee in the interpretation process and when, the psychology of utterance processing leaves a lot of scope for further theoretical and experimental research. The occurrence of local, word-based or phrase-based defaults is necessarily subject to frequent cancellation and cancellation is a costly process that should not be postulated freely. I return to this point in Section 2.

1.3. Defaults and logics

Defaults and nonmonotonic reasoning are also well acknowledged in logic and computational linguistics and can be traced back to the works of Humboldt, Jespersen and Cassirer, and more recently to Reiter's (1980) default logic and his default rules of the form:

$$\frac{A:B}{C}$$

meaning that C can be concluded if A has been concluded and B can be assumed (and not B cannot be proven, see Thomason 1997: 783). Default

² It has to be pointed out that, as Saul (2002) and Horn (2006) aptly observe, it is contentious whether Grice's original GCIs are default inferences in the first place: GCIs are speaker's meanings, while default meanings are the result of hearer's interpretation. See Horn 2006 for a discussion and some more pertinent references.

reasoning is thus a type of reasoning which obeys laws of salience, common sense, and common-sense ideas of probability. Such defaults can be built into standard logic, they are not a pragmatic overlay over a semantic theory.³ One of the best-developed formal semantic theories that makes use of default rules of discourse is Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT, Asher and Lascarides, e.g. 2003). It contains a series of so-called rhetorical structure rules that 'glue' sentential logical forms together, specifying relations between them such as Narration or Explanation, according to the rule: if A, then (normally, defeasibly) B. Such relations are thus default relations, cancellable when information to the contrary is present.

1.4. Constraints of Optimality-Theory (OT) Pragmatics

In OT Pragmatics (e.g. Blutner 2000; Blutner and Zeevat 2004), pragmatic constraints account for the resulting interpretation. Since the meaning recovered from the syntactic structure underdetermines the expressed, intended proposition, a pragmatic mechanism of completion of this meaning has to be activated. OT Pragmatics proposes such a mechanism, conceived of as an optimization procedure, founded on the interaction of violable and ranked constraints. The selected, optimal proposition is the one that best satisfies the constraints. This selection is performed by the pragmatic system whose role is to interpret the semantic representation of a sentence in a given setting. This system is founded on the principles of rational communication worked out by Grice and subsequently by Horn (1984) and Levinson (1987, 2000) in the form of the Q- and I/R-principles, introduced in Section 1.2. The I/R-principle compares different interpretations of an expression, while the Q-principle assesses the produced structure as compared with other unrealised possibilities: it blocks interpretations that would be more economically connected with those alternative, unrealised forms. Examples of interpretation constraints are STRENGTH (preference for informationally stronger readings), CONSISTENCY (preference for interpretations that do not conflict with the context), and FAITH-INT (faithful interpretation, interpreting all that the speaker said). FAITH-INT precedes CONSISTENCY which precedes STRENGTH in the ranking (see Zeevat 2000). Default interpretations are explained by the interaction of these constraints. For example, the fact

³ The literature on the topic is vast. See e.g. Thomason (1997) for an overview and e.g. Pelletier and Elio 2005; Benferhat et al. 2005; Veltman 1996. For defaults and the lexicon see e.g. Asher and Lascarides 1995; Lascarides and Copestake 1998.

that we choose to bind an anaphor to a potential antecedent rather than make up an alternative antecedent (i.e. accommodate) can be explained in this way (see Zeevat 2004). The analysis relies on Smolensky's (e.g. 1986) concept of 'harmony maximization', according to which the output state is arrived at through the greatest possible consistency between constraints with respect to a given input. The rule of harmonic processing is then proposed on the sub-symbolic level as 'Go to the most harmonic available state' (Prince and Smolensky 2004: 20).⁴ Default interpretations of OT Pragmatics seem to be the closest to our ideal of default interpretations that genuinely occur in processing. In other words, they are not cancellable presumptive meanings: if the default interpretation has been arrived at, OT Pragmatics tells us how. If the default has been prevented from arising, the interaction of the constraints has to explain how it happened.

1.5. Subdoxastic enrichment

Recanati's (2002, 2003, 2004) solution to the enrichment of the meaning recovered from the syntactic processing of utterances includes saturation, that is completing a semantically incomplete proposition as in (3), as well as *free enrichment*: free in the sense of not being linguistically controlled and hence not pertaining to any unfilled slots in the logical form, as in (4).

(3a) The roof isn't strong enough.

(3b) The roof isn't strong enough to withstand the gales.

(4a) Everybody likes Paris.

(4b) Everybody I know likes Paris.

Recanati claims that such enrichment is automatic, it takes place subdoxastically, that is below the level of consciousness. Hearers are not aware of performing this enrichment and, unlike the derivation of implicatures, this process is not costly or effortful. It is *not* an inferential process. Such unreflective processes are dubbed primary pragmatic processes. They 'click into place' once the need for manipulating the output of grammatical processing becomes obvious to the addressee. Recanati's proposal of direct communication is founded on the model of perception. The pragmatically-enriched, truth-conditional content of utterances is arrived at directly, just like perceptual content. Primary pragmatic processes are direct and

⁴ I owe thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out to me the importance of the concept of 'harmonic mind'.

impenetrable, unlike the inferential processes that lead to implicatures. He calls this position 'anti-inferentialist' (Recanati 2002: 109). Unlike Levinson's, Recanati's defaults are *processing* defaults, they are not meanings that are presumed by the pragmaticist to ensue for a particular expression. They ensue in the particular situation of discourse.

The main point of contention in the current debate in the literature is the conscious-subconscious divide that differentiates this default enrichment of the linguistic meaning of the uttered sentence and the inferential generation of implicatures. It is unlikely that the dispute can be settled without empirical evidence one way or the other. The problem with designing appropriate experiments grows, therefore, to the central issue for furthering our understanding of what exactly is happening when hearers understand more than what the sentence literally says. I return to the issue of experimental evidence and types of defaults it eliminates and supports in Section 1.7.

1.6. Default Semantics

In Default Semantics (DS), the meaning of an utterance is a product of the merger of meaning information that comes from various sources: (i) word meaning and sentence structure, (ii) conscious pragmatic inference, and (iii) defaults (Jaszczolt, e.g. 2005, 2006). The latter are understood as salient interpretations that occur in a particular context of conversation. Like Recanati's subdoxastic meanings, these defaults cut across the generalized/particularized distinction in that they can arise either without, or with, the help of the situational setting. For example, (5a) is more likely to acquire a referential rather than an attributive interpretation, as in (5b):

(5a) The best novelist wrote *Oscar and Lucinda*.

(5b) Peter Carey wrote *Oscar and Lucinda*.

The salience and, on DS, the 'default status' of (5b) are dictated by the fact that the referential intention is stronger on that interpretation, or, more generally, by maximization of informational content.⁵

⁵ I discussed extensively the intentionality of mental states that underlie speech acts in various publications and will not repeat the arguments here. See Jaszczolt, e.g. 1997, 1998a, b, 1999a, b, 2000.

Such default interpretations are shortcuts through the costly process of inference. Like Recanati's defaults, they are not products of conscious inference. However, it remains an open question as to whether their subdoxastic status warrants classifying them as qualitatively different components of meaning from those arrived at through conscious pragmatic inference. It seems more plausible to regard them as meanings that are so salient through being either (i) entrenched in our culture and society, or (ii) reflecting the characteristics of the human thought, that inference just ceases to be required. In other words, we can envisage a cline of inferential processes that has as one of its polar ends the scenarios in which such shortcuts occur. This question is taken up further in Section 4.

Further, the defaults of DS are, so to speak, more 'powerful' than those in other approaches. In DS, the role of the logical form as the output of syntactic processing is considerably reduced as compared with other post-Gricean accounts. There are situations in which the most salient meaning, dubbed 'what is said', will have little to do with the structure of the uttered sentence. Information from inference or from defaults can override information from the logical form. It has to be noted that the said/implicated distinction is preserved: implicatures are simply propositions that are derived in addition to what is said. But note that both what is said and what is implicated can have little to do with the sentence meaning. I elaborate further on the theory itself in Section 4. For the moment, suffice it to say that defaults are classified there by their sources, they are also pragmatic through and through. They can make use of contextual and other background information and are not normally defeasible: they may simply not arise. Defeasibility cannot be precluded but it is very infrequent and ensues, for example, in garden-path processing. The way to think about this property is this. Defaults that draw on more specific information are more likely to hold than defaults that draw on less specific information. For example, the utterance 'Phoebe is a bird' will trigger the interpretation that Phoebe flies, but this can be overridden by further information that Phoebe is a penguin. If the piece of information that Phoebe is a penguin had been available from the start, the inference that Phoebe flies would not have arisen. In general, salient interpretations that draw on rich contextual background are less likely to be cancelled.

1.7. Features and types of defaults

It is evident from this brief overview that there is considerable support in various semantic and pragmatic theories for the existence of default

interpretations. But it is also clear that there is no consensus as to what default interpretations are. To sum up, we have found differences on the following fronts, summarized as D1-D5:

- D1 Defaults can belong to competence or performance.
- D2 Defaults can be defeasible when there is little contextual background, but are not normally defeasible when they can draw on substantial contextual or other background information.⁶
- D3 Defaults can, but need not, be 'automatic': they can amount to unconscious (subdoxastic) enrichment of the output of the syntactic processing of the uttered sentence.
- D4 Defaults are uniform or come from qualitatively different sources in utterance processing.
- D5 Defaults enrich the logical form (the underdetermined semantic representation of the sentence) or they can also override it.

Other differences to be investigated in the following sections are D6 and D7:

- D6 Defaults necessarily arise quicker than inference-based interpretations and hence can be tested for experimentally by measuring processing time.
- D7 Defaults are always based on the proposition or can be 'local', sub-propositional, based on a word or a phrase.

Naturally, these properties are interrelated and some go together better than others. For example, Levinson's defaults are defeasible, sub-propositional, competence-based and hence also arise faster than inference-based meanings. The 'competence-based' characteristic requires more explanation here. Since Levinson's presumptive meanings arise irrespective of context, are automatic and defeasible, they can be easily classified as competence defaults on a par with the rhetorical rules of Asher and Lascarides (2003), rather than as performance defaults. For example, scalar implicature such as (6b) arising out of the scale <all, some> is a clear example of a competence default: the property of the quantifying expression 'some' triggers the strengthened reading.

- (6a) Some laptops are reliable.
- (6b) Some but not all laptops are reliable.

⁶ In other words, they are progressively less defeasible with the increase of background information.

Inference to a stereotype such as that in (7b) is triggered by an indefinite description and not by the context of utterance.

(7a) I talked to a man who advised me to try Polish ski resorts.

(7b) I talked to a man (who was not my close relative or friend) who advised me to try Polish ski resorts.

Such defaults are said to arise due to the semantic properties of expressions and they are automatic: the processing agent does not consult the available context before he or she accepts them, but instead takes them for granted and, if necessary, cancels them later on. According to Levinson, these defaults arise as soon as the triggering word ('some') or phrase ('a man') is encountered.⁷

1.8. Features of defaults and experimental testing

We now move to the feature D6 and the experimental testing of the status of conflicting interpretations. This cluster of properties, namely defeasibility, locality, and foundation in competence is relatively easy to test. Predictably, current experimental pragmatic literature is successful in testing this particular type of default. It suffices to check, in carefully controlled conditions, whether the default meaning takes shorter to produce than the non-default one.⁸ One can also test for the sensitivity to default meanings displayed by subjects of different ages, to produce an argument from language development (Noveck 2001; Papafragou and Musolino 2003; Musolino 2004). By demonstrating that such interpretations are not faster to achieve and are not displayed in the behaviour of five-year olds, we can obtain a strong argument against their existence in processing.⁹ On the other hand, performance-based, rarely

⁷ What is required at this point is a cognitive explanation of the property 'automatic'. It seems that an explanation on a sub-symbolic level making use of Smolensky's (1986) 'harmony maximization' can be applied here. See Section 1.4 and fn 4.

⁸ See articles in Noveck and Sperber 2004.

⁹ The argument from language development is particularly applicable to Levinson's presumptive meanings because this is the most radical, so to speak, type of default. When the child judges that the sentence with a weaker meaning is a correct description of a situation in which the stronger version would be applicable, such as (i.a) and (i.b) respectively, then the automatic, time-free, inference-free, competence-based, highly defeasible defaults have to appear dubious. See Papafragou and Musolino 2003.

(i.a) Some of the horses jumped over the fence.

(i.b) All of the horses jumped over the fence.

cancellable salient meanings that can draw on contextual information are much more likely to prove correct in neurolinguistic research, the more so that they are all but theoretical elaborations of common intuitions of default senses.

In a nutshell, the state of the art in experimental pragmatics is as follows. Noveck (2001, 2004) investigated the acquisition of modal and quantificational constructions and his most interesting finding was that when presented with a sentence such as (8a), only 41 per cent of adult subjects regarded it is true, while 85 per cent of children were happy with it. Most adults understand (8a) as (8b) and judge it to be false. In other words, their understanding of 'some' is 'some but not all'.

(8a) Some elephants have trunks.

(8b) Some but not all elephants have trunks.

Now, as Noveck says,

These developmental findings do not favour one account over another because both could explain it. From the Default perspective, it could be claimed that scalar inferences become automatic with age and that our results are simply revealing how such inference-making matures. In contrast, Relevance Theory would suggest that children and adults use the same comprehension mechanisms but that greater cognitive resources are available for adults, which in turn encourages them to draw out more pragmatic inferences.

Noveck (2004: 307)

But when the task complexity was increased, it appeared that the logical interpretation arose faster, at least for children. Children were presented with descriptions of situations in which the order of narration inverted the sequence of events and were asked for their judgement on the truth or falsity of the description of what happened. The reaction time was measured, that is the time before the answer 'yes' or 'no' was produced, and it was found that the children who accepted the inverted order as a true description did it faster, while those responding 'no' took on average two seconds longer.¹⁰ The obvious conclusion is that the logical interpretation of 'and' takes time to become enriched to temporal 'and', at least for children.

¹⁰See Noveck (2004: 309-311).

The experimental design assumes here Levinson's notion of automatic, cancellable defaults and rests on the assumption that testing the relative time it takes to produce a default meaning as opposed to the inferentially derived meaning is going to provide a compelling argument for or against defaults:

...if Logical responses are made more quickly than Pragmatic responses, we have evidence against a default system of inference.

Noveck (2004: 314)

and

If one could provide evidence showing that pragmatic interpretations of scalars are the first to arise and that interpretations that require their cancellation occur subsequently, then the default inference view would be supported. However, if one could show that minimal interpretations are at the root of initial interpretations and that pragmatic interpretations arise only later, that would be further support for Relevance Theory.

Noveck (2004: 311)

Noveck discusses at length cancellation of defaults that requires extra processing time. Bezuidenhout and Morris (2004), again, found their experiments on the time argument and monitor the movement of the readers' right eyes to show whether there is cancellation of a default 'some but not all' when 'in fact all' is encountered. This clearly shows that the notion of default accepted in current experimental studies is rather specific and restricted. Pace Noveck, Bezuidenhout and other experimenters, there is no '*the* default view' or 'Default Model' of pragmatic processing: there are many different models, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, and each using a different combination of values summarized in Section 1.7 as D1-D7. The results of the extant experiments should thus be qualified as pertaining to one, or to some subset, of the family of views that use the term 'default interpretation'.

2. Pre-propositional and post-propositional defaults

Let us now move to the discussion of D7 and the point in utterance interpretation at which defaults arise. We have established, among others, that when 'typical', 'normal' readings are regarded as salient in a common-

sense, pre-theoretical way, they raise little objection: they seem to be a fact of discourse. The controversy begins when the defining properties of such readings are under scrutiny, such as their inferential or non-inferential status, cancellability, or the stage in utterance processing at which they are produced. In this section I concentrate on the controversy surrounding the unit of utterance that gives rise to such defaults.

According to Levinson (1995, 2000), default, preferred interpretations, or presumptive meanings, arise out of the structure of the utterance. They can arise even before the processing of the utterance is completed, i.e., even before the intended proposition has been processed: they arise locally, *pre-propositionally*. This is so because discourse interpretation proceeds, so to speak, bit by bit, incrementally, and there is a stage at which the part that triggers a default interpretation has been uttered, the default has been produced, while the processing of the utterance has not yet been completed. For example, on such a pre-propositional account, 'some of her lectures' in (9) triggers the 'some but not all of her lectures' interpretation as soon as the quantifying expression 'some' has been processed. I shall mark the default meaning by (\rightarrow d ...) and write it in the place in the utterance in which it allegedly occurs in processing.

(9) Some (\rightarrow d some but not all) of her lectures are inspiring.

Such default meanings are said to be quite common in language and occur in a variety of constructions. Let us have a look at (10) and (11).

(10) The coffee spoon (\rightarrow d spoon used for stirring coffee) is dirty.

(11) I bought him a silver spoon (\rightarrow d spoon made of silver) as a christening present.

The inference in (9) is due to the Q-heuristic¹¹, while examples (10) and (11) conform to the I-heuristic. These three heuristics, however, are merely convenient generalizations. Moreover, they are not even of the same epistemological status. While I-implicatures such as those in (10) and (11) arise as inferences to a stereotype, Q- and M-implicatures are more complicated in that they arise due to a comparison with what might have been, but was not, uttered. This demonstrates that default meanings arrived at through different heuristics have a different status. Let us look at examples (10)-(11) again. It is evident that not all of them give rise to equally obvious

¹¹ See Section 1.2. These heuristics originated in Levinson 1987. Grice's original maxims have also been reworked in a similar way by Horn, see e.g. 1984, 1988. For an introduction see Jaszczolt 2002, Chapter 10.

and uncontroversial default interpretations. Examples (10) and (11) are, arguably, the best candidates for defaults. On the contrary, (9) is more likely to be compatible with 'some and possibly all', than 'coffee spoon' is with, say, 'spoon used for scooping coffee beans' or 'silver spoon' with 'spoon used for stirring liquid silver'. However, 'silver spoon' and 'coffee spoon' have a strong sense of lexical compounds about them and hence it can be argued that what we consider to be default meaning is in fact a lexical meaning. This should not be surprising as generalized implicatures are generally believed to be a source of semantic change (see e.g. Traugott 1999; Traugott and Dasher 2002).¹² But using the special case of 'near-compounds' to argue in favour of pre-propositional defaults in general ceases to be plausible if they are indeed compounds with lexical meaning given by their respective (\rightarrow d)s. Now, sentence (9) does indeed normally trigger an interpretation 'some but not all'. But this is likely to be caused by the specification of the domain of quantification by means of the preposition 'of', or by a tacit assumption that 'some' normally comes with such a domain. Hence, although the meaning 'not all' is likely to arise, this is not a clear case of a lexical default.¹³

It seems that in order to constitute a comprehensive account, pre-propositional defaults will have to subsume a special case of default interpretation that takes place after the whole utterance has been produced. For example, in (12a), the adjective 'warm' occurs at the end of the utterance.

(12a) Coffee is warm (\rightarrow d not hot).

This is not surprising: 'warm' in (12a) just happens to occur at the end of the sentence, there is otherwise nothing special to it. To be consistent, we have to regard this as a special case of a pre-propositional default that can be contrasted with the original, Gricean, 'post-propositional' scenario that would look as in (12b):

(12b) Coffee is warm. (\rightarrow d Coffee is not hot).

In (12b), the hearer recovers the proposition first and then ascribes to it the salient interpretation: the coffee is only warm, not hot.

¹² According to this view, pragmatic meaning is conventionalized and reanalyzed as semantic meaning. Or, according to the well quoted slogan, 'inferences become references' (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 35, after Bolinger).

¹³ It has to be pointed out that by 'domain specification' I do not mean what is discussed in the literature as 'domain restriction'. All I mean is that it is plausible to assume that the lexical item 'some' comes with the salient meaning 'some out of a certain domain'. I owe thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting I clarify this point.

The main advantage of introducing such pre-propositional defaults is that they eliminate the need to postulate a level of utterance interpretation on which we have a proposition without such a default inference. We obtain a more economical picture of utterance interpretation on which we have only one proposition: the one that pertains to the default interpretation or to a non-default one triggered by a context-driven overriding of what is normally presumed. So far so good, but are Levinson's presumed meanings truly context-free? Let us take (13a). 'A man' is interpreted as 'not the speaker's husband, brother, father, friend, or any other close relation or acquaintance' as in (13b):

(13a) I saw a man driving an old Bentley.

(13b) I saw a man (→d not the speaker's husband, brother, father, friend, or any other close relation or acquaintance) driving an old Bentley.

Let us now compare it with (14) where, if I am correct, no such 'default inference' takes place.¹⁴

(14) There is a man in the Women's League. He is a treasurer and a good friend of mine.

Intuitively, in (14), 'a man' does not seem to give rise to a pre-propositional default to the effect 'not the speaker's husband, father, brother, or any other close acquaintance or relation'. In fact, neither does it seem to give rise to a post-propositional default: it seems to be a safe stipulation that the processing of an utterance of the first sentence in (14) ('There is a man in the Women's League') does not result in such an enriched reading by default. In the absence of empirical evidence this claim has the status of an intuitively plausible hypothesis. However, even 'experimenting' with the possible intonation patterns for this sentence corroborates this stance. All of (14a)-(14d) are equally conducive to the continuation by the second sentence of (14) ('He is a treasurer and a good friend of mine.').

(14a) There is a MAN in the Women's League.

(14b) There is a man in the WOMEN'S LEAGUE.

(14c) There IS a man in the Women's League.

(14d) There is a man in the Women's League.

(uttered with an intonation pattern of an ordinary assertion)

¹⁴ Cf. the discussion of example (7) in Section 1.7.

In short, we have the following difficulty. Levinson's defaults are automatic, they are generated when the trigger for a relevant default has been uttered and hence can be generated locally. When they do arise locally, they can be cancelled later on as discourse progresses. At the same time, intuitively, they seem to be generated *unless* the context prevents them from arising. Let us take a simple example of number terms as in sentence (15).

(15) Fifty-five votes in favour are needed to ratify the amendment.

Assuming for the purpose of this argument that the semantics of number terms is either 'at least n ' or is underdetermined, there are two possible scenarios here. 'Fifty-five' can trigger, locally, an interpretation 'exactly fifty-five', to be cancelled subsequently when the content of the sentence makes it obvious that the intended meaning is 'at least fifty-five'. Or, in view of the topic of the conversation prior to sentence (15), the 'exactly' default does not arise and the 'at least' meaning is produced instead. Similarly, in (16), the definite description 'the first child' may give rise to a default, referential reading that is cancelled as soon as the qualifier 'to be born in 2066' is processed, or alternatively one can argue that the whole noun phrase is to be regarded as a unit and the default referential reading does not arise because the future-time reference of the event is obvious from it.

(16) The first child to be born in 2066 will be called William.

Any further discussion of this dilemma would be futile in the current state of theorizing and experimenting: we simply don't know what is happening there. We can conclude that if defaults can be so very local as to arise out of a morpheme, word, or part of a phrase, they are part and parcel of the computational power of grammar and they are likely to belong to the lexicon, syntax, and epiphenomenally to semantics. If this theory proves to be correct, then their high defeasibility is a natural outcome and is not to be shunned.¹⁵ But there can be no reliable answer to the questions of locality and cancellability until there is compelling empirical evidence one way or the other.

For the time being, we have to remember that cancellation is a costly move and it must not be postulated unless there is evidence

¹⁵ This view is held by, among others, Chierchia (2004) and Landman (2000). Chierchia demonstrates that scalar implicatures fail to arise in downward-entailing contexts, that is contexts that license inference from sets to their subsets (e.g. where 'any' is licensed). This shows that there is a reliable syntactic explanation of their behaviour. See Chierchia et al. 2004. See also Recanati 2003 for a critical overview.

in its support. So, perhaps, for the time being, it is more effective from the methodological point of view to maintain the old-fashioned Gricean picture of defaults that are added somehow or other to the total output of grammatical and lexical processing. This is the path I will pursue in Section 4, using the framework of Default Semantics.

To conclude the discussion so far, not only are local, pre-propositional defaults not sufficiently supported to be taken for granted, but also there are different degrees to which salient meanings are really salient.¹⁶ As we have seen, the process of formation of such salient readings is a subject of debate in that it can be conceived as inference, as non-inferential, ‘instantaneous’, so to speak, default, or even as a more theory-laden category of ‘subconscious inference’.¹⁷ I discuss this issue further in Section 3.1. At the moment, and with reference to examples (13) and (14), it suffices to observe the following dependencies:

If
 and
 then it seems that
 We end up with a rather problematic concept:

- (i) default interpretations are conceived of as pre-propositional
- (ii) they are the result of an interpretation of an expression *in a particular utterance*,
- (iii) the utterance constitutes a context for the interpretation of this expression.

(iv) *Local default interpretations are defaults for that context.*

¹⁶ Pre-propositional defaults have also been discussed in Recanati 2003 who demonstrates that they fall within the scope of operators such as disjunction or implication:

- (i) Bill and Jane have three or four (\rightarrow d exactly three or exactly four) children.
- (ii) Every father feels happy if his daughter gets married and gives birth to a child (‘and’ \rightarrow d and then); much less if she gives birth to a child and gets married (‘and’ \rightarrow d and then).

adapted from Recanati (2003: 2).

In (i), ‘three’ and ‘four’ are given the ‘exactly’ reading that is not derived from the ‘at least three or at least four’, as the global enrichment account would predict. In (ii), the two cases of temporal enrichment of the conjunctions are internal to their clauses: the antecedent and the consequent respectively.

¹⁷ See Section 1 above and Recanati 2002, 2004.

This is supported by the observation that ‘a man’ intuitively triggers the interpretation ‘a man who is not the speaker’s relative or acquaintance’ in some contexts but not in others. The question arises as to whether salient meaning so conceived warrants the name of a default interpretation. It seems that it does. Context is understood here narrowly, as the current utterance, and hence the provisional term ‘default interpretation’ is justified in order to distinguish this type of meaning from a full-blown, context-dependent interpretation which is the result of a full-blown, incontestable pragmatic inference. To repeat, the question as to whether this interpretation is arrived at automatically and explicable through, for example, Smolensky’s maximization of harmony on the sub-symbolic level,¹⁸ or through a process of (conscious or subconscious) inference, is still a contentious issue, as the overview in Section 1 demonstrates.

To sum up, we are left with a set of unresolved differences in the defining set of characteristics of defaults. It is evident that the question of what default interpretations are is still an open one – the more so that the cases under scrutiny tend to require contextual or other background knowledge triggers. Surely, there are some syntax-triggered and semantics-triggered defaults such as those for anaphora (and presupposition) resolution, reference assignment, unpacking of ellipsis, and they are all governed by syntactic or semantic principles of some sort.¹⁹ Next, there are various shortcuts through inference. But if the criterion for defaults were to be that default meanings arise prior to any processing of the context and without any processing of the speaker’s intentions, then we do not have a uniform category that can fulfill it.

3. Towards a typology of default interpretations

As can be seen from this sample of views on defaults, there is no consensus as to the meaning of the term. Nevertheless, the following generalizations (G1-G2) can be made:

G1 Defaults are governed by principles of rational communicative behaviour such as neo-Gricean heuristics, logic of information structuring, or some other defeasible logic.

G2 Defaults are salient meanings arrived at with the help of information that comes from outside the meaning of words and the structure of the sentence.

¹⁸ See Section 1.7

¹⁹ I discuss them in Chapters 4 and 7 of Jaszczolt 2005.

But it will not suffice to postulate and attempt to support the view that utterance interpretation makes use of more or less salient meanings. If we tried to stop at this point, we would once again end up with an eclectic notion of default, which is against a methodological requirement of reliable definitional characteristics of category membership. We know that defaults are shortcuts through inference, but this is about all that unifies them as a category.

Further divisions stem out of the provenance of defaults. I suggested in the previous sections that defaults come from various sources such as the properties of language, the way the mind works, the way societies are organized, the cultural heritage of the interlocutors, and other background material. These sources of defaults are not necessarily mutually exclusive. While the reliable ontology of defaults may be beyond our reach at present, we can attempt their classification on epistemological grounds by attending to these different ways in which we understand more than the sentence alone contains. As a step towards this classification, I discuss below four main sources of such salient embellishments of sentence meaning, beginning with 'the way we think': the properties of mental states. It has to be stressed, however, that in the current state of research on the salience of interpretations any attempted classifications must be regarded as, at best, viable hypotheses that will provide food for empirical testing.

3.1. Cognitive defaults

Believing, fearing, doubting, knowing, are all examples of mental states. These states can be externalized, conveyed to another person, by means of language. The mental states that will be of interest to us are those that have content, or are *about* something. For example, to believe or to doubt is to believe *something* and doubt *something*. This property of some mental states is called their intentionality. Intentionality has been the subject of philosophical disputes at least since Aristotle, and through medieval philosophy, nineteenth-century phenomenology, to the speech act theory of John Searle. We shall therefore take the importance of his property for granted and move on to how it can be useful for understanding some default meanings. Suffice it to say that we shall assume that propositions are built up by composing meaning out of elements which have intentionality. This intentionality of units of language has to be understood as intentionality of the brain, the mind, and the mental state, and only derivatively,

epiphenomenally, of language. The argument goes that if mental states are intentional, then so are their externalizations in the form of sentences about these mental states (beliefs, doubts, fears, and the like).²⁰

Intentionality becomes useful when we try to explain the reason behind the salience of, say, referential interpretations of definite descriptions such as 'the author of *Oscar and Lucinda*' in (17). It is intuitively plausible that the addressee B is likely to react to A's statement by posing a question that assumes that A knows who the author of this novel is.

(17) A: The author of *Oscar and Lucinda* is a very good writer.
B: Really? Who is it?

B's reaction is compatible with the strongest intentionality, pertaining to the referential reading of the description. The strongest intentionality is the default intentionality and it corresponds to the referential, correct reading of the description where it stands for Peter Carey. Due to the presence of a cognitive, phenomenological explanation, I shall call such readings cognitive defaults. However, we can discuss such defaults on two levels of explanation: by invoking intentionality, or we can remain on the level of language and explain them with reference to degrees of speaker's intentions. Needless to say, the first option is more reliable in that intentionality as a property of brains and minds is, alas, more reliable an explanans than speculations about speaker's intentions. Cognitive defaults pertain to ample types of language constructions and phenomena. They explain the use of temporal expressions, the construction of anaphoric dependencies, and the use of number terms.²¹

3.2. Physical defaults?

In some cases, the default interpretation ensues because the addressee tacitly knows what the scenario that corresponds to the utterance would be. For example, in (18) and (19), it is obvious to the addressee that water has to be fully immersed in the vase, while flowers have stems inside the

²⁰ Language is intentional insofar as it allows for representing beliefs, doubts, fears, and other mental states. See Lyons (1995:44). For Fodor (1994), 'intentional' is synonymous with 'representational', having informational content. In brain science, one talks about brain cells being intentional in virtue of being *about* things other than themselves. See Damasio (1999: 78-9) and Jaszczolt (2005: 49).

²¹ All of these are discussed in detail in Jaszczolt 2005.

vase and decorative heads above. This tacit knowledge is independent of any context of conversation.

(18) There is water in the vase.

(19) There are pink flowers in the vase.

There are ample possible explanations of this tacit knowledge. There is a physicalist explanation to the effect that liquids have to be fully enclosed in a vessel while solids need not, a functionalist explanation to the effect that water is for keeping flowers alive while flowers are to be visible to be aesthetically pleasing, and a cognitivist explanation that humans normally experience scenarios of these types where 'in' is used as in the above examples. Undoubtedly there are more hypothetical explanations to be produced but this issue is tangential to our purpose.

The question arises as to whether salient interpretations such as those in (18) and (19) constitute a separate type of default and, if so, what are its defining characteristics. This default arises because of what the world is like and/or because of what we perceive it to be like. The natural name for it would be a physical default. However, it is at least disputable whether we need the concept of a default interpretation to account for the processing of 'in'. In spite of the post-Gricean tradition of subsuming spatial expressions under default pragmatic enrichments (e.g. Levinson 2000), there is little reason to do so. For example, in (18) and (19), the two senses of 'in' are not very different from each other. The differences are not very salient either. Moreover, in the case of other spatial expressions, where the meanings differ, the differences can be ascribed to the context, as in (20) that allows for two readings of 'under': floating within the boundaries of the bridge, or moving towards the bridge.²²

(20) The bottle floated under the bridge.

If I am correct, then the interpretations of spatial prepositions depend on the objects they relate. For example, we know that water is in (→d inside) the vase because we know enough about liquids to envisage this. We know that, say, boats tend to move forward and hence they would normally float under (→d in the direction of) the bridge, albeit this can be easily overridden in the context. We also know that, say, buoys normally float in place, and hence they float under (→d within the boundaries of) the

²² The literature on spatial prepositions is vast, both in cognitive linguistics (e.g. Talmy 1985, 2000; Jackendoff 1990, 1991) and typology (Levinson 2003).

bridge.²³ Since, as it seems to me, we have no preconceptions about floating bottles, then context has to step in to help with the inference in (20). All in all, there is little evidence of physical defaults. The salient interpretations, where there are such, in the case of spatial prepositions can possibly be subsumed under a broader category of, say, cultural defaults in that it is culture in which we are immersed that gives speakers access to such default meanings. I move on to cultural defaults in the following section.

3.3. Social-cultural defaults

It is not difficult to produce examples of salient interpretations that arise due to some cultural or social stereotypes or cultural or social knowledge. In (21a), it is the shared cultural knowledge that almost invariably produces the interpretation (21b) in most (reasonably educated) speakers within the western culture.

(21a) Pablo's painting is of a crying woman.

(21b) The painting by Pablo Picasso is of a crying woman.

Cultural knowledge allows the addressee to identify Pablo as Pablo Picasso, and the possessive as authorship rather than, say, ownership. Similarly, in (22b), the salient interpretation arises due to the shared knowledge that babies are normally raised by their own parents.

(22a) The baby cried and the father rocked the cradle.

(22b) The baby cried and the baby's father rocked the cradle.

Again, as before, I shall tentatively assume that the readings in (21b) and (22b) are non-inferential. The assumption is founded on the methodological principle of economy adopted here, stating that if there are alternative explanations, the more economical one is selected. In other words, since there is no compelling evidence that we should assume the existence of conscious processing, such processing will not be assumed. The interpretation is automatic, instantaneous and unreflective.²⁴ Similarly, the readings 'secretary' →d 'female secretary', or 'nanny' →d 'female nanny', discussed in Section 2, are unlikely to be the result of conscious inference. Instead, the tacit social knowledge produces, unreflectively, the

²³ Alternatively, one can assume that 'float' is ambiguous between an activity and accomplishment verb.

²⁴ Ironically, these defaults are called by Levinson (2000) '*inferences to a stereotype*'!

senses enriched to these defaults. But note that, as I discussed in Section 2, these defaults can be stronger or weaker. There may be a cut-off point at which salient interpretations are not so salient as to justify calling them 'defaults'. When I proposed a cline of inferential processes in Section 1.6, I also remarked that defaults are a matter of degree. This claim can be used now for discussing the properties of social-cultural defaults. The word 'nanny' can trigger an unreflective enrichment to 'female nanny'. However, the word 'nanny' may activate various other salient properties of typical nannies derived from such cultural icons as Mary Poppins, Jane Eyre, or Fräulein Maria from *The Sound of Music*, such as 'young', 'pretty', 'musical', 'strict' or 'lovable'. There is a cut-off point, which is as yet to be experimentally established, beyond which such embellishments do not warrant the label of default interpretations.

It has to be pointed out that, while cognitive defaults are well motivated by their property of strong, undispersed intentionality, social-cultural defaults have no such characteristic property to recommend them. They are only motivated by the methodological requirement not to postulate inferential processes beyond necessity. They are hardly distinguishable from cases of conscious pragmatic inference, they are simply on the polar end of an 'inference +salience' cline. As I observed before in Jaszczolt (2005: 56),

The boundary between such social-cultural defaults and social-cultural inferences can only be *assumed* as methodologically desirable and psychologically plausible. But any classification of interpretations as social-cultural defaults or conscious inferences based on social or cultural knowledge is still largely a matter of speculation.

One cannot discard them, though. Culturally and socially salient meanings are a fact of conversation. They may contribute to the truth-conditional meaning of the utterance – on the post-Gricean construal of truth-conditional semantics such as the approach discussed in Section 4.

3.4. Lexical defaults?

In the neo-Gricean literature, the behaviour of sentential connectives such as *and*, *or*, *if*, *not* is said to be subject to default inferences (see e.g. Levinson 1995, 2000). Let us first look at negation in negative-raising. Negative-raising is a tendency for the main-clause negation to be understood as the

subordinate-clause negation, as in (23a) that is normally interpreted as (23b).

(23a) I don't think Shrek is funny.

(23b) I think Shrek is not funny.

This shift of the scope of negation works well with the verb 'to think' but does not extend to all verbs of propositional attitude. For example, (24a) does not communicate (24b) but instead seems to communicate the opposite attitude, something to the effect of (24c).

(24a) I don't hope England will win.

(24b) I hope England will not win.

(24c) I wish against hope that England will win.

Is negative-raising a case of a default interpretation? Since the phenomenon is restricted to only some verbs, it probably is not. We can perhaps consider it to be a default for these verbs and subsume it under cognitive defaults on the understanding that the informativeness of (23b) is greater than that of (23a) taken literally. In (23b), an attitude to a comment about a certain film character is expressed, whereas the literal meaning of (23a) is merely that the speaker has no mental state concerning the amusement value of the famous ogre. But this explanation is rather far-fetched in that we are not comparing here members of a gradable category: a thought about a property of Shrek is not directly comparable to the total lack of a thought on the matter. All in all, it seems that negative-raising is not a good candidate for a word-based (lexical) default.

Implication has also been regarded as a trigger for presumptive meanings through its frequent 'perfection' to an equivalence, as in (25b):

(25a) If you know the password, you can log in.

(25b) If and only if you know the password can you log in.

Levinson (1995, 2000) accounts for this perfection by means of the I-heuristic. In our proposed classification, we could try subsuming *if*-strengthening under cognitive defaults and argue that intentionality is stronger in (25b) and that (25b) is more informative. This, however, is overstretching the tool of intentionality. By pragmatically perfecting the conditional we are adding fine detail to the meaning of (25a), that is, we are increasing the granularity of the description of the situation. A similar argument can be constructed for conjunction. (26b) communicates more

information than the linguistic meaning²⁵ of (26a) rather than a sense that is comparable to another, less salient, sense.

(26a) Lidia hurt her finger and couldn't play the violin.

(26b) Lidia hurt her finger and as a result couldn't play the violin.

Default interpretations have also affected the analysis of the semantic properties of number terms. A number term *n* has been claimed to have the 'at least *n*' semantics, the 'exactly *n*' (punctual) semantics, or the semantics that is ambiguous/underdetermined between 'at least', 'at most', and 'exactly'.²⁶ If we follow the underdeterminacy path and the argument from the strength of intentionality and intention, then the 'exactly' interpretation appears the default. In arguing for the punctual, 'exactly' semantics, Koenig (1993: 147) also makes use of the relative informativeness of interpretations: greater informativeness is the norm, and greater informativeness is associated with the property of being a proper subset of a truth set, that is including a smaller set of scenarios compatible with, say, (27).

(27) Mary has four brothers.

The interpretation on which Mary has neither fewer nor more than four brothers wins over the one on which she has four and perhaps even five or six. Now, assuming for the moment that the underdetermined semantics is the correct view, we could easily apply the argument from the strength of intentionality and intentions again: the output of syntactic processing leaves utterance meaning underdetermined, and then the strength of intentionality dictates in which direction the enrichment proceeds. The strongest *aboutness* pertains to the proper subset of a truth set, that is to the reading on which more information is conveyed and the set of scenarios is most restricted ('exactly four', no more and no less). However, once again, we have to beware of overstretching the class of cognitive defaults to cases where it may not be necessary. Experimental evidence and argumentation both suggest the following alternatives: either (i) the semantics of number terms is punctual ('four' means 'exactly four'), or (ii) the semantics of number terms is underspecified, but the 'exactly' interpretation is the normal, default one (see Musolino 2004). Hence, at the moment, we have to resort to theoretical arguments. Naturally, one can

²⁵ For a detailed bibliography and for my detailed analysis of default properties of sentential connectives see Jaszczolt 2005, Chapter 8.

²⁶ For a selection of views see Horn 1984, 1992; Levinson 2000; Carston 1998b; Koenig 1993; Geurts 1998; and Bultinck 2005.

continue (27) by cancelling this ‘exactly’ sense as in (28), but this move is not qualitatively different from, say, the correction in (29).

(28) Mary has four brothers. In fact, she has five but the fifth one is only her half-brother.

(29) I have been to China. Well, strictly speaking, I have been to Taiwan.

We would not want to say that ‘four or more’ or ‘China including Taiwan’ are alternatives to the salient readings: ‘exactly four’ and ‘People’s Republic of China’. And if they are not, there is no need for defaults there. All in all, there is no evidence for the need of a word-based category of default.

4. Future directions

This is where my current vivisection of defaults ends: ‘default’ ends up as a label for widely understood salient interpretations. What follows in this part is a taste of what is next to be done, namely the incorporation of defaults so-conceived into a fully fledged, compositional theory of discourse meaning. I will stop at setting some desiderata and signalling the direction in which such a theory may develop.

Firstly, we have to address the question of how various sources of default meanings interact with other sources of meaning information. In other words, it may be more promising to start with the question of whether utterance meaning that is arrived at through grammatical processing and enrichment (including default enrichment) is amenable to an analysis in terms of a truth-conditional theory of meaning, be it semantic or pragmatic. We have two options here. One is the by now standard route of underdetermined logical form, enriched by pragmatic inference and, on some accounts, also through default enrichment, that results in truth-conditional semantic representations – representations that allow for the intrusion of pragmatic input.²⁷ A variation on this view is Recanati’s (2004) truth-conditional pragmatics, where free, top-down pragmatic enrichment operates on logical forms. ‘Free’ and ‘top-down’ stand there for embellishments that are not linguistically controlled; that is, they do not have any triggers in the logical form. The other option is

²⁷ This topic has been particularly amply discussed in the literature. For seminal works, see Carston 1988 and Recanati 1989. See also Carston 2001, 2002a, b; Recanati 2004. For reviews of various approaches from different perspectives, see Recanati 2005; Cappelen and Lepore 2005; and Jaszczolt 2002.

put forward in Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005). Instead of seeing the output of pragmatic inference and of defaults as ‘intrusions’ into some already entrenched unit, namely logical form, all the sources of meaning information are treated on a par: the sentence’s logical form, default senses, and the output of pragmatic inference all provide chunks of meaning information that merge to produce the representation of utterance meaning. In this section I consider the latter option in more detail.

Cognitive and social-cultural defaults fit very well with Recanati’s (2003, 2004) free enrichment within his truth-conditional pragmatics. But, since at least some of these salient meanings are automatic and unreflective, relegating them to the ancillary role of a finishing touch on the logical form does not seem quite correct. It would imply that the logical form is processed first, while the enrichment is always temporally second. What we want instead is an arrangement in which default interpretations and (conscious) pragmatic inference are treated on an equal footing with the processing of grammar and lexicon. Using the framework of Default Semantics, we can identify the following sources of information about utterance meaning: word meaning and the structure of the sentence uttered (WS), (conscious) pragmatic inference (CPI)²⁸, as well as two types of ‘shortcuts’ through this inference, discussed in the preceding sections: salient interpretations of the social-cultural and cognitive type (SCD and CD). Jointly, these sources give as output a representation of utterance meaning called ‘merger representation’. This representation can be broadly compared to Recanati’s notion of ‘what is said’ or the relevance-theoretic ‘explicature’ in that it is a representation of the speaker’s thought as recovered by the addressee in the process of communication. It is supplemented by implicatures, understood as additional thoughts, derived by means of the sources SCD and CPI. The main difference between the merger representation and the explicature is that the first is much less restricted by the syntactic processing of the sentence: the output of WS can be overridden by the output of any other source.²⁹ So, if the most salient intended meaning happens to be what would on relevance-theoretic or Recanati’s accounts be called an implicature, this implicature is the main communicated thought and is therefore given in the merger representation. Perhaps this is merely a reorganization of the

²⁸ Pragmatic inference is dubbed ‘conscious’ in view of the recent debates on the scope of the term ‘inference’ (see e.g. Recanati 2004). There is no unconscious inference in my model.

²⁹ It seems that in this way we can also account for metaphor and irony, but this is a project for the future.

field in order to focus on salience, but I shall not attempt a comparison for the purpose of this paper.

To sum up, we have rejected the assumed priority of the WS source. We have also allowed more power to the sources CPI, SCD and CD, which seems to better reflect the interaction of the pragmatic components of utterance meaning with the logical form than Recanati's free enrichment does. But this comes at the price of redrawing the boundary between what is said and what is implicated and abandoning the development of the logical form as the defining characteristic of what is said. In other words, what is said may not always be a *development* of the logical form of the sentence, but on some (rare) occasions it can have an altogether different form. For example, (30a) can now have, say, (30b) as its primary utterance meaning, rather than (30c).

(30a) Mother to a little boy, crying over a cut finger: 'You are not going to die.'

(30b) You shouldn't worry.

(30c) You are not going to die from this wound.

This is a big step, but, it seems, a supportable and promising one. The primary meaning (what is said, what is explicit, etc.) need not be partially isomorphic with the linguistic meaning. Pace post-Gricean attempts to draw the boundary, best summarized in Carston (1988) and Recanati (1989), there is no compelling reason to make this restriction. If we take this step, then new possibilities open up concerning solutions to the problems with intensional contexts, metaphorical expressions, irony, and other stumbling blocks for semantic theory. The main strength of this reanalysis is that we obtain a more accurate account of the composition of meaning. It seems that this is how we should conceive of compositionality. If the output of the four sources of meaning (WS, CPI, CD, and SCD) merges to produce a meaning representation (merger representation), then it is only natural to require the merger representation, rather than the output of grammar (WS), to be compositional. Such pragmatics-rich compositionality would be considered highly controversial in some formal semantics circles, but is gaining ground in post-Gricean views on meaning construction.³⁰ The next step will be to construct an algorithm that would capture the interaction of the sources of meaning identified in the theory.

³⁰ The above proposal is compatible with, and can be regarded as an execution of, Recanati's observation:

"...the semantics of natural language is not insulationist. (...) [T]he meaning of the whole is *not* constructed in a purely bottom-up manner from the meanings of the parts. The

5. Concluding remarks

The objective of this enquiry was not to provide a rigid classification of defaults or to match types of expressions with types of defaults. Instead, it was to point out that before we continue the disputes concerning the adequacy of the 'default model' of utterance interpretation, it is necessary to scrutinize the use of the term 'default' in the literature, and then provide definitional characteristics, as far as it is possible, of such default meanings. First, I pointed out that there are considerable differences in the understanding of the term 'default' in the literature. Further, I demonstrated that the seminal topics for defining defaults are (i) the question as to whether defaults and pragmatic inference are compatible, and (ii) the specification of the unit on which default enrichment operates, that is, the question whether defaults can be local, pre-propositional, as well as global, post-propositional. Next, I attempted a classification of default interpretations, resolving to accept strong, cognitive defaults, and somewhat less clear-cut social and cultural defaults, but reject the putative categories of physical and lexical defaults. Finally, I sketched some principles on which a compositional theory of utterance meaning that incorporates meaning information from such defaults can be founded. It can be gleaned from my discussion of the properties of default interpretations that 'default', for the purpose of pragmatic theory, is at present best understood rather loosely to mean 'salient interpretation'. The exact properties, listed as D1-D7 in Section 1.7, are still a matter of controversy. If this is the case, then the polarisation of the post-Gricean field may easily give way to more consensus. There are salient interpretations, as we all agree, but the answer as to how they are arrived at may prove to borrow insights from both sides: the advocates of strong, defeasible and local defaults like Levinson and the advocates of inference, like relevance theorists. The thoughts and arguments in this paper point to the possible utility of such a middle way, concluding that, at least, it is worth exploring.

References

- Asher, N. and A. Lascares (1995). Lexical disambiguation in a discourse context. *Journal of Semantics* 12: 69-108.
- Asher, N. and A. Lascares (2003). *Logics of Conversation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

meaning of the whole is influenced by top-down, pragmatic factors, and through the meaning of the whole the meanings of the parts are also affected. *So we need a more 'interactionist' or even 'Gestaltist' approach to compositionality.*" Recanati (2004: 132).

- Bach, K. (1984). Default reasoning: Jumping to conclusions and knowing when to think twice. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 65: 37-58.
- Bach, K. (1987a). *Thought and Reference*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bach, K. (1987b). On communicative intentions: A reply to Recanati. *Mind and Language* 2: 141-154.
- Bach, K. (1994). Semantic slack: What is said and more. In: S.L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), *Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives*. London: Routledge. 267-291.
- Bach, K. (1995). Remark and reply. Standardization vs. conventionalization. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 18: 677-686.
- Bach, K. (1998). Postscript (1995): Standardization revisited. In: A. Kasher (ed.), *Pragmatics: Critical Concepts*. Vol. 4. London: Routledge. 712-722.
- Benferhat, S., J. F. Bonnefon and R. da Silva Neves (2005). An overview of possibilistic handling of default reasoning, with experimental studies. *Synthese* 146: 53-70.
- Bezuidenhout, A. L. and R. K. Morris (2004). Implicature, relevance and default pragmatic inference. In: I. A. Noveck and D. Sperber (eds.), *Experimental Pragmatics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 257-282.
- Blutner, R. (2000). Some aspects of optimality in natural language interpretation. *Journal of Semantics* 17: 189-216.
- Blutner, R. and H. Zeevat (2004). Editors' introduction: Pragmatics in Optimality Theory. In: R. Blutner and H. Zeevat (eds.), *Optimality Theory and Pragmatics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 1-24.
- Bultinck, B. (2005). *Numerous Meanings: The Meaning of English Cardinals and the Legacy of Paul Grice*. Oxford: Elsevier.
- Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore. (2005). *Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Carston, R. (1988). Implicature, explicature, and truth-theoretic semantics. In: R. M. Kempson (ed.), *Mental Representations: The Interface Between Language and Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 155-181.
- Carston, R. (1998a). Postscript (1995) to Carston 1988. In: A. Kasher (ed.), *Pragmatics: Critical Concepts*. Vol. 4. London: Routledge. 464-479.

- Carston, R. (1998b). Informativeness, relevance and scalar implicature. In: R. Carston and S. Uchida (eds.), *Relevance Theory: Applications and Implications*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins. 179-236.
- Carston, R. (2001). Relevance Theory and the saying/implicating distinction. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 13: 1-34.
- Carston, R. (2002a). *Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Carston, R. (2002b). Linguistic meaning, communicated meaning and cognitive pragmatics. *Mind and Language* 17: 127-148.
- Chierchia, G. (2004). Scalar implicatures, polarity phenomena, and the syntax/pragmatics interface. In: A. Belletti (ed.), *Structures and Beyond: The Cartography of Syntactic Structures*, vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 39-103.
- Chierchia, G., M. T. Guasti, A. Gualmini, L. Meroni, S. Crain and F. Foppolo (2004). Semantic and pragmatic competence in children's and adults' comprehension of *or*. In: I. A. Noveck and D. Sperber (eds.), *Experimental Pragmatics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 283-300.
- Damasio, A. R. (1999). How the brain creates the mind. *Scientific American*, December 1999: 74-79.
- Fodor, J. A. (1994). *The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Geurts, B. (1998). The mechanisms of denial. *Language* 74: 274-307.
- Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In: P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and Semantics*. Vol. 3. New York: Academic Press. Reprinted in: H. P. Grice. 1989. *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 22-40.
- Horn, L. R. (1984). Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and R-based implicature. In: D. Schffrin (ed.), *Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics 1984*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 11-42.
- Horn, L. R. (1988). Pragmatic theory. In: F. J. Newmeyer (ed.), *Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 113-145.
- Horn, L. R. (1992). The said and the unsaid. *Ohio State University Working Papers in Linguistics* 40 (SALT II Proceedings). 163-192.
- Horn, L. R. (2004). Implicature. In: L. R. Horn and G. Ward (eds.), *The Handbook of Pragmatics*. Oxford: Blackwell. 3-28.

- Horn, L. R. (2006). The border wars: A neo-Gricean perspective. In: K. von Heusinger and K. Turner (eds.), *Where Semantics Meets Pragmatics: The Michigan Papers*. Oxford: Elsevier. 21-48.
- Jackendoff, R. (1990). *Semantic Structures*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Jackendoff, R. (1991). Parts and boundaries. *Cognition* 41. Reprinted in: B. Levin and S. Pinker (eds.), *Lexical and Conceptual Semantics*. Oxford: Blackwell. 9-45.
- Jaszczolt, K. M. (1997). The Default *De Re* Principle for the interpretation of belief utterances. *Journal of Pragmatics* 28: 315-336.
- Jaszczolt, K. M. (1998a). Reports on beliefs: Default interpretations and default intentions. *Journal of Literary Semantics* 27: 31-42.
- Jaszczolt, K. M. (1998b). Referring in discourse: Referential intention and the 'taking for granted' principle. *Journal of Literary Semantics* 27: 96-109.
- Jaszczolt, K. M. (1999a). Default semantics, pragmatics, and intentions. In: K. Turner (ed.), *The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of View*. Oxford: Elsevier Science. 199-232.
- Jaszczolt, K. M. (1999b). *Discourse, Beliefs, and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription*. Oxford: Elsevier Science.
- Jaszczolt, K. M. (2000). The default-based context-dependence of belief reports. In: K. M. Jaszczolt (ed.), *The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports*. Oxford: Elsevier Science. 169-185.
- Jaszczolt, K. M. (2002). *Semantics and Pragmatics: Meaning in Language and Discourse*. London: Longman.
- Jaszczolt, K. M. (2005). *Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jaszczolt, K. M. (2006). Meaning merger: Pragmatic inference, defaults, and compositionality. *Intercultural Pragmatics* 3: 195-212.
- Koenig, J.-P. (1993). Scalar predicates and negation: Punctual semantics and interval interpretations. *Chicago Linguistic Society* 27. Part 2: The Parasession on Negation. 140-155.
- Landman, F. (2000). *Events and Plurality*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Lascarides, A. and A. Copestake (1998). Pragmatics and word meaning. *Journal of Linguistics* 34: 387-414.
- Levinson, S. C. (1987). Minimization and conversational inference. In: J. Verschueren and M. Bertuccelli-Papi (eds.), *The Pragmatic Perspective*.

- Selected Papers from the 1985 International Pragmatics Conference.* Amsterdam: J. Benjamins. 61-129.
- Levinson, S. C. (1995). Three levels of meaning. In: F. R. Palmer (ed.), *Grammar and Meaning. Essays in Honour of Sir John Lyons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 90-115.
- Levinson, S. C. (2000). *Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Levinson, S.C. (2003). *Space in Language and Cognition: Explorations in Cognitive Diversity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lyons, W. (1995). *Approaches to Intentionality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Musolino, J. (2004). The semantics and acquisition of number words: Integrating linguistic and developmental perspectives. *Cognition* 93: 1-41.
- Noveck, I. A. (2001). When children are more logical than adults: Experimental investigations of scalar implicature. *Cognition* 78: 165-188.
- Noveck, I. A. (2004). Pragmatic inferences related to logical terms. In: I. A. Noveck and D. Sperber (eds.), *Experimental Pragmatics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 301-321.
- Noveck, I. A. and D. Sperber (eds.) (2004). *Experimental Pragmatics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Papafragou, A. and J. Musolino (2003). Scalar implicatures: Experiments at the semantics-pragmatics interface. *Cognition* 86: 253-282.
- Pelletier, F. J. and R. Elio (2005). The case for psychologism in default and inheritance reasoning. *Synthese* 146: 7-35.
- Prince, A. and P. Smolensky (2004). *Optimality Theory: Constraint Interaction in Generative Grammar*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Recanati, F. (1989). The pragmatics of what is said. *Mind and Language* 4. Reprinted in: S. Davis (ed.) (1991) *Pragmatics: A Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 97-120.
- Recanati, F. (2002). Does linguistic communication rest on inference?. *Mind and Language* 17: 105-126.
- Recanati, F. (2003). Embedded implicatures. <http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents>.
- Recanati, F. (2004). *Literal Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Recanati, F. (2005). Literalism and contextualism: Some varieties. In: G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds.), *Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 171-196.
- Reiter, R. (1980). A logic for default reasoning. *Artificial Intelligence* 13: 81-132.
- Saul, J. M. (2002). What is said and psychological reality; Grice's project and relevance theorists' criticisms. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 25: 347-372.
- Smolensky, P. (1986). Information processing in dynamical systems: Foundations of Harmony Theory. In: D. E. Rumelhart, J. L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group (eds.), *Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition*, vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 194-281.
- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. (1995). *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell. Second edition.
- Talmy, L. (1985). Lexicalization patterns: Semantic structure in lexical forms. In: T. Shopen (ed.), *Language Typology and Syntactic Description*. Vol. 3. Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 57-149.
- Talmy, L. (2000). *Toward a Cognitive Semantics* (2 volumes). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Thomason, R. H. (1997). Nonmonotonicity in linguistics. In: J. van Benthem and A. ter Meulen (eds.), *Handbook of Logic and Language*. Oxford: Elsevier Science. 77-831.
- Traugott, E. C. (1999). The role of pragmatics in semantic change. In: J. Verschueren (ed.), *Pragmatics in 1998: Selected Papers from the 6th International Pragmatics Conference*, vol. 2. Antwerp: International Pragmatics Association. 93-102.
- Traugott, E. C. and R. B. Dasher (2002). *Regularity in Semantic Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Veltman, F. (1996). Defaults in update semantics. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 25: 221-261.
- Zeevat, H. (2000). Demonstratives in discourse. *Journal of Semantics* 16: 279-313.
- Zeevat, H. (2004). Particles: Presupposition triggers, context markers or speech act markers. In: R. Blutner and H. Zeevat (eds.), *Optimality Theory and Pragmatics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 91-111.

Marek Kuźniak
University of Wrocław, Poland

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS ON ASPECT AS A SITUATION TYPE

Abstract. This paper discusses some controversies that arise in the treatment of aspect as viewed from the perspective of cognitive linguistics¹. More specifically, the paper constitutes a critical review of Radden and Dirven's (2007) account of aspect as a situation type presented in Chapter 8 of the book. The basic criticism of the category of aspect viewed as a situational type involves, as the author of this paper maintains, unsubstantiated proliferation of the typology of aspectual distinctions, which are hard to account for once the criterion of psychological reality of a conceptual category is considered².

1.0 Fundamentals

In order to understand how the notion of situation is discussed in cognitive linguistics, let us look at Fig. 1 below.

Thus, the concept of aspect relates conceptually to different types of "time schemas" as indicative of different types of situations. According to Radden and Dirven (2007: 176), there are two types of situation that can be referred to as events and states. The former is illustrative of *John wrote several letters*, whereas the latter is exemplified by *We just like this place as it is*. The event differs from the state in that it has a well delineated

¹ Radden and Dirven (2007: 198) quote Vendler (1967), Dowty (1979), and Langacker (2001) as representing significant contributions to the study of situation types (the former two books) and introducing into the literature of the subject matter the conception of "basic aspectual class" (the latter). Both insights constitute the foundation of the framework discussed by Radden and Dirven.

² See Laurence and Margolis (1999).




Fig. 1 Elements constituting a situation (after Radden and Dirven 2007: 176)

temporal structure with its starting point and end-point as well as some duration period between the initial and final stage. The state does not exhibit any of the above properties in that it has no starting point, no end-point, no duration time clearly marked (Radden and Dirven 2007: 176). The authors thus insist that situation types are qualitatively different from other elements constituting a situation in that they have a particular temporal structure. At the same time Radden and Dirven include into the aspectual class types of situation that have atemporal characteristics. This is clearly a contradiction in terms that can only be resolved if we postulate a temporal structure to be manifested in states as well. When we say *We just like this place as it is*, we implicate the existence of some “earlier time space” in which our attitude to the place was at least neutral, as it takes some time for a human being to get the liking of a particular place. Developing such affection does not happen instantaneously, but usually evolves over a particular stretch of time. So we clearly have in the case of states two stages that are claimed by Radden and Dirven to be missing, i.e. a starting point and a duration period.

Let us move on to the discussion of the fundamental typological distinctions of aspect. Radden and Dirven (2007: 176-177) discuss basic aspectual classes: the non-progressive aspect and the progressive aspect. The former is characterized by “a maximal viewing frame”, whereas the progressive is characterized by a “restricted viewing frame”. It is to be remembered that a maximal viewing frame enables a human conceptualizer to view the situation in its entirety, whereas the restricted viewing frame highlights but a part of the entire event. This division helps us categorize the following sentences into four different groups which result from the acceptance of the two pairs of variables: event/state and maximal viewing frame/restricted viewing frame.

- a. *Ann cuddled the baby* (event: maximal viewing frame)
 - b. *Ann is cuddling the baby* (event: restricted viewing frame)
 - c. *Ann lives with her parents* (state: maximal viewing frame)
 - d. *Ann is living with her parents* (state: restricted viewing frame)
- (Radden and Dirven 2007: 177)

The descriptions of aspectual meaning pertinent to *a* and *b* are rather inarguable. In the case of *a* we view the situation as a whole, with its beginning, duration, and end-point. In the case of *b* we concentrate on the internal “durational” aspect of an event. However, due to our everyday experience we are likely to conclude that the boundaries in *b* are definitely implied as these sorts of situations do not last forever. The problem begins with the explication of *c*. Radden and Dirven (2007: 177) say that the sentence “provides an *infinite view* of an inherently unbounded and homogeneous or lasting state”. What is highly controversial in the above-quoted statement is the category of “inherent unboundedness” as speculated for this situation type. There is no explication provided as to the meaning of “inherent unboundedness” and how such inherent structural types of situation emerge in language. Moreover, there is no conclusive piece of argument in favour of postulating inherently unbounded structure in *c*. To my view, situation *c* is in no way ontologically different from situations *a* or *b*, but only epistemically. Thus, *c* relates to a static kind of event with implicit boundaries, whereas *a* relates to a dynamic kind of event with explicitly marked boundaries. Sentence *b* differs from *c* in that the event is dynamic. However, as it turns out, both *b* and *c* have implicitly marked boundaries since both can be classified as events with varying degrees of “boundary designation” within their scope of predication.

Fundamentally, then, the division of situation types into two sets, i.e. states and events fails as it is not compatible with the definition of situation type as manifesting temporal structure. Our conclusion is that the only way we may “exculpate” this understanding of temporal structures is by postulating an ontologically homogeneous type of situation, called “event” which may however undergo modulations involving the selection of either of two distinct ways of viewing, whether maximal or restricted. Regardless of the nature (idiosyncrasy of meaning) of the verb, the “event” may be characterised by two fundamental properties, i.e. dynamicity and state. In light of the criticism spelled out above, the postulated typological distinctions are suggested as follows:

- a. *Ann cuddled the baby* (event: maximal viewing frame/dynamic)
- b. *Ann is cuddling the baby* (event: restricted viewing frame/dynamic)
- c. *Ann lives with her parents* (event: maximal viewing frame/static)
- d. *Ann is living with her parents* (event: restricted viewing frame/static)

The advantage of this typology is that it dismisses the often impressionistic categorial differentiation between an event and a state in favouring one heterogeneous category of event as governed by two qualitatively different sets of viewing perspectives. Fig. 2 below presents a modified version of typology presented by Radden and Dirven (2007):




Fig. 2 A modified typology of aspect

Also problematic is the very definition of aspect provided by Radden and Dirven (2007: 176), who classify “aspect as the grammatical form used by a speaker in taking particular view of the situation”. As we will show in the subsequent sections of this paper, this definition is too narrow on a cognitive-linguistic account, as it limits the discussion to a set of formal exponents constituting the category of aspect. As the discussion proceeds, we will observe that the category of “aspect” may have some formal manifestations, but quintessentially is to be seen as a cognitive phenomenon whose realisations in language are not only strictly grammatical, but also encoded in the context of situation or conventional semantic load of particular lexical units selected to designate a particular event.

2.0 Specificities

The methodological problems arising from postulating the existence of two fundamental kinds of situation, i.e. events and states have got their long-lasting consequence on the details of typological organization of situation types as laid down by Radden and Dirven. Events, for example, are further

subdivided into bounded and unbounded events. This distinction is, as already indicated above, viewed as artificial because we should rather concentrate on the degree of boundedness that a particular event profiles in language than postulate ontologically separate kinds of bounded and unbounded events. The parameters of duration and telicity that cut across the typology presented by Radden and Dirven (2007: 180-181) can be preserved as long as we treat them as non-discrete categories. Thus duration according to the authors (2007: 179) refers to the length of time in which a particular event is seen to occur. In effect we may distinguish between events that occur within a longer stretch of time (display the feature “durational”) and those which are short enough to be perceived as long-lasting and therefore are classified as bearing the feature “punctual”. Telicity as another parameter is about the possession by an entity of a conclusive (definitive) end-point or the lack of it. Radden and Dirven thus postulate the following typology of events (see Fig. 3-4).




Fig. 3 Bounded events and their classification (after Raden and Dirven 2007: 180)




Fig. 4 Unbounded events and their classification (after Radden and Dirven 2007: 181)

The argument advanced in the present paper is that the above-presented typology, although clear and lucid, unnecessarily abounds in terms whose existence is motivated not so much by perceptual (psychological) criteria of discrimination between categories, but rather is dependent on minute semantic differences between the verbs selected for the analysis, which becomes the source of terminological diversification offered by the book. At the same time, it must be remarked that the choice of some verbs which are meant to illustrate a particular category appears far from fortunate. For example, the verb “burp” affords access to encyclopaedic knowledge structures wherein the activity can hardly be classified as atelic, at least not prototypically. Setting aside the considerations over lexical choices made by Radden and Dirven (2007: 181), we conclude that the category of aspect is no longer correlated to any formal exponency, but rather is conveyed through meaning subtleties encoded by the conventional knowledge interpretation evoked by a particular verb.

The proposal offered in the present paper is to modify the classification illustrated above and integrate Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 into one representation in which the fuzziness of boundedness of the category of event will explicitly be marked.




Fig. 5 Events and their classification

The advantage of such modified typology is that it clearly manifests a continuum-like character of categories relevant to the analysis. This continuum perspective allows us to substantially reduce the number of notions characterising different types of events. Because events are prototypically viewed as CONTAINERS (see Krzeszowski 1997), we therefore assume that the category of boundedness is more psychologically real than this of unboundedness, hence the postulated gradation of boundedness in the above-presented typology. The same holds for the category of telicity. In this case, we resign from the notion of atelicity as prototypical events that are correlated to the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema (see Krzeszowski 1997), which constitutes a benchmark for designating less prototypical instances as consistently less GOAL oriented than others. Fig. 1 also appears to get out from the “shackles” of structuralist binarism in the representation of linguistic phenomena. This binary imperative led Radden and Dirven to postulate two nodes branching off the superordinate category of unbounded event in Fig. 4, which are, however, qualitatively the same. We believe that such neat binary typological representations are not the value in themselves in cognitive linguistics, which on the other hand tries to reflect how things *are* in the world rather than how they *should* be. Finally, the verb “burp” has been replaced by the verb “hiccup” because it is more in compliance with our everyday experience of this activity as more iterative in character.

As the analysis of aspect continues, Radden and Dirven notice what constitutes quite a considerable departure from their original definition of aspect as a grammatical form, namely they observe that a situation type is not solely a matter of aspect viewed as a grammatical form, nor is it exclusively connected with the semantics of the verb, but rather it is the nature of the situation as a whole that may determine how it is viewed by the human conceptualizer. The conclusion is that the category of aspect is not to be bound with a set of formal correlatives in language, but rather makes up a more dynamically organized category. Such conceived aspect transcends formal exponents of category status and extends over to encapsulate within its scope other lexical elements, e.g. adverbials. This may be exemplified by the following:

- a) *He sang three songs.*
- b) *He sang three songs all evening.*

On a traditional account (see e.g. Quirk and Greenbaum 1973)³, these two sentences display the same, so-called simple aspect. We notice,

³ See also classic works by Leech (1971); Palmer (1988) or Comrie (1976).

however, and we do it on experiential grounds, that the addition of an adverbial of time, i.e. *all evening*, changes the internal viewing structure of an event from less durational and at the same time more telic (sentence a)) to a more durational and less telic (sentence b)). All in all, my argument goes like this: we can discuss all the slightest differences in aspectual organization of an event without recourse to multiplying different categories like “accomplishments”, “accomplishing activities”, “achievements”, “acts”, etc., because such proliferation of labels induces the reader to search for clear-cut discriminative criteria where fuzziness seems to prevail.

This methodological imperative for the search of different names for particular categories of events causes Radden and Dirven, aside from the aforementioned pitfalls, to sound rather inconclusive when it comes to finding more elaborate explications of multifarious differences encoded by the use of progressive or non-progressive forms⁴. Paradoxically, these explications indirectly corroborate what has been clearly stated in this paper, i.e. that the category of aspect – a dynamically organized category – is assigned the details of internal event viewing framework *online*, i.e. via the complex process of contextual information retrieval. This certainly does not exclude the assumption that progressive and non-progressive forms do not have conventional, schematic interpretations that humans impose on viewing the structure of an event. But given the validity of the existence of such conventionally encoded interpretative frameworks, they can only be reduced to general conceptual categories of duration, boundedness and telicity as these constitute a framework of aspectual organization of any event described in language.

3.0 Conclusion

Thought-provoking and insightful as Radden and Dirven’s (2007) cognitive account of the category of aspect may be, it appears to unnecessarily go into detailed binary typological classifications, which otherwise can perfectly be


⁴ Such is the case when Radden and Dirven (2007: 187) attempt to discuss the difference between the following two sentences: a) I *talked* to Mr. Green, and b) I *was talking* to Mr. Green. In a) the non-progressive form according to Radden and Dirven “invites implicatures of factuality and determination” whereas in b) suggests that “I possibly happened to meet Mr Green, that we talked for talk’s sake, and that we only had some casual small talk” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 187). Such detailed interpretations that hinge upon the notions of other than those strictly temporal cannot, in my view, be easily captured within a conventional implicature encoded by these forms, but rather are a function of complex processes of contextual modulation of information (see Cruse 1986) during which rich encyclopaedic knowledge structures are activated.

handled through a recourse to a few conceptual schematic categories like boundedness, duration, or telicity. An important reservation is that these categories are construed along a certain continuum, rather than neatly pigeon-holed into well-defined fields. This is far from a revolutionary statement, but rather a simple restatement of one of the fundamental tenets behind a cognitive-linguistic enterprise which postulates fuzziness of category boundaries in natural language (see Rosch 1977, Evans and Green 2006). Of course, we do not claim that Radden and Dirven's account ignores the aspect of fuzziness whatsoever. However, because they lay the emphasis on introducing specific typological distinctions as different manifestations of event viewing frames, they appear to defocus, at the same time, on the factor of non-discreteness of categories, which leads to a certain degree of fallacy behind the argumentation advanced by the eminent scholars.

The best illustration of such fundamental fallacy is an attempt at explicating the category of "culminating activity", which Radden and Dirven (2007: 188) themselves acknowledge "for the lack of a better term" (sic!), as a special type of an unbounded event⁵. The motivation for coining the label comes from the assumptions made at the outset (see Fig. 3) where the category of "achievements" was postulated as inherently bounded (*He fell asleep*), so Radden and Dirven did not admit of any unbounded versions of this category of event. They, on the other hand, state somewhat straightforwardly: "There are no unbounded achievements since achievements cannot be extended in time". This led them to search for a different label that would not distort once accepted typology. Such label was found and the event was finally categorized as "culminating activity". The sole reason behind the rejection of the term "unbounded achievement" was thus stylistic (a matter of labelling) rather than motivated by other cognitively relevant factors.

Last but not least, we may hypothesize that the ultimate source of various problems in providing conclusive explications of aspectual organization of events by Radden and Dirven consists in the illegitimate

⁵ The category of culminating activity is instantiated by the following: *The Queen is arriving* and prompted for by the illustration (after Radden and Dirven 2007: 189).



interchangeability of qualitatively different levels of description in which a schematic definitive argumentative formula *x is y* is seen as synonymous with a tentative argumentative formula *x is perceived as*. These, in my view, introduce two ontologically separate modes of existence; therefore, they cannot be so freely interchanged. Taking the aforementioned example of *The Queen was arriving*, we notice that Radden and Dirven use the formula *x is y* in postulating the necessity of naming the event as a “culminating activity” rather than “unbounded achievement”, because as they claim “unbounded achievements cannot be extended in time”. So their definition of unbounded events is quite definitive. At the same time they show that once we find a different label for the same event (e.g. culminating activity), it is perfectly possible to view the same event as extendable temporally due to the working of conceptual metonymies UNIPLEX FOR MULTIPLES and TERMINAL POINT FOR ACTIVITY. Such loose treatment of the two formulas in substantiating the stylistic aspect of finding a name with reference to the same event should be seen as rather a risky enterprise.

References

- Comrie, B. (1976). *Aspect*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cruse, D. A. (1986). *Lexical Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dowty, D. R. (1979). *Word Meaning and Montague Grammar: The Semantics of Verbs and Times in Generative Semantics and in Montague's PTQ*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Evans, V. and M. Green (2006). *Cognitive Linguistics. An Introduction*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Krzyszowski, T. P. (1997). *Angels and Devils in Hell*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Energeia.
- Langacker, R. (2001). The English present tense. *English Language and Linguistics* 5: 251-272.
- Laurence, S. and M. Margolis (1999). Concepts and cognitive science. In: E. Margolis and S. Laurence (eds.), *Concepts: Core Readings*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3–81.
- Leech, G. (1971). *Meaning and the English Verb*. London: Longman.
- Palmer, F. (1988). *The English Verb*. 2nd ed. London: Longman.
- Quirk, R. and S. Greenbaum (1973). *The University Grammar of English*. London: Longman.

- Radden, G. and R. Dirven (2007). *Cognitive English Grammar*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorization. In: N. Warren (ed.), *Studies in Cross-linguistic Psychology*. London: Academic Press, 1-49.
- Vendler, Z. (1967). *Linguistics in Philosophy*. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.

Zoltán Kövecses

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary

ASPECTS OF METAPHOR IN DISCOURSE¹

Abstract. If we assume metaphors to be deeply entrenched correspondences between two conceptual domains that are manifested by highly conventional linguistic expressions in the lexicon, we cannot account for two aspects of metaphor that are crucially important. First, if we identify metaphors with isolated conceptual structures that find expression in the lexicon, we cannot appreciate the role of metaphor in real discourse. Second, if we view metaphors as a set of entrenched conceptual correspondences that give rise to conventionalized linguistic expressions, it is not possible to account for much of the creativity of metaphors. The paper argues that we can, and should, go beyond these difficulties in conceptual metaphor theory. First, I argue, together with others, that conceptual metaphor theory must recognize the discourse-organizing force of metaphors. To this effect, I point out both the intertextual and intratextual effects of conceptual metaphors in real discourse. Second, I argue that there are several distinct types of metaphorical creativity that appear in discourse, including source-related creativity, target-related creativity, and creativity that is the result of “context-induced” metaphors. Of these, I discuss source-related and target-related creativity in the present paper.

In recent years, a large number of scholars have criticized the theory of conceptual metaphor for a variety of reasons (for example, Cameron, 2003, 2007; Clausner and Croft, 1997; Deignan, 1999; Dobrovolskij and Piirainen, 2005; Gevaert, 2001, 2005; Pragglejaz Group, 2007; Rakova, 2002; Ritchie, 2003; Semino, 2005; Steen, 1999; Stefanowitch, 2007; Zinken, 2007). Perhaps the most significant element of this criticism was the suggestion that conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) ignores the study

¹ I want to thank the Institute of Advanced Study and Van Mildert College, Durham University, for their generous support in the preparation of this paper and the wonderful academic, social, and personal environment they provided for three months. My special thanks go to Andreas Musolff and David Cowling for the wonderful time we spent on studying metaphors.

I also thank Reka Benczes, my colleague back home, for her help with this paper.

of metaphor in the contexts in which metaphorical expressions actually occur; namely, in real discourse. The claim is that the practitioners of “traditional” conceptual metaphor theory (i.e., Lakoff and Johnson and their “ardent” followers) set up certain, what they call conceptual metaphors and exemplify them with groups of (mostly) invented metaphors. In this way, traditional researchers in CMT fail to notice some essential aspects of the study of metaphor and cannot account for phenomena that can only be accounted for if we investigate metaphors in real discourse.

I have responded to several aspects of this criticism in some previous publications (Kövecses, 2005; Kövecses, forthcoming, a, b, c), and I do not wish to repeat my response here, though it will be necessary to briefly bring some of that work into the present discussion. Instead, I will take the advice of the critics seriously, look at some pieces of real discourse where metaphors are used, and see how “traditional” CMT can and should be modified and changed to accommodate at least some of the criticism. As I see it, the result will be a substantial addition to the edifice of CMT – with the basic ideas of conceptual metaphor theory remaining intact, however.

Two kinds of metaphorical coherence in discourse

Most researchers who work on metaphor in real discourse would agree that a major function of the metaphors we find in discourse is to provide coherence (see, for example, Cameron, 2003; Charteris-Black, 2004; Chilton, 1996; Chilton and Ilyin, 1993; Deignan, 2005; Eubanks, 2000; Koller, 2004; Musolff, 2000, 2004, 2006; Ritchie, 2004a, b; Semino, 2008). The coherence metaphors provide can be either intertextual or intratextual; that is, metaphors can either make several different texts coherent with each other or they can lend coherence to a single piece of discourse.

Intertextual coherence

In some cases of intertextuality, intertextual coherence is achieved through inheriting and using a particular conceptual metaphor at different historical periods. One of the best examples of this is how several biblical metaphors have been recycled over the ages. Shortly after arriving in

Durham, where I did the research for this work, I was given a bookmark in Durham cathedral with the following text on it:

Almighty God

Who called your servant Cuthbert
from keeping sheep to follow your son
and to be shepherd of your people.

Mercifully grant that we, following his
example and caring for those who are lost,
may bring them home to your fold.

Through your son.

Jesus Christ our Lord.

Amen.

In the prayer, the basic conceptual metaphor is the one in which the shepherd is Jesus, the lost sheep are the people who no longer follow God's teachings, the fold of the sheep is people's home with God, and for the shepherd to bring the sheep back to the fold is for Jesus to save the people. We can lay out these correspondences, or mappings, more explicitly as follows:

Source:	Target:
the shepherd →	Jesus
the lost sheep →	the people who do not follow God
the fold of the sheep →	the state of people following God
the shepherd bringing back the sheep →	Jesus saving the people

This metaphor was reused later on when God called a simple man, called Cuthbert, to give up his job (which, significantly, was being a shepherd) and become a "shepherd of people." Here it is Cuthbert (not Jesus) who saves the lost people (a set of people different from the ones in Jesus' times). Finally, in the most recent recycling of the metaphor in the prayer said on St Cuthbert's day, 20th March, 2007, the particular values of the metaphor change again. It is the priests who live today who try to bring people back to the fold – again, a set of people different from either those who lived in Jesus' or Cuthbert's times.

This type of intertextuality characterizes not only Christianity (and other religions) through time but many other domains within the

same historical period. Thus a metaphor can provide coherence across a variety of discourses both historically and simultaneously.

Intratextual coherence

In a similar fashion, the same conceptual metaphor can lend coherence to a single text. The metaphor that structures the discourse does not necessarily have to be a deeply entrenched conventional conceptual metaphor – it can be what we can call a metaphorical analogy of any kind. Consider the following three paragraphs, taken from the very beginning of a newspaper article:

Performance targets are identical to the puissance at the Horse of the Year Show. You know the one – the high-jump competition, where the poor, dumb horse is brought into the ring, asked to clear a massive red wall, and as a reward for its heroic effort is promptly brought back and asked to do it all over again, only higher.

I've never felt anything but admiration for those puissance horses which, not so dumb at all, swiftly realize that the game is a bogey. Why on earth should they bother straining heart, sinew and bone to leap higher than their own heads, only to be required to jump even higher? And then possibly higher still.

Hard work and willingness, ponders the clever horse as he chomps in the stable that night, clearly bring only punishment. And so next time he's asked to canter up to the big red wall, he plants his front feet in the ground and shakes his head. And says, what do you take me for – an idiot? (Melanie Reid, *The Times*, Monday, February 4, 2008).

Here puissance horses are compared to people, riders to managers, the red walls as obstacles to the targets people have to achieve, having to jump over the obstacles to being subject to assessment, clearing the obstacles to achieving the targets, raising the obstacles to giving more difficult targets, the Horse Show to a company, and so on and so forth. This elaborate metaphorical analogy provides a great deal of structure for the text. As a matter of fact, most of the structure of the text is given in terms of

the metaphor up to this point in the article, with only the first two words (“performance targets”) suggesting what the analogy is all about.

But then in the fourth paragraph the author lays out the correspondences for us, probably to make sure that we understand precisely what she has in mind:

Thus it is with work-related targets. Most of us will in the course of our careers be subject to performance assessments, where we are examined against the objectives we were set the previous year, then tasked with new ones.

From this point onward, the article uses predominantly literal language with some of the metaphorical language of the Horse Show interspersed in the text. At the end, however, the metaphor comes back in full force:

Oh, the bar may be set at what the politicians regard as a reasonable height. Aspirational enough to keep them all in power. From the perspective of the weary horse, however, we’ve reached the point where whipping doesn’t work, but a carrot and a short rest just might.

Clearly, the metaphor is used here at the end of the article to make a point emphatically. This is a common rhetorical function that metaphors are assigned to perform in discourse. Thus, in addition to providing some of the internal coherence of the text, metaphors are often exploited for such and similar rhetorical functions (see, for example, Goatly, 1997).

What I would like to underscore here is that, in many cases, once introduced, conceptual metaphors (or metaphorical analogies) appear to have the effect of taking over what one says or thinks about a particular subject matter. We push the metaphor as far as it fits the target for our purposes. This way, on such occasions, conceptual metaphors or metaphorical analogies can predominate, or “rule,” an entire discourse or a stretch of it. I will return to this topic below.

However, often, we are not aware of potential further “usurpations” of the metaphor against our intentions. This situation has its dangers and can be the source of other people turning a metaphor against us in a debate over contentious issues. A particularly apt illustration of this happening is provided by Elena Semino (2008). Tony Blair used the following metaphor in one of his speeches:

Get rid of the false choice: principles or no principles. Replace it with the true choice. Forward or back. I can only go one way. I've not got a reverse gear. The time to trust a politician most is not when they're taking the easy option. Any politician can do the popular things. I know, I used to do a few of them.

Obviously, Blair tries to present himself here as a forward-looking politician who has clear and, what he takes to be, progressive goals and wants to reach those goals. In setting up this image, he uses the conventional conceptual metaphors *PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD* and *PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS*, but he also employs a little trick to achieve this: he portrays himself as a car without a reverse gear. In the same way as a car without a reverse gear cannot move backward, only forward, he, the politician, can only move forward and can only do things in the name of progress. That is, he uses knowledge about the target domains to effect changes in the source domain that he employs to achieve his rhetorical purpose in the situation. (We could analyze this situation as a case of conceptual integration, *à la* Fauconnier and Turner, 2002.)

So we have in the source domain a car without a reverse gear that cannot move backward, only forward, and we have in the target a politician who can and wants to achieve progressive goals alone. However, the source image can be modified somewhat. Let us suppose that the car gets to the edge of a cliff. Wouldn't it be good to have a reverse gear then? Semino (2008) found an example where this is precisely what happens. Following the speech in which Blair used the "car without reverse gear" image, an anchorman on BBC evening news remarked:

but when you're on the edge of a cliff it is good to have a reverse gear.

The "edge of a cliff" in the source symbolizes an especially difficult and dangerous situation, where it is a good thing to have a car with a reverse gear. In the target, the dangerous situation corresponds to the Iraqi war, where, in the view of the journalist and others, it would have been good for Blair to change his views and withdraw from the war, instead of "plunging" the country into it.

In other words, as Semino points out, a metaphor that a speaker introduces and that can initially be seen as serving the speaker's interests in persuading others can be slightly but significantly changed. With the

change, the metaphor can be turned against the original user. This often happens in political debates.

Metaphorical creativity in discourse

One of the criticisms of the CMT view is that it conceives of metaphors as highly conventional static conceptual structures (the correspondences, or mappings, between a source and a target domain). It would follow from this that such conceptual structures manifest themselves in the form of highly conventional metaphorical linguistic expressions (like the metaphorical meanings in a dictionary) based on such mappings. If correct, this view does not easily lend itself to an account of metaphorical creativity. Clearly, we often come across novel metaphorical expressions in real discourse. If all there is to metaphor is a fixed set of static conceptual structures matched by highly conventional linguistic expressions, it would seem that CMT runs into difficulty in accounting for the many unconventional and novel expressions we find in discourse. I will discuss various types of metaphorical creativity in this section.

Source-related metaphorical creativity in discourse

If all CMT is about is a fixed set of static mappings, we can easily run into difficulty when we try to explain the presence of metaphors in real discourse. Consider the Horse of the Year Show metaphor discussed in one of the texts above. The Horse of the Year Show metaphor is a novel mapping for the target domain of company. The conceptual metaphor A COMPANY IS THE HORSE OF THE YEAR SHOW is anything but a conventional mapping for this target. Conventional source domains for COMPANY include BUILDING, PLANT, MACHINE, etc. Much of what we know about companies can be conceptualized by means of such conventional source domains. But THE HORSE OF THE YEAR SHOW metaphor is highly unconventional and allows us to conceptualize novel aspects of the target. This is a phenomenon that I called “the range of the target” (as opposed to “the scope of the source”) in *Metaphor in Culture* (2005) and this is a way of creating new conceptual metaphors.

Target-induced metaphorical creativity in discourse

Now let us see another way in which certain unconventional and novel metaphors in discourse can be handled with the help of a modified

version of CMT. In the “standard” CMT view, a part of our conceptual system consists of abstract concepts that are metaphorically defined. The definition of abstract concepts by means of metaphor takes place automatically and unconsciously. This is the case when emotions are viewed as forceful entities inside us (EMOTIONS ARE FORCES), when we think of abstract complex systems as growing (= developing) (ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS), when we define our goals as “goals” (to be reached) (PURPOSES ARE DESTINATION), and when we believe that marriage is some kind of a union (MARRIAGE IS A PHYSICAL UNITY). We take these metaphorical “definitions” as givens that are literal. There are many concepts, such as the ones just mentioned, that are defined or constituted by conceptual metaphors. And they are so constituted unconsciously and without any cognitive effort. I believe that this kind of definition of abstract concepts takes place at what I call the “supra-individual” level of conceptualization (see Kövecses, 2002, chapter 17). It is the supra-individual level in the sense that it consists of a static and highly conventionalized system of mappings between physical source and abstract target domains. Because of the automatic and unconscious nature of the mappings, we tend to think of these abstract concepts as literal.

As an illustration, let us consider an example taken from Chilton & Lakoff’s (1995) work on the application of the BUILDING metaphor to the political domain; in particular, former Soviet communist party general secretary Gorbachev’s metaphor in the early 1990s of the COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE, or in its full form, EUROPE (A POLITICAL STRUCTURE) IS A COMMON HOUSE. A more general conceptual metaphor of which the HOUSE metaphor is an instantiation is ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS (Kövecses, 2000; 2002). This metaphor has several mappings that can be given as submetaphors within the general metaphor; specifically:

THE CREATION OF ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS BUILDING
ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (OF THE BUILDING)
ABSTRACT LASTINGNESS IS THE STABILITY OF THE PHYSICAL
STRUCTURE (TO STAND)

According to CMT, the source domain of BUILDING and the target domain of, in this case, POLITICAL STRUCTURE is characterized by these mappings (see, e.g., Kövecses, 2002; Grady, 1997). My claim, in line with the argument above, would be that the abstract target concept of POLITICAL STRUCTURE is constituted by these mappings. That is to say, the notion of political

structure (as in the discussion of the unification of European countries into a single political entity) is in part defined by the metaphors below:

POLITICAL STRUCTURES ARE BUILDINGS

ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS

And indeed, we find numerous examples that are based on these mappings in the discourse on the integration of Europe in the 1990s, as analyzed by Musolff (2000, p. 222):

“We want a Europe that’s not just an elevated free trade area, but the construction of a house of Europe as laid down in the Maastricht treaty” (*The Guardian*, July 6, 1994)

“The common currency is the weight-bearing pillar of the European house.” (*The Guardian*, June 3, 1997)

The first example is based on the submetaphor THE CREATION OF ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS BUILDING (construction), while the second is based on both ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (OF THE BUILDING) (pillar) and ABSTRACT LASTINGNESS IS THE STABILITY OF THE PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (TO STAND) (weight-bearing). These examples show that political structure is thought about in terms of the BUILDING metaphor, and, more importantly, that certain aspects of this abstract entity (and of many additional ones), such as construction, structure, and strength, are inevitably constituted by metaphor. (Notice the unavoidably metaphorical character of the words *construction*, *structure*, *strength* in relation to political structure.)

But in the course of the debate about the unification of Europe at the time many expressions other than those that fit and are based on these submetaphors were used in the press. Musolff (2000) provides a large number of metaphorical expressions that were *not* supposed to be used (according to the “standard” CMT view). There was talk about the *roof*, the *occupants*, the *apartments*, and even *caretakers* and *fire-escapes*. If the BUILDING metaphor is limited to the previously mentioned highly static and conventional aspects of the target domain, then speakers should not talk about any of these things in connection with political structure. But they do. Here are Musolff’s (2000, p. 220-1) examples:

“We are delighted that Germany’s unification takes place under the European roof.” (Documentation by the Federal press- and information office, Bonn)

“At the moment, the German occupants of the first floor apartment in the ‘European house’ seem to think that foreigners from outside the continent should be content with living in the rubbish bin.” (translation from *Die Zeit*, 10 January 1992)

“What does he [Chancellor Kohl] need this house for, after so many years as Chancellor? – Well, it’s obvious, he wants to become the caretaker.” (translation from *Die Zeit*, May 16, 1997)

“[the European house is] a building without fire-escapes: no escape if it goes wrong” (*The Guardian*, May 2, 1998)

“[it is a] burning building with no exits” (*The Times*, May 20, 1998)

Given these examples of metaphor usage, it seems that metaphors can do more than just automatically and unconsciously constitute certain aspects of target domains in a static conceptual system (i.e., at the supra-individual level). Once we have a source domain that conventionally constitutes a target, we can use any component of this source that fits elements of the target. Notice that there is a reversal here. In a dynamic discourse situation the activated target domain (such as political structure) in the discourse can indeed select components of the source (such as building) that fit a particular target idea or purpose. For example, if one has a negative view of the unification of Europe and has problems with, say, the difficulty of leaving the union in case it does not work out for a particular country, then the speaker can talk about a “*building without fire-escapes*”—a part of the source that is obviously outside the conventionally used aspects of the source but that fits the target nevertheless.

In other words, the examples above demonstrate that in real discourse unconventional and novel linguistic metaphors can emerge not only from conventionally fixed mappings between a source and a target domain but also from mappings initiated *from the target* to the source. This mechanism can also account for the examples from Semino’s work that were discussed in the previous section. The novel example of *having no reverse gear*, as we have seen, is initiated from the target domain, and the second example of how *it is good to have a reverse gear on the edge of a cliff* is actually motivated by both the target and the source. However, the selection of the unconventional and novel metaphorical expressions is somewhat limited in this type of metaphorical creativity.

It is limited because these expressions come from a source that is already constitutive of the target. The initial and original constitution of the target by a particular source puts limitations on which new metaphorical expressions can be created on the basis of the source and then applied to the target. Albeit limited in this sense, this mechanism seems to serve us well in accounting for the creation of many unconventional and novel metaphorical expressions in real discourse.

Conclusions

Metaphors can ensure the coherence of discourse. Two basic types of coherence have been identified: intratextual and intertextual coherence. This means that the same conceptual metaphor or metaphorical analogy can make a single discourse (intratextual) or a number of different discourses (intertextual) coherent.

The “standard” version of CMT operates with largely uncontextualized or minimally contextualized linguistic examples of hypothesized conceptual metaphors. The conceptual metaphors are seen as constituted by sets of mappings between the source and the target domains. The mappings are assumed to be fairly static conceptual structures. The linguistic metaphors that are motivated by such static correspondences are entrenched, conventional expressions that eventually find their way to good, detailed dictionaries of languages. Dictionaries and the meanings they contain represent what is static and highly conventional about particular languages. In this view it is problematic to account for metaphorical creativity. How does this somewhat simplified and rough characterization of “standard” CMT change in light of the work reported in this paper?

If we look at metaphors from a discourse perspective and if we try to draw conclusions on the basis of what we have found here, we can see two important sources of metaphorical creativity. The first is the type of creativity that arises from the source domain and the second from the target domain. (A third type is context-induced metaphorical creativity, but I did not discuss it here.)

I examined the second type of metaphorical creativity under the heading of “target-induced” creativity. As we saw in the analysis of the BUILDING metaphor, what seems to happen in this case is that the conceptualizer’s knowledge of the target causes him or her to pick out

additional materials from the source that fit the target. I take this process to be equivalent or, at least, similar to what Lakoff and Turner (1989) call “elaboration” and “extending.” Lakoff and Turner suggest that these are two of the ways in which poetic metaphors are created from conventional, everyday conceptual metaphors. If the example of the BUILDING metaphor that is described in the paper is indeed like elaboration and/or extending, then the Lakoff-Turner claim that elaboration and extending are characteristic of creating poetic metaphors is called into question for the simple reason that the discussion of the BUILDING metaphor in relation to European unification is simply not an instance of poetic language. This conclusion would mean that two early critics of Lakoff and Turner’s 1989 book, *More Than Cool Reason*, Jackendoff and Aaron were (are) right (Jackendoff and Aaron, 1991). Be that as it may, the achievement of Lakoff and Turner in connection with the issue under discussion is that at least they tried to tackle the problem of metaphorical creativity. What the present paper adds to this debate is a more precise formulation of the cognitive process underlying elaboration and/or extending.

References

- Cameron, Lynne (2003). *Metaphor in Educational Discourse*. London: Continuum.
- Cameron, Lynne (2007). Patterns of metaphor use in reconciliation talk. *Discourse and Society* 18: 197-222.
- Cameron, Lynne /To appear/. Confrontation or complementarity? Metaphor in language use and cognitive metaphor theory. *Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics*.
- Cameron, Lynne and Alice Deignan (2006). The emergence of metaphor in discourse. *Applied Linguistics* 27 (4): 671-690.
- Charteris-Black, Johnathan (2004). *Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave-MacMillan.
- Chilton, Paul and Mikhail Ilyin (1993). Metaphor in political discourse. The case of the ‘Common European House’. *Discourse and Society* 4 (1): 7-31.
- Chilton, Paul and George Lakoff (1995). Metaphor in foreign policy discourse. In: C. Schäffner and A. Wenden (eds.), *Language and Peace*. Dartmouth: Aldershot. 37-59.

- Chilton, Paul (1996). *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common European Home*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Clausner, Timothy C. and William Croft (1997). Productivity and schematicity in metaphors. *Cognitive Science* 21 (3): 247-282.
- Deignan, Alice (1999). Corpus-based research into metaphor. In: Lynne Cameron and Graham Low (eds.), *Researching and Applying Metaphor*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 177-199.
- Deignan, Alice (2005). *Metaphor and Corpus Linguistics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Dobrovolskij, Dmitrij and Elisabeth Piirainen (2005). *Figurative Language. Cross-cultural and Cross-linguistic Perspectives*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Eubanks, Philip (2000). *A War of Words in the Discourse of Trade. The Rhetorical Constitution of Metaphor*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Fauconnier, Gilles and Mark Turner (2002). *The Way We Think*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gevaert, Caroline (2001). Anger in Old and Middle English: A 'hot' topic? *Belgian Essays on Language and Literature*. 89-101.
- Gevaert, Caroline (2005). The anger is heat question: detecting cultural influence on the conceptualization of anger through diachronic corpus analysis. In: N. Delbacque, J. Van der Auwera, and G. Geeraerts (eds.), *Perspectives on Variation: Sociolinguistic, Historical, Comparative*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 195-208.
- Goatly, Andrew (1997). *The Language of Metaphors*. London: Routledge.
- Grady, Joseph (1997). *Foundations of Meaning: Primary Metaphors and Primary Scenes*. Doctoral dissertation, University of California at Berkeley.
- Jackendoff, Ray and David Aaron (1991). Lakoff and Turner: More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor. *Language* 67 (2): 320-338.
- Koller, Veronika (2004/2008). *Metaphor and Gender in Business Media Discourse: a Critical Cognitive Study*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
- Kövecses, Zoltán (2000). *Metaphor and Emotion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Kövecses, Zoltán (2002). *Metaphor. A Practical Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kövecses, Zoltán (2005). *Metaphor in Culture. Universality and Variation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kövecses, Zoltán (2006). *Language, Mind, and Culture. A Practical Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kövecses, Zoltán /Forthcoming, a/. Conceptual metaphor theory: some criticisms and some alternative proposals. *Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics*.
- Kövecses, Zoltán /Forthcoming, b/. Methodological issues in conceptual metaphor theory. In: Hans-Joerg Schmid and Sandra Handl (eds.), *Windows to the Mind. Metaphor, Metonymy, and Conceptual Blending*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Kövecses, Zoltán /Forthcoming, c/. Metaphor, culture, and discourse: the pressure of coherence. In: Andreas Musolff and Hans-Joerg Zinken (eds.), *Metaphor and Discourses*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lakoff, George and Mark Turner (1989). *More Than Cool Reason. A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Musolff, Andreas (2000). Political imagery of Europe: A house without exit doors? *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 21 (3): 216-229.
- Musolff, Andreas (2004). *Metaphor and Political Discourse. Analogical Reasoning in Debates about Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Musolff, Andreas (2006). Metaphor scenarios in public discourse. *Metaphor and Symbol* 21 (1): 23-38.
- Pragglejaz Group (2007). MIP: A method for identifying metaphorically used words in discourse. *Metaphor and Symbol* 22 (1): 1-39.
- Rakova, Marina (2002). The philosophy of embodied realism: A high price to pay? *Cognitive Linguistics* 13 (3): 215-244.
- Ritchie, David (2003). "ARGUMENT IS WAR" – Or is it a game of chess? Multiple meanings in the analysis of implicit metaphors. *Metaphor and Symbol* 18 (2): 125-146.
- Ritchie, David (2004a). Metaphors in conversational context: toward a connectivity theory of metaphor interpretation. *Metaphor and Symbol* 19: 265-287.

- Ritchie, David (2004b). Common ground in metaphor theory: continuing the conversation. *Metaphor and Symbol* 19: 233-244.
- Semino, Elena (2005). The metaphorical construction of complex domains: The case of speech activity in English. *Metaphor and Symbol* 20 (1): 35-70.
- Semino, Elena (2008). *Metaphor in Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Steen, Gerard (1999). From linguistic to conceptual metaphor in five steps. In: R. Gibbs and G. Steen (eds.), *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 57-77.
- Stefanowitch, Anatol (2007). Words and their metaphors. In: Anatol Stefanowitch and Stefan Th. Gries (eds.), *Corpus-based Approaches to Metaphor and Metonymy*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 64-105.
- Zinken, Joerg (2007). Discourse metaphors: the link between figurative language and habitual analogies. *Cognitive Linguistics* 18 (3): 445-466.

Snežana Bilbija

University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

WHAT WILL THE OHR DISCOURSE BE REMEMBERED BY?

Abstract. The main objective of this paper is to give an overview of linguistic properties of the political discourse produced by the Office of the High Representative (the OHR) in post-Dayton Bosnia. The paper concerns itself with morphological idiosyncrasies, syntactic choices, semantic presuppositions and kinds of metaphors contributing significantly to the promotion of the OHR ideology.

1. Introduction

According to numerous political speculations and predictions circulating in the political context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is expected that the Office of the UN High Representative¹ will cease to exist in the course of 2009. The consequence of this will be the disappearance of the HR's powerful discourse which has since 1995 been the exclusive factor in shaping political life in BiH after the war (1992-1995). In the course of the past fourteen years, six appointed High Representatives have generated the same type of discourse organized round their undisputed political power. They also never failed to remind the Bosnian peoples of who has the "upper hand."

¹ The following quotation, containing the description of the role of HR, is posted in the official OHR website www.ohr.int: "In its resolution 1031 (of 15 December 1995), the Security Council endorsed the nomination of the High Representative to *"monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and mobilize and, as appropriate, give guidance to, and coordinate the activities of, the civilian organizations and agencies involved"* in the implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council also requested the Secretary General to submit reports from the High Representative, in accordance with Annex 10 of the Peace Agreement ".

2. Theoretical framework

The present analysis of the data was conducted within the theoretical framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) as formulated primarily in the standard works of “the quartet”² consisting of Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak and Paul Chilton.³ In addition to enabling the analyst to detect the form and function of discourse structures arising from a particular social context, CDA presupposes that the analysis should include the identification of ideologies. Of course, within CDA there are numerous definitions of ideology. But if we compare van Dijk’s definition of ideology according to which “an ideology is the foundation of the social representations shared by a social group” (Van Dijk 2006:728) with Chiapello and Fairclough’s claim that it is “a system of ideas, values and beliefs oriented to explaining a given political order, legitimizing existing hierarchies and power relations and preserving group identities” (Chiapello and Fairclough 2002:187), we can see that their respective views on ideology are practically identical.

3. Analysis of the data

The data was obtained from selected documents created in English by the High Representative himself, or in cooperation with his various associates. The documents are categorized as *press releases, decisions, the HR’s Speeches, the High Representative’s Special Reports to the UN*⁴ and were all posted on the official OHR site in the course of 2007/08 and the first two months of 2009. We should seize upon this moment, right before the replacement of the OHR by a different Office, and make an overview of the linguistic facets of the OHR discourse. Why was the discourse of current HR Miroslav Lajčak chosen to represent the OHR discourse as such? The answer to this may be found in our conviction that in his discourse M. Lajčak, the sixth in the line of the High Representatives, seeks to retain the

² This term is used by I. Blommaert (Blommaert 2005:21) to emphasize the four scholars’ common contributions to CDA rather than their mutual differences.

³ P.Chilton’s writings significantly influenced my perception of CDA, apart from his recent views that the social grounding of CDA should be minimized if not completely abandoned.

⁴ Current HR Miroslav Lajčak has so far submitted three Reports to the UN Secretary-General since assuming the Office of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and EU Special Representative on 1 July 2007.

recognizable central idea that BiH needs the OHR, under the assumption that it cannot leave decision making to its politicians. Having inherited from the previous HRs a tacitly agreed upon linguistic rendering of OHR political objectives, the discourse of the current HR also mirrors numerous pragmatic reflexes of life in post-Dayton Bosnia which crept into this discourse during the fourteen-year-long rule of the OHR.

4. OHR discourse ideology

Rather than merely claiming that the OHR's discourse is ideological, this paper aims to closely examine the ways in which the OHR produces and reproduces its ideology through language. It is widely known that the most important world powers, posing under the UN "umbrella" established the OHR with the ambition to politically govern post-war Bosnia. In this way, it was publicly announced that the imposed rule of the OHR implies unequal distribution of political power and, equally importantly, that such rule has legitimacy. Therefore, any discourse generated by the only source of political power in Bosnia (the OHR) can be labeled ideological. It is therefore difficult to understand why the discourse of the OHR insists so vehemently on linguistically securing the UN licensed political inequality.

The OHR's political discourse abounds in various linguistic means used for the realization of its ideology and the following sections will concern themselves with the identification and description of such means.

4.1 Linguistic realization of the OHR political discourse

Our linguistic analysis of the current OHR discourse will begin with a morphological description since certain decisions that were made by discourse creators are not in agreement with mainstream practices in morphology.

4.1.1 Morphology of the OHR discourse

When the OHR discourse is examined from a morphological angle, it can be noted that this discourse is replete with *ad hoc* morphological

solutions realized within such derivational morphological processes known as compounding and abbreviations. The appearance of unusual morphological derivatives in this discourse can be attributed to the idiosyncrasies of the Bosnian political context that had to be dealt with linguistically.

4.1.1.1 Compounding

We can start with the morphological realization of the country's name itself, which can be rendered in English in two ways: either as a hyphenated compound '*Bosnia-Herzegovina*' or as a coordinated compound '*Bosnia and Herzegovina*', which can be regarded as a calque or loan translation of the home term "Bosna i Hercegovina". The coordinated compound variant seems to be the only linguistic choice in the OHR texts in English

- (1) Regrettably, this important step has not led to a change in the politics that are conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina (*HR's 34 Report to the UN*)

4.1.1.2 Abbreviations (initialisms)

Abbreviations are often referred to as pet morphological forms of Contemporary English. Interestingly enough, the *BiH* form, which is the B/C/S⁵ abbreviated form for the country's name, is borrowed unchanged into English, retaining the non-English conjunction *i* ('and').

- (2) ...expresses its deep concern about the frequent challenges to the constitutional order of *BiH* and, in particular... (*Press release*)

The adoption of an *ad hoc* morphological solution for the abbreviated form for the country's name *Bosnia and Herzegovina* in English can be contrasted with the three legitimate morphological abbreviating possibilities existing in English: BH, B-H and B&H .

By looking at other morphological solutions for abbreviating those complex noun phrases used to name Bosnian political phenomena (ranging from political parties to different organizations) one finds cases where the full name of such political bodies is provided in the English translation, while

⁵ The abbreviation B/C/S stands for the English translation of the 3 official languages in BiH: B stands for Bosnian, C for Croatian and S for Serbian. In the official text the letters always appear in this order.

the abbreviated form is provided in the local B/C/S version. Illustrations of such cases are provided by examples (3) and (4) below.

- (3) The leaders of both the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) and HDZ 1990... (*Press release*)
- (4)...worth noting that the statement marks a distinct change of policy on the part of Dodik's ruling party Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), which... (*Press release*)

The moment one is inclined to conclude that morphological possibilities for the abbreviations have been exhausted, one finds that in the OHR discourse it is possible for the abbreviated forms to appear without their full name preceding them (which would provide the interpretation for the abbreviations) as is shown in the example (5) below:

- (5) Miroslav Lajčák met with the SDA President Sulejman Tihić in Sarajevo today to discuss the current political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the implementation of the agreement reached by the leaders of HDZ BiH, SDA and SNSD in Prud... (*Press release*)

On the other hand, when the complex names of other Bosnian institutions require abbreviation, the "normal" English abbreviation practice is implemented and the abbreviations are formed by stringing the initial letters of the constituent words in the complex name in English which is illustrated by examples (6) and (7) below.

- (6) Ensuring the independence of the Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA) in the RS is particularly... (*Press release*)
- (7) Miroslav Lajčák met today in Sarajevo with Chair of the Council of Ministers Nikola Špirić and addressed the regular session of the CoM to discuss the priorities on the EU agenda, which need to get back on track... (*Press release*)

How can this *ad hoc* morphology be accounted for? One thing is certain – opting for the morphological solutions noted above does not stem from a collection of instructions recorded in some fixed and reliable language policy on English usage in BiH. Rather, it is a result of the 'arbitrary linguistic judgment' adopted by the offices that release various documents or statements.

The inconsistency of morphological decisions in the OHR discourse is even more salient when the name of BiH's smaller Entity, i.e. *Republika*

*Srpska*⁶ is mentioned. In some instances of OHR written discourse this proper noun is used both with the definite article and without it as illustrated in examples (8) and (9) below.

(8) The merger is awaiting adoption by Ø Republika Srpska of the necessary transitional legislation. (*Press release*)

(9) .. challenges to the existence of the Republika Srpska as one of two entities under the Constitution of BiH. (*Press release*)

The same indecisiveness regarding the use of definite article in front of the proper noun *Republika Srpska* affects the use of the article when the full name is abbreviated as in the example (10) below.

(10) ...implied an implicit recognition of the RS. (*Press release*)

In concluding this section on morphological diversity in the OHR discourse, it can be noted that the choice of unusual *ad hoc* morphological solutions was motivated by the desire of the creators of this discourse to make salient reference to the existing political factors in Bosnia. In this way, the OHR also demonstrates knowledge and, more importantly, control of the situation in the concrete Bosnian context. However, it could equally be justifiable to attribute this morphologically volatile behaviour to the OHR's disrespect for a possibly different linguistic solution.

4.2 Syntactic characterization of the OHR discourse

The remaining sections of this paper will continue to argue that OHR discourse is a textbook example of a genuine ideological discourse in which there is an adversarial relationship between *We/Us* and *They/Them*. Ideological adversaries are supposed to engage in a struggle out of which

⁶ It is interesting to note that the proper name *Republika Srpska* appeared as such for the first time in the Dayton Peace Agreement. It continued to be used as such in the official documents created by the OHR as well as other official institutions in BiH, that go under the umbrella term of "the international community". Moreover, one may also often find the English hybrid translation of the original term rendered as "The Republic of Srpska" in a number of journalistic texts relating to Bosnia in the war period as well as to its post-war reality. This neologism could be justified by the existence of similar proper names for the names of countries like the Republic of Croatia and the People's Republic of China. What was the rationale behind the decision for the original "foreign" (Serbian) sounding name to be retained in all subsequent (post-Dayton) official English texts (as in the OHR's discourse and many others)? This appears even more mysterious since other home terms like *Federacija BiH* were translated as *The BiH Federation*. Perhaps it is wiser to look for possible answer in politics rather than in linguistics.

the “Us” (the OHR = the good guys) is expected to come out as the winner. The implementation of the strategy of positive *self-representation* (the OHR) and negative *Other-presentation* (BiH politicians = Them) is supposed to ensure this outcome. In such a discourse this strategy is executed through a plethora of syntactic choices, some of which, like passive and active uses of verbs, are illustrated in examples (11) and (12) and (13) and (14) below.

4.2.1 Passive verb forms for negative *Other-presentation*

- (11) With regard to Herzegovina-Neretva Canton it proved necessary for me to set a deadline of 1 August to ensure formation a new cantonal government – ten months after the general elections. This deadline was met. (*HR’s 33 Report to the UN*)
- (12) In April, two police reform laws were adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (*HR’s 34 Report to the UN*)

4.2.2 Active verb forms for positive *self-presentation*

- (13) ...the OHR will assist the domestic authorities in examining and applying these proposals. (*HR’s 34 Report to the UN*)
- (14) The Office of the High Representative successfully mediated a compromise for the adoption of the national justice sector reform strategy in June. (*HR’s 33 Report to the UN*)

The ideological discourse of the OHR, like any other ideological discourse, makes use of *passive sentences* in order to minimize the positive things about the adversary. By removing the focus from responsible, positive agents, their praise-worthy achievements become intentionally depersonalized. Contrary to this, *active sentences* are always used to emphasize agents (OHR) and portray them explicitly as responsible subjects always ready to undertake an active role.

4.3 The role of semantics in OHR ideological discourse

The area of lexical semantics provides generators of any discourse – the political in particular – with access to the semantic phenomenon known as *semantic presuppositions*. The intriguing aspect of semantic presuppositions is that they cannot be extracted from the concrete discourse as specific, salient structures. But they are released as meanings

(propositions) by linguistic signals that trigger them. Levinson (1989:181-185) gives a rather exhaustive list of presupposition triggers which range from definite descriptions to factive verbs to change of state verbs, etc. Because they are associated with what is not said, but is implied, presuppositions are very effective in the hands of discourse manipulators. Presuppositions allow the speaker or writer to question or challenge or attack something or someone and avoid responsibility for such actions. These are very effective linguistic devices for implementing the strategy of positive *self*-presentation and negative *Other*-presentation and Chilton (2007) defines them as follows:

Presupposition is of central importance to discourse analysts, and in particular to those concerned with elucidating what is not said, what is taken for granted and what is assumed to hold valid for a political community (Chilton 2007:297).

The following examples from the OHR discourse exemplify two propositions, one that is “visible” and contained in the example and the other that is triggered by a characteristic device. The fact that the parallel proposition is invisible does not mean that it cannot be understood as shown in (15) and (16) below.

4.3.1. Presupposition for positive *self*-presentation:

Change of state verb – trigger

(15) .. the OHR will continue to engage with the BiH authorities to secure the implication of the reform agenda, but progress will not come easily. (*HR’s 33 Report to the UN*)
<OHR has already been engaged with the BiH authorities to secure the implication.....>⁷

4.3.2. Presupposition for negative *Other*-presentation:

Definite description – trigger

(16) In close coordinate with other IC actors, OHR has worked over the reporting period with the BiH Ministry of Security, the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), the Border Police and the entity and cantonal interior ministries

⁷ The symbol < > is used here to accommodate the presupposition, while the trigger signal is underlined.

and police forces to enhance their effectiveness, particularly in the fight against organized crime. (*HR's 33 Report to the UN*) (HR'S 32 Report to the UN)

< *Organised crime is being fought* >

5. The use of metaphor in HR's political discourse

The texture of HR's political discourse would be deemed incomplete if metaphors employed in the discourse were not included in the critical elucidation of his language. In fact, metaphors are exceptionally convenient in political discourse to justify policies and define events. Chilton and Illyin (1993) state that "from a cognitive point of view, metaphors are used in communication, political included, and in order for us to understand problematic situations in terms of situations we understand and are familiar with" (1993: 9). In the same article they also say that "metaphors new and old tend to be built out of basic human concepts arising from bodily interaction with the environment: standing upright, being in a containing space, moving from one point to another" (ibid).

5.1 The concept of the body moving from one place to a better place as the foundation for the "road metaphor"

In the discourse of the current HR *road* metaphors are often exploited since his mandate coincides with the beginning of negotiations with the EU regarding the BiH status as its potential state member. The literal meaning of the word "road" is described in the COED as "a long piece of hard ground that people can drive along from one place to another". (Concise Oxford English Dictionary 11th edition)

5.1.1 Metaphor of "the road leading to the European Union"

From the cognitive perspective the use of the *road* metaphor in HR discourse can be associated with the concept of a stretch of ground framed by edges which separate the road from 'what is not the road'. Thus, to opt for the former means to walk on ground that is contained and can be controlled. The *road*, being entrenched in a schema of a container, has, like

any container, its physical boundaries, i.e. its beginning and its end. The movement on the road is very rarely undertaken without a plan and a hope that the progress on it will be a success. At the end of the *road*, if one is lucky, one can find oneself in front of a dream house and a garden and can be admitted, integrated into that domain, provided one is first approved by the guards at the entrance. The domain waiting at the end of the *road* is likened to the *rainbow* metaphor, reminiscent of the *road in the sky*, which, in the myth, ends with the *pot of gold* awaiting those who are good and motivated to reach it. It is not difficult to guess that these metaphors are used to familiarize the recipients with the favourable political, economic and geographical concept of the EU and all that it represents as shown in examples (17), (18), and (19) below.

- (17) It remains a requirement for *the road to Europe* and the International Community is firmly committed to a multiethnic, editorially independent and financially sustainable public service that operates in the interests of all BiH's citizens. *(Press release)*
- (18) This country could be more prosperous and it could be further along the *European road*, if it did not have to contend with obstructionist forces. *(Press release)*
- (19) Nobody in the EU will ease the visa regime for a country that refuses to follow the *European path*.⁸ *(Press release)*

5.1.2 Metaphor of “*the rainbow and the pot of gold*”

This metaphor, in fact, may be interpreted as a derivative of the *road* metaphor.

- (20) Our *overarching objective* <RAINBOW> is to make this country stable, prosperous, democratic and secure and a member of the EU. This is a process in which the whole of society must take part for it concerns everyone; it is a process that can continue *until the country joins the EU.* <POT OF GOLD> *(Press release)*
- (21) The stance that parliamentary parties adopt will decide whether it is possible to open *the European Perspective*

⁸ The fact that the HR sometimes uses the word “path” as a synonym for the word “road” does not affect the function and understanding of the *road* metaphor.

<RAINBOW> for BiH and its citizens,” said the High Representative and EU Special Representative, Miroslav Lajčák. (*Press release*)

(22) However, with the *road to Europe* <RAINBOW> currently blocked, it is incumbent on us to act – robustly and creatively – to accelerate *improvements in the daily life* <POT OF GOLD> of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to deescalate the crisis that has been created. (*Speech given by High Representative to the UN Security Council 2007*)

6. Conclusion

As stated earlier, the OHR discourse as political discourse is by definition ideological, which implies that it is dialogic too. However, ideologies cannot be disseminated without the existence of a receiving *Other*. In this geopolitical environment, that *Other* appears to be the Bosnian society. It remains to be seen whether the future exclusive presence of the Office of the European Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina will impose a different type of discourse. But judging from the text of the “Introduction” to the EUSR’s Mission⁹ in which it says that

the ultimate aim is *to help*¹⁰ Bosnia and Herzegovina *evolve* into a *stable, viable, peaceful* and multiethnic country, *cooperating peacefully* with its neighbours and *irreversibly on track towards EU membership*. (*The EUSR homepage, March 2009*),

it is more likely than not that we will be having the same kind of discourse all over again.

References

- Blommaert, J. (2005). *Discourse: A Critical Introduction*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Blommaert, J. (2006). Language ideology. In: *Elsevier Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* (2nd edn.) Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishers. 510-522.

⁹ The Office of the European Union Special Representative homepage currently occupies half of the OHR’s homepage (www.ohr.int)

¹⁰ The italics are mine.

- Chiapello, E and N. Fairclough (2002). Understanding the new management ideology: a transdisciplinary contribution from critical discourse analysis and the new sociology of capitalism. *Discourse and Society* 13 (2): 185-208.
- Chilton, P. and M. Ilyn (1993). Metaphor in political discourse. *Discourse and Society* 4 (7): 7-3.
- Chilton, P and C. Schäffner (1997). Discourse and politics. In: T. A van Dijk (ed.), *Discourse as Social Interaction*. London: Sage. 206-230.
- Chilton, P. (2004). *Analyzing Political Discourse*. London: Routledge.
- Chilton, Paul (2007). Challenges in the study of language and politics. *Journal of Language and Politics* 6: 297-301.
- Chouliaraki, L. and N. Fairclough (1999). *Discourse in Late Modernity. Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. Edinburgh: University Press.
- Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and Power*. London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and Social Change*. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA: Polity Press and Blackwell.
- Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical Discourse Analysis: the Critical Study of Language*. London and New York: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. and R. Wodak (1997). Critical discourse analysis. In: T. A van Dijk (ed.) *Discourse as Social Interaction. Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, Vol. 2. London: Sage. 258-284.
- Fairclough, N. (2000). *New Labour, New Language?* New York: Routledge.
- Lakoff, G and M. Johnson (1980). *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Levinson, S. C. (1989). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Dijk, T. (1993). *Critical Discourse Analysis*. Special Issue of *Discourse and Society*, 4 (2).
- van Dijk, T. (2006). Politics, ideology and discourse. In: *Elsevier Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* (2nd edn.). Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishers. 728-740.
- Wodak, R. and M. Meyer (eds.) (2001). *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage.
- Wodak, R. (2006). Politics and language: Overview. In: *Elsevier Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* (2nd edn.). Oxford: Elsevier Publishers. 707-719.

Ranko Bugarski
University of Belgrade, Serbia

ENGLISH IN EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS: SOME OBSERVATIONS

Abstract. This paper presents a brief and somewhat informal discussion, in part based on participant observation, of the status and use of English in the European Union and the Council of Europe. The linguistic profile of 'Euro-English' is commented on, emphasising its nature as a special, partly de-nationalised variety which as such may be acceptable to those involved in the work of European institutions, regardless of their different linguistic backgrounds. The effectiveness of native and non-native English in such contexts is then compared, the conclusion being that the former, while in some general sense 'better', is not necessarily advantageous to its speakers but may in fact turn into a disadvantage, depending on the way it is used in large multinational and multilingual organisations.

What follows is the written version of a talk given at the international conference "The Future of Englishes", organised by the English-Speaking Union of Serbia to mark the 90th anniversary of the English-Speaking Union and held in Belgrade on 1 November 2008. Reflecting the somewhat informal spirit of the occasion, this paper is not a strictly academic treatment of the subject, ominously bristling with statistics, figures and tables, but rather a loose discussion based partly on generally known facts and partly on personal observations and experience. By 'European institutions' I mean the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CE), with their various bodies – parliaments, commissions, committees, etc.

The topic will be dealt with under four headings:

- (1) The position of English in the EU
- (2) The position of English in the CE
- (3) The profile of 'European English'
- (4) Native vs. non-native English in European institutions

(1)

As is well known, the EU is the only international organisation which, rather than choosing a small number of official languages for internal communication, has from the start granted equal language rights to all its member countries. This policy, based on a belief in the values of the linguistic and cultural diversity of Europe and of fully democratic procedures, worked tolerably well while membership was small, but increasingly exposed its practical weaknesses as more and more countries joined in, their national languages automatically becoming co-official languages of the EU. Given that, at least in theory, all oral proceedings and all documents of the EU bodies had to go on or be made available in all the languages, simple arithmetic clearly showed an increasingly unmanageable rise in language combinations (interpretation/translation from any one language into all the others) with the successive membership enlargements. At one stage, with 11 languages there were 110 such pairs (11x10), with 20 languages the number of combinations rose to 380 (20x19), and currently, with 23 languages, it has shot up to 506 (23x22). (And let us not forget that there are more candidates waiting in line, including the Serbo-Croatian speaking area of the former Yugoslavia, which alone stands ready to contribute four new languages to the pool: Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and now also Montenegrin!).

This situation has long since passed the point of tolerability, in view of the staggering costs of maintaining what is already by far the largest translation service in the world, the difficulties of training qualified staff for such a Babylonian enterprise, of providing enough rooms and equipment, etc. To invoke the truism that democracy costs money is not very helpful under circumstances like these, and alternative solutions had to be sought – bearing in mind the strongly political rather than practical nature of the issue. Two theoretical possibilities were understandably discarded without serious examination: introducing a dead language (Latin) or an artificial one (such as Esperanto) as the only official means of communication; and according this privileged status to only one or two of the languages already on the repertoire (English and possibly French), thus definitely giving up the treasured principle of equal rights. Keeping all the languages as official, with English as the only working language, found some advocates but did not stand a real chance either, due to national sensitivities of especially the closest rivals. (For more on the recent reform proposals see Appendix 2 in De Swaan 2007:16-18). And so, with very little elbow room left under pressure of so many tongues symbolising

the sovereignty of the member states, shortcuts had to be resorted to in order to break the deadlock by striking a workable compromise between national pride and efficient communication, between ideology and economy, without however relinquishing the philosophy of language equality altogether.

Two main steps were taken to achieve this. One was putting a loose interpretation on the term 'working language'. Technically, all EU official languages are at the same time working languages (and the distinction is nowhere explained), but using the latter label made it easier to carry out the drafting process in only a few languages and then have the main documents translated into all the rest. These few also served as unofficial in-house languages for informal meetings and day-to-day operations. The other simplifying device was using these same languages as pivots in oral proceedings, with interpretation not involving all the languages directly but going through a relay system (from any one of them into one or two and then from these into all the rest). The upshot of all this is that there are at present three *de facto* working languages: English (roughly 60 % of all proceedings), French (some 30 %), and German (up to 10 %) – with a negligible presence of any other candidates that may occasionally appear in that role. (The percentages are only a rough estimate based on different sources, because it is hard to work out precise overall statistics on internal and external language use of different EU organs).

These practices have resulted in the initially 'integral multilingualism' gradually developing (some would say: degenerating) into 'selective multilingualism': all languages are still represented only at the top of the hierarchy (plenary sessions of the European Parliament and the European Commission, meetings of the Council of Ministers, main decisions and declarations, public proclamations and the like), with the lower levels tending to rely on the few privileged ones and increasingly on English. Incidentally, this pecking order is relatively recent. In the earlier periods English had lagged far behind French but gradually overtook it towards the end of the last century, as more countries became members where English tended to be more popular and more widely taught; as one shrewd observer succinctly phrased the apparent paradox, "The more languages, the more English" (De Swaan 2001:144). This trend of non-native speakers gaining the upper hand in laying down the course of English, clearly observable in the world at large, is likely to continue, so that the percentages given above as crudely reflecting the current picture can be expected to change yet more in favour of English in the coming years. (For a detailed critical examination of EU language policy, including

the major relevant documents and position statements, see Phillipson 2003; also Kraus 2008).

(2)

Compared with the rich linguistic landscape of the EU, the CE is pretty much a barren field, with only English and French as official (and the possibility of the occasional use of German, Italian and Russian as additional working languages). Translation and interpretation facilities are available to all bodies of the organisation; on the higher levels they are made use of regularly, and on the lower ones if such a need arises. On the whole English predominates here too. There seem to be no overall figures on the relative representation of English and French, but in this instance (as opposed to the EU) I can offer some impressions based on participant observation. An important part of CE activities is the regular work of numerous international expert committees in different areas, and I happen to be a member of one such – the Committee of Experts on the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. During the first two years of my mandate there I have heard very little French, as this particular body, composed of some two dozen experts and Charter secretariat members from as many countries functions almost exclusively in English, this being the language of choice for practically all of them. Interpretation services from and into French are available and may be engaged, for the entire proceedings or parts of them, at the request of even a single member. In my experience this in fact happened only twice, when the full four-day proceedings were interpreted (by two interpreters taking turns) for the benefit of one member who actually knew enough English but preferred French. I mention this merely to show that linguistic equality is taken very seriously in the CE as well, but also that it can be quite costly even with only two languages involved. And I should add, of course, that this particular committee is not necessarily representative of the linguistic practice of CE bodies generally; however, it does seem to suggest a strong current preference for English over French.

(3)

As to the kind of English used in European institutions, sometimes referred to as ‘European English’ or ‘Euro-English’ (ironically also ‘Euro-speak’), it is perhaps best regarded as a local variety of what used to be termed International (or World) English. Such non-native varieties, including the

currently rather popular but different notion of Lingua Franca English, have attracted considerable attention in recent years, giving rise to much controversy. It is neither necessary nor possible to engage in a discussion of this large topic here. (For a general overview the interested reader may look up sources like McArthur 1998, Leech/Svartvik 2006, Jenkins 2007 or McKay/Bokhorst-Heng 2008). It will suffice to state merely that 'Euro-English' is to a certain extent developing its own features, especially in lexis and terminology, which often make it difficult for outsiders to understand. For example, I have had trouble grasping the special meaning of words like *conditionality* or *outsourcing*, frequent in Euro-jargon. The latter, in fact, is my negative favourite, if I may put it that way. When I first encountered this neologism it struck me as morphologically ill-formed and semantically opaque (which, needless to say, also goes for the verb *to outsource* and related grammatical forms). It took me a while to realise that it meant something like enlisting paid outside help with excessive tasks on the agenda of a particular body, a meaning which I could hardly consider even remotely transparent. So when it was suggested by senior CE officials that 'outsourcing' might be a good way of overcoming the shortage of qualified staff and the matter was brought up for discussion in my committee, I spoke out against the proposal – but could not help feeling that my negative reaction was partly due to my dislike for the word: shades of Benjamin Lee Whorf! (For anyone interested: the proposal was rejected, though I am sure not for linguistic reasons...).

On the whole, however, I share the view expressed by many that 'Euro-English', as a variety distinct from 'national English', whatever its shortcomings, plays a useful role in verbally uniting the entire European community by giving everyone a sense of ownership of English on an equal footing, as opposed to feeling permanently overshadowed by the privileged native English speakers among them. Which brings me to my fourth and last section.

(4)

The relationship between native English (NE) and non-native English (NNE) has likewise become a controversial issue, and the very notion of the native speaker, especially in its idealized form associated with Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, has become an object of critical scrutiny in some quarters, notably including sociolinguistics and applied linguistics. Once again, the general arguments advanced in the accumulated recent literature cannot be reviewed in this paper (but see e.g. Singh 1998,

Davies 2003, Graddol 2006). The same goes for more specific proposals concerning pronunciation, the linguistic level where non-nativeness is most readily revealed (on which see e.g. Jenkins 2000, Dziubalska-Kořaczyk/Przedlacka 2005, Paunović 2007). I have myself long held the view that there are more important tasks in English language teaching than insisting on an absolutely 'native-like', 'accent-free' pronunciation, a view stressing proficiency over 'nativeness' (Bugarski 1986). However, this implies no denigration of the native speaker, and I certainly do not go along with the hasty coroners announcing his death (alluded to in the alarming title of Paikeday 1985). He is far from dead, of course, even as a teaching goal to be handled with care, but is no longer the sole unquestioned authority or norm always and everywhere, so one should rid him of his conventional but largely unwarranted mystique.

Focusing now on the language rather than on its speakers, while it stands to reason that NE is in some sense 'better' than NNE (being the original thing and not a necessarily imperfect copy, and the like), the point should not be overdrawn. Not all speakers on both sides speak alike (in fact, few of them do), so that a cline of proficiency cuts through the distinction, and a really good representative of NNE can be more effective than a relatively poor speaker of NE. There are indeed major contexts where taking the absolute priority of NE for granted, without any reservation or closer examination, is a simplistic and highly questionable, not to say plainly false position.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the day-to-day work of large multinational and multilingual organisations, such as the EU and the CE, including some native English speakers and numerous groups or individuals of other language backgrounds, with a knowledge of English ranging from excellent to quite weak, even nonexistent, when interpretation must be relied on quite heavily. Under such circumstances – and this is my main point here – the apparent exclusivity of NE is not necessarily an advantage, and unless properly exercised and controlled may in fact turn into a distinct disadvantage, from the point of view of overall understanding and efficient communication.

Probably the most insightful and revealing source to consult on these matters is the recent study of Wright (2007), based on interviews, observation and questionnaires conducted in the European Parliament, where the author investigated the usage and attitudes of members of different national and language backgrounds with regard to English (and French too, but that part falls outside my topic). In a nutshell, her findings confirmed the thesis just set forth. Some of the native English speakers,

typically monolingual ones, displayed a variety of regional accents, speaking fast and carelessly in their usual conversational style, generally oblivious of their audiences and not even attempting to accommodate to their frequently limited understanding of English, or to take into account the fact that their speeches were being interpreted. Many of them often employed idioms and metaphors with distinctly Anglo-Saxon cultural associations, which did not help much either. (Incidentally, the refusal to make any concessions was very much in evidence in the French case too, where many delegates wished to demonstrate French high culture by resorting to literary allusions; an amusing instance – not to the poor interpreter, certainly! – was the use of the adjective *Tartuffesque* on one occasion, a reference to Molière which must have been lost on almost everyone present). Such practices, in addition to slowing down interpretation, are also counterproductive in that the speakers often do not get their messages across, which should surely be the whole point of their being there, while those listening may be repelled and even offended by the smugness of the allegedly privileged native speakers.

In sharp contrast to this, fluent non-native speakers typically speak more slowly and carefully (with a ‘foreign’ but mostly cultivated and more easily comprehensible accent), concerned not so much with demonstrating verbal skill or cultural knowledge as with making themselves and their points fully understood. This shows that in such contexts (which, by the way, also include many academic lectures and discussions, multinational business meetings and much else) mutual understanding among non-native users of English takes precedence over prowess in imitating native models, and that careful and competent NNE is more readily comprehended, along with the messages it carries, than carefree, even irresponsibly used NE.

It is precisely this role that ‘Euro-English’ is tailored to fit on its large and expanding home ground. No longer being merely, or even primarily, the national language of one European state, it cannot be simply written off as bad English, a corrupt version of ‘real’ English (an affectation common in outmoded elitist and purist rhetoric). At present it may still be more of an idea, an attitude of mind, than a coherent and workable tool, a distinct and linguistically fully describable variety of international English. However, it is being jointly developed by its users for their communicative needs and cultural practices as citizens of Europe, transcending particular nationalist ideologies and biases, and these people are to that extent its authentic ‘owners’. (For English in general it could then be said that it ‘belongs’ to some speakers as a first and to others, increasingly, as an additional

language). It may be some years before 'Euro-English' fully takes shape, but its future in some form, under this or another name, seems assured: the supranational polities which the nations of Europe have been building as their common roof are here to stay – and with them, it appears, this somewhat unorthodox idiom as *primus inter pares*.

In conclusion, English is doing very well in European institutions, as in Europe and the world generally, despite certain problems inevitably brought about by its very spread. Facing such challenges and constantly adjusting to new situations may, however, give it new strength in its progress as a global language.

References

- Bugarski, R. (1986). The role of sociolinguistics in foreign language teaching at university level. In: S. Efstathiadis and N. Tryfona-Antonopoulou (eds.), *Foreign Language Learning and Interpersonal Tolerance and Understanding*. Thessaloniki: Greek Applied Linguistics Association. 108-116.
- Davies, A. (2003). *The Native Speaker: Myth and Reality*. Second edition. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- De Swaan, A. (2001). *Words of the World: The Global Language System*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- De Swaan, A. (2007). The language predicament of the EU since the enlargements. *Sociolinguistica* 21: 1-21.
- Dziubalska-Kołaczyk, K. and J. Przedlacka (eds.) (2005). *English Pronunciation Models: A Changing Scene*. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Graddol, D. (2006). *English Next*. London: British Council.
- Jenkins, J. (2000). *The Phonology of English as an International Language*. Oxford: OUP.
- Jenkins, J. (2007). *English as a Lingua Franca: Attitude and Identity*. Oxford: OUP.
- Kraus, P.A. (2008). *A Union of Diversity: Language, Identity and Polity-Building in Europe*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Leech, G. and J. Svartvik (2006). *English: One Tongue, Many Voices*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McArthur, T. (1998). *The English Languages*. Cambridge: CUP.

- McKay, S. L. and W. D. Borkhorst-Heng (2008). *International English in its Sociolinguistic Contexts: Towards a Socially Sensitive EIL Pedagogy*. New York/London: Routledge.
- Paikeday, T.M. (1985). *The Native Speaker is Dead!* Toronto/New York: Paikeday Publishing.
- Paunović, T. (2007). Professor Higgins is not yet out (Or why do we teach phonetics?). In: K. Rasulić and I. Trbojević (eds.), *English Language and Literature Studies: Interfaces and Integration*, Vol. II. Belgrade: Faculty of Philology. 47-55.
- Phillipson, R. (2003). *English-Only Europe? Challenging Language Policy*. Oxford: OUP.
- Singh, R. (ed.) (1998). *The Native Speaker: A Multilingual Perspective*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Wright, S. (2007). English in the European Parliament: MEPs and their language repertoires. *Sociolinguistica* 21: 151-165.

Anne Katz
Education Design Group, USA

LINKING LEARNING AND ASSESSMENT IN CLASSROOM PRACTICE

Abstract. In the language classroom, assessment has long been used to describe and verify students' developing language proficiency. More recently, research has suggested that assessment used to promote learning can have a positive impact on student achievement. This paper explores the theoretical foundation for this claim and its implications for classroom practice. It describes how assessment linked to learning can provide insight into the development of language skills and transform the roles of teachers and students. It concludes with examples drawn from the English Department at the University of Belgrade that illustrate how assessment can be integrated with instruction.

Nearly one decade into the 21st century, the role of assessment in language classrooms is changing, expanding from such traditional functions as describing and certifying student proficiency to more student-centered uses that provide richer insight into the development of skills and, along the way, that transform the roles of teachers and students (Rea-Dickins 2008). This paper examines these changes and their potential impact on language classrooms.

Assessment has long served key functions in education. School systems rely on assessment data to address important questions related to student learning as well as to serve accountability functions such as determining the effectiveness of specific programs or services. In the case of foreign language programs, several kinds of assessments customarily provide such information: placement tests guide the selection of candidates for specific services and identify appropriate class levels. Diagnostic tests offer a closer look at students' specific strengths and areas for continued development. Achievement tests describe the amount and range of learning students have developed as a result of instruction both

during and at the end of school terms. Language proficiency tests brought forth by large-scale testing programs such as the Cambridge ESOL suite of examinations and TOEFL are designed to certify language levels as learners progress in their language development.

More recently, assessment has also been seen as an important tool to support learning in the classroom (Black and Wiliam 1998b; Rea-Dickens 2001). For teachers, this linkage of assessment with learning represents a departure from more traditional views that separate assessment from what is considered the teachers' main role – that of instructional leader. In fact, many teachers may harbor misgivings about adopting this new role, often feeling they are ill prepared to take on assessment functions such as monitoring, describing or measuring student learning. The following vignette illustrates some of the concerns teachers bring to the table when considering how to adapt their practice to include assessment.

Teachers who work in a private language school have gathered for a workshop on developing assessments. As a starting exercise, they've thought about their previous experiences with assessment. As they share their reflections with others, a theme quickly emerges. Most of the talk centers on why they do not feel comfortable with assessment. Here are some of their concerns:

- *Most of us lack knowledge or training.*
- *We feel that books about assessment aren't interesting or relevant because the focus is on theory rather than application.*
- *We feel like we are being underestimated.*
- *We teach using a communicative approach and don't think testing fits with our approach.*

The teachers in this vignette voice a concern, common to many language teachers, that neither their pre-service training programs nor their in-service professional development activities have prepared them to incorporate assessments into the stream of classroom activities. In addition to illuminating the essential discomfort many teachers feel towards assessment, the last bullet highlights an important insight from teachers regarding the relationship between assessment and learning – that for assessment to be useful in the classroom, it must be congruent with instruction so as to ensure that the information collected is appropriate and relevant to students' learning. It is this linkage between assessment and learning that can transform classrooms, helping teachers develop more useful tools for tapping into student learning and changing the nature of teacher and student roles in assessment.

Emerging views of assessment in school

In many classrooms that continue to conform to traditional notions of how languages are learned and taught, instruction and assessment are conceptualized as separate activities within the stream of classroom events. The teacher delivers instruction and folds in the occasional test. While teachers may design some of these informal tools, these assessments often are provided by outside agencies or departments or included as ancillary materials accompanying class textbooks and take the form of traditional tests found across subject areas: multiple-choice, short answer, fill-in-the-blank, essays, translations, and the like. However, in the emerging assessment culture (Inbar-Louie 2007) of the 21st century, educators are turning from the use of such traditional test formats to a broader range of assessments, ones that can be linked to and support learning. The push for change has emerged as current theories of learning have focused educators' attention on describing the processes students engage in as well as the products of their efforts as they tackle classroom tasks, interact with other students and the teacher, and work through assignments. Shepard (2000) identifies the following principles underlying new forms of classroom assessment.

- The use of challenging tasks to elicit higher order thinking
- A focus on learning processes as well as learning outcomes
- An on-going process, integrated with instruction
- Expectations visible to students
- Students active in evaluating their own work
- Used to evaluate teaching as well as student learning (p. 10)

Together, these principles inform an approach to assessment that has ushered in a range of assessment types that go well beyond traditional paper and pencil tests at the end of a segment or unit of instruction.

Assessment in the language classroom

With the advent of task-based and communicative approaches to language teaching has come the use of alternative approaches to traditional testing (Brown 2004). As students engage in showing what they can *do* with language – writing essays, carrying out role-plays, listening to podcasts, arguing points of view – teachers must implement alternate methods of capturing these performances, for example, through teacher notes, rubrics

and scoring guides. Students have joined teachers in both collecting and analyzing language performance data through self- and peer-assessments. Figure 1 compares features of traditional and communicative language testing.

Traditional language testing	Communicative language testing
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on language form • Learner produces isolated bits of language that can be scored as right or wrong • Decontextualized test tasks focused on the right answer • Oriented to product • Highly objective scoring 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on the total communicative effect • Draws on several language skill areas • Draws on context of the language text • Open-ended, creative answers • Oriented to process • Clear criteria for scoring

Figure 1: A comparison of traditional and communicative language testing (Katz 2008, p. 620)

In addition to changing *how* assessment data are collected, emerging practices in classroom assessment have sharpened the focus on *what* will be assessed by linking assessment to learning. In arguing for a more constructivist perspective for assessment, Broadfoot (2005) points out:

Whilst certification and selection, monitoring and accountability are also legitimate and important purposes of assessment, the most important of all must be its role in helping or hindering learning since this is the primary purpose of education. (p. 124)

For teachers and students in language classrooms, this function of assessment to support learning is appealing since it emphasizes the usefulness of assessment information in informing decision-making about teaching and learning. The assessment literature has described assessment linked to learning in two ways.

Aligning assessment to instructional targets. A shared understanding of teaching and learning targets leads to transparency for all stakeholders in terms of identifying needs, determining learning objectives, choosing materials, selecting instructional approaches, and developing assessments. A common set of criteria that describe targeted language outcomes provides an explicit basis for linking assessment to instruction within a

coherent teaching-learning system both at macro and micro levels. Such systems using shared criteria can take several forms as the following examples at the educational macro level suggest.

In Australia, clear statements of learning objectives derived from learner needs analyses were the starting point for developing criterion-referenced assessments and for designing classroom instruction used in Adult Migrant English Programs across the country (Brindley 1989). Because of the shared criteria, local programs were able to develop common expectations for student outcomes and thus devise instructional approaches and assessments to support learners in developing their language skills.

The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) provides a set of reference levels of language proficiency that act to link language learning, teaching and assessment through descriptions of the knowledge and skills learners must develop to communicate effectively. From this framework, language educators produce language syllabi, curriculum guidelines, assessments, and learning materials (Council of Europe, 2001).

In the US as well as increasing numbers of other countries, standards form the basis for designing educational delivery systems that include targeted learning outcomes as well as assessments to measure students' progress in achieving those outcomes. In one example, English language performance standards describe what learners should know and be able to do with language in various academic content areas such as mathematics, language arts, science and social studies (TESOL 2006). These standards provide a basis for developing curricula, including assessments, to meet the needs of school age English learners (Gottlieb, Katz & Ernst-Slavit 2009).

At the micro level, in language classrooms, when tests or other forms of assessment are designed so that they are aligned with learning goals and objectives, the data collected from such tools provide direct evidence of students' progress in reaching instructional targets. Figure 2 is an example of a simple alignment chart that shows the relationship across learning objectives, classroom activities, and possible assessments.

Notice that students as well as teachers engage in tracking student progress in meeting the language objective. With a planning tool such as this one, teachers can ensure that assessment data related to important learning targets are collected across the period of instruction.

Learning objective	Classroom activity	Assessment tool
Students will be able to develop and maintain a "Lexical" vocabulary notebook.	Students will create flash cards from their own notebooks using lexical chunks. On one side is the chunk; on the other side is a picture or mnemonic device.	1. Two Parts: A. Students will race against the clock and see how many cards they can name in a minute. Every week they will measure themselves against their previous "score" and against the "scores" of their peers. B. Students will fill-in a self-assessment form.

Figure 2: Alignment chart linking assessment with learning¹¹

Integrating assessment with learning. According to current thinking, more diverse assessment tools and more frequent collection of information about student performances provide richer insight into understanding the process of developing language skills as well as measuring learning that is taking place. The phrase "formative assessment" has been widely used to refer to the array of informal assessments used by classroom teachers to help students develop their language skills by providing feedback on their performances. The aim with such an approach is not merely to classify types of assessment tools but rather to describe how assessment can be used to take action about learning. Another more recently introduced phrase related to assessment integrated with learning is "assessment *for* learning" (Assessment Reform Group, 2002), often used in juxtaposition with assessment *of* learning. Both "formative assessment" and "assessment for learning" suggest that assessment can be a means to promote learning, not only to describe or monitor it.

Research evidence supports the claim that assessment that is used to promote learning leads to improvements in student attainment. In a review of 250 studies of assessment practices in the UK in such subjects as mathematics and science, Black and Wiliam (1998a) found that both lower and higher achieving students benefited from classroom practices that provided students with feedback on their performances. This feedback has an impact when it is used in some way to improve student

¹¹This alignment chart was created by Jeff Puccini as part of the requirement for the Curriculum Development and Assessment course at SIT Graduate Institute.

learning, for example, by teachers adjusting their instruction or students adjusting their learning tactics (Popham 2009). It is useful to note is that such feedback can involve not only teacher to student interaction, but also student-to-student interaction during peer assessment.

Applying assessment linked to learning to the classroom

Classroom assessment can provide both learners and teachers with useful information about learning and, if well-designed, can even support the development of language skills. Black and Wiliams (1998a) identify two actions that form the core of formative assessment: first, the learner perceives a gap between the present state of knowledge, understanding or skill and the desired target level, and second, the learner takes an action to close the gap and reach the desired target level. The teacher's task, then, is to design assessments that can achieve these actions. Clearly, these actions require a reformulation of the learner and teacher roles within the classroom and a more explicit focus on learning aims that is shared by both teachers and students. Harlen and Winter (2004) describe several characteristics of classroom assessment that can benefit learning:

- Information is gathered about both the processes and products of learning
- This information is used to adapt teaching and learning environments and provide learners with feedback that will help them improve their performances and learn
- Learners and teachers have a shared understanding of the learning goals for activities in the classroom
- Learners are involved in assessing their work through self- and peer-assessments
- Learners are active participants in their learning.

Practice in action: the English Department at the University of Belgrade

The English program at the University of Belgrade has developed assessment practices in line with an approach that is linked to learning. These practices are part of a larger reform effort to bring instruction and assessment in line with specific learning outcomes and language competences as outlined in the Bologna Declaration. At the program

level, faculty are using the language proficiency levels from the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) as a common set of criteria to describe students' developing communicative competence in English. The CEFR is used at multiple points throughout the English language program. At entry, the proficiency framework sets a baseline level (at B2) for students admitted into the English program. As students move through each year of language classes, the CEFR informs the criteria used by teachers to measure achievement at each level. It is also used to establish exit levels for fluency and proficiency at the end of English language studies. With learning aims that are clearly articulated and shared among students and faculty across the program, all stakeholders can chart language growth over time in the program against a constant measure.

The CEFR also informs the nature of the feedback provided to students. With the CEFR's focus on what learners can do with language, assessments are tailored to examining student performances with scoring rubrics calibrated to the proficiency levels of the CEFR yet reflecting the local context of the English language program. For example, in the case of the writing portion of the Entrance Examination, the scoring guide encompasses a range of writing proficiency from B2 to C1 as indicated in CEFR descriptions of writing ability. However, the descriptions have been tailored to reflect specific language features by dividing the scoring guide into two main categories: Lexical Resource/Grammar and Coherence/Task Achievement. In addition to the CEFR, the descriptions were informed by readings of student papers and extensive discussions with faculty who were guided by their knowledge of the instructional program. (See Katz 2008 for a fuller description and analysis of the writing portion of University of Belgrade's Entrance Examination.)

While the Entrance Examination illustrates how assessment can align with learning aims, the use of process writing in the University of Belgrade's English writing program provides an example of how assessment is integrated into and supports learning. Process writing is predicated on the assumption that for each assignment, students will complete multiple drafts and that feedback – either from the teacher or from peers – will help to guide students in developing their writing skills as they work toward an explicit and shared learning target. Rather than viewing writing as a linear progression, teachers who use process writing have students engage in a recursive process. One such process writing approach used in the English program is Six-Trait Writing. The six traits are: Ideas, Organization, Voice, Word Choice, Sentence Fluency, and Conventions.

The six traits provide the shared explicit learning targets for writing; these are the areas of writing in which students will be expected to develop their skills. The approach to that development comes through a series of steps as they engage in producing drafts. For example, before beginning their first draft, students will engage in prewriting exercises such as answering questions, brainstorming, or listing ideas as a means of generating potential content for their first draft. Feedback, perhaps in the form of talk among students as they review their prewriting exercise, helps student writers find their voice and reflect on what they plan to say. This is but one point in the writing process at which they can change their focus, amend their approach, add ideas or start on a new path altogether.

Once students begin drafting their ideas into some sort of an organizational structure such as a paragraph or essay, feedback can be provided through scoring rubrics used by teachers or by fellow students. Such rubrics help learners focus on one or more specific aspect or trait of writing. Self-assessment tools can also provide students with criteria for reflecting on their progress so far in turning their ideas into a finished written product. As with the prewriting stage, students use the feedback to make changes, revise thinking, fill holes, bolster main points, and so forth. The drafting and revising stage may encompass one or more drafts depending on the assignment and time available. By the end of this recursive process, students will have produced at least two drafts of their writing and worked on developing their skills as writers. Through interactive feedback, students will have moved closer to the targeted learning aims for the class.

Conclusion

Assessment belongs in the classroom as an important resource for teachers who work diligently with their students to develop communicative language skills. As much of the current assessment literature suggests, assessment can both reflect and impact learning in useful ways. There are, of course, issues that must be considered in any attempt to implement such an approach.

- *What is useful feedback?* The key to much of the success of the formative assessment found to be effective in the Black and Williams' study was in the nature of the feedback provided to students. Several studies have begun to examine the characteristics of useful feedback and to suggest that careful

thought be given to how it is structured if it is to support learning and provide beneficial washback (Leung and Mohan 2004; Rea-Dickins 2001). For example, Lyster and Mori (2006) in looking at teacher-student interaction related to students' oral production in French and Japanese immersion classrooms, found that students varied in their ability to use teacher feedback and that contrary to expectations effective feedback was inversely related to the type of instructional orientation in the classroom.

- *Are teachers prepared to implement new assessment approaches?* Teachers are critical in implementing new assessment approaches as they adapt them to local instructional contexts and to the needs and language levels of their students (Colby-Kelly and Turner 2007; Inbar-Louie 2008). As with any innovation for the classroom, however, teachers require professional development to ensure they have developed the theoretical knowledge and the skills to carry out new ideas and approaches. As programs consider whether or not they will take on assessment innovations, they must also reflect on how they will support teachers by providing staff meeting time, opportunities to collaborate with one another, and necessary resources.
- *How receptive are students to new forms of assessment?* Students, like their teachers, are the product of years of traditional classroom instruction. Thus, they have expectations about their role and that of their teachers in the learning process. Similarly, their understanding of assessment has been formed by their educational experiences. When teachers attempt to change the rules – engage students in taking responsibility for learning and in reflecting on that learning through self- and peer-assessments – students may not react favorably, feeling uncomfortable or lacking confidence in the role of assessor, especially of their peers' performances (Cheng and Warren 2005). Certainly, developing a supportive classroom climate and engaging students in developing and using assessment criteria may help students develop more confidence in using such assessment tools.

New uses for assessment provide both opportunities and challenges as we reconsider expectations for how learning takes place in the classroom. For those changes to become effective and useful additions to our traditional notions of language classrooms, we will need to reflect on how they can

be integrated into local contexts and become part of the shared practice of language teachers and learners.

References

- Assessment Reform Group. (2002). Assessment for learning: Ten principles. <http://arg.educ.cam.ac.uk/CIE3.pdf>.
- Black, P. and D. Wiliam (1998a). Assessment and classroom learning. *Assessment in Education* 5: 7-68.
- Black, P. and D. Wiliam (1998b). Inside the black box: Raising standards through classroom assessment. *Phi Delta Kappan International*. www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kbla9810.htm
- Brindley, G. (1989). *Assessing Achievement in the Learner-centered Curriculum*. Sydney, Australia: National Centre for English Language Teaching and Research.
- Broadfoot, P. (2005). Dark alleys and blind bends: Testing the language of learning. *Language Testing* 22 (2): 123-141.
- Brown, H. D. (2004). *Language Assessment: Principles and Classroom Practices*. White Plains, NY: Pearson Education.
- Cheng, W. and M. Warren (2005). Peer assessment of language proficiency. *Language Testing* 22 (1): 93-121.
- Colby-Kelly, C. and C. E. Turner (2007). AFL research in the L2 classroom and evidence of usefulness: Taking formative assessment to the next level. *The Canadian Modern Language Review* 64 (1): 9-38.
- Council of Europe (2001). *Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, teaching, assessment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gottlieb, M., Katz, A. and G. Ernst-Slavit (2009). *Paper to practice: Using the TESOL English language proficiency standards in preK-12 classrooms*. Alexandria, VA: TESOL.
- Harlen, W. and J. Winter (2004). The development of assessment for learning: Learning from the case of science and mathematics. *Language Testing* 21 (3): 390-408.
- Inbar-Louie, O. (2008). Language assessment culture. In: E. Shohamy and N. H. Hornberger (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Language and Education, Volume 7. Language Testing and Assessment*. New York: Springer. 285-299.

- Katz, A. (2008). Changing the culture of assessment: Redefining proficiency. In: K. Rasulić and I. T. Milošević (eds.), *ELLSSAC Proceedings, Volume 1*. Belgrade: Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade. 615-629.
- Leung, C. and B. Mohan (2004). Teacher formative assessment and talk in classroom contexts: Assessment as discourse and assessment of discourse. *Language Testing* 21 (3): 335-359.
- Lyster, R. and H. Mori (2006). Interactional feedback and instructional counterbalance. *Studies in Second Language Acquisition* 28: 269-300.
- Popham, W. J. (2009). A process – Not a test. *Educational Leadership* 66 (7): 85-86.
- Rea-Dickins P. (2001). Mirror, mirror on the wall: Identifying processes of classroom assessment. *Language Testing* 18 (4): 429-462.
- Rea-Dickins P. (2008). Classroom-based language assessment. In: E. Shohamy and N. H. Hornberger (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Language and Education, Volume 7, Language Testing and Assessment*. New York: Springer. 257-271.
- Shepard, L. (2000). *The Role of Classroom Assessment in Teaching and Learning*. Washington, DC: Center for Research on Education, Diversity and Excellence/Cener for Applied Linguistics.
- Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages. (2006). *PreK-12 English language proficiency standards*. Alexandria, VA: Author.

*Literary and
Cultural Studies*

Lee Clark Mitchell
Princeton University, USA

DOES READING GOOD BOOKS MAKE US BETTER?

Abstract. The long-standing debate over the ethical value of literature has never been satisfactorily resolved. Those in favor of reading classic texts from an ethical perspective often have trouble stating precisely what is at stake, precisely because the literary qualities of a text regularly draw us away from moral to aesthetic considerations. That tension between the ethical and the literary lies at the heart of our most sustained reading experiences.

It once was thought (for many centuries) that reading “the good book” was a prerequisite to behaving well. And while the Bible was honored as a sacred and didactic text long before it became “literature,” there is a sense in which its special mix – moral content expressed in high style – became the measure by which texts are judged to be not just literature but themselves “good books”. That premise, once a given, was radically revised in the past century, with objections taking two forms. Those who believe “beauty is truth” argue that great literature is salutary *because* of its aesthetic play. Others simply deny that aesthetic play has anything to do with ethics. The former argue literature is an enchanted art that plays out human possibilities within ethical constraints, even as it allows aesthetic qualities to shape one’s sense of truth. The latter argue literature is nothing other than configured words, more akin to painting, music or dance than to philosophy. The two sides could hardly be better parodied than they are in Nabokov’s *Lolita*, which famously opens with a preface by John Ray, Jr., Ph.D., announcing:

more important to us than scientific significance and literary worth, is the ethical impact the book should have on the serious reader; for in this poignant personal study there lurks a general lesson; the wayward child, the egotistic

mother, the panting maniac – these are not only vivid characters in a unique story: they warn us of dangerous trends; they point out potent evils. ‘Lolita’ should make all of us – parents, social workers, educators – apply ourselves with still greater vigilance and vision to the task of bringing up a better generation in a safer world. (5-6)

Some hundreds of pages later, this fictional preface is countered by Nabokov’s putatively *soi-disant* afterward, in which he protests that:

despite John Ray’s assertion, *Lolita* has no moral in tow. For me a work of fiction exists only insofar as it affords me what I shall bluntly call aesthetic bliss, that is a sense of being somehow, somewhere, connected with other states of being where art (curiosity, tenderness, kindness, ecstasy) is the norm. There are not many such books. All the rest is either topical trash or what some call the Literature of Ideas. (314-15)

The two viewpoints prove caricatures of positions taken ever since. Twenty years after *Lolita*, John Gardner asked “what has gone wrong with criticism” and answered that it was a failure to realize that “true art is moral”. True art “seeks to improve life, not debase it”. (5) More recently, William Bennett compiled *The Book of Virtues*, subtitled *A Treasury of Great Moral Stories*, “intended to aid in the time-honored task of the moral education of the young”. Speaking up for “moral literacy,” Bennett argues that we need “to show parents, teachers, students, and children what the virtues look like, what they are in practice, how to recognize them, and how they work.” (11-12)

John Ray, Jr., M.D. would have loved that. Yet before dismissing Bennett, we should acknowledge that his response to literature had a well-respected pedigree up until forty-odd years ago. F. R. Leavis, after all, devised a “great tradition” of the English novel wholly contingent on moral preoccupations. That Leavis’s actual readings of Austin, Eliot, James, and Conrad were insubstantial did little to detract from his conception of the novelist as someone who “admired truthfulness and chastity and industry and self-restraint, [and] disapproved of loose living and recklessness and deceit and self-indulgence.” (23) This novelistic stance seemed to Leavis so “favourable to the production of great literature” that he even argued English was Conrad’s language of choice “because of the moral tradition associated with it”. (27)

Leavis' successor in this line was Lionel Trilling, a more nuanced thinker for whom novels were "the most effective agent of the moral imagination". Their greatness as an art "lay in [the] unremitting work of involving the reader himself in the moral life, inviting him to put his own motives under examination, suggesting that reality is not as his conventional education has led him to see it. It taught us, as no other genre ever did, the extent of human variety and the value of this variety". (221-2) This expression of a "liberal imagination" sustained a generation of critics, even in the face of such notorious ripostes as Nabokov's that "literature consists, in fact, not of general ideas but of particular revelations, not of schools of thought but of individuals of genius . . . [L]et us remember that literature is of no practical value whatsoever, except in the very special case of somebody's wishing to become, of all things, a professor of literature". (*Lectures* 116, 125) As he added, mocking Trilling's humanism: "Only children can be excused for identifying themselves with the characters in a book". (150) Well, Nabokov always found his high horse tethered conveniently nearby, but the question of psychological projection and identification cannot be simply dismissed by declaring it puerile.

In the 1960s, criticism took a turn from Trillingsque liberalism to considerations more strongly formalist *and* more narrowly social. As we have lurched from structuralism to post-structuralism to New Historicism, literary interpretation has been braided together with a search for the cultural and political significance of fictional works, even if the two activities sit uneasily together. For decades, readings that readily gain an academic hearing have come to seem radically unlike: one sort assesses a text in terms of the pleasure principle (delighting in its formal design), while the other looks to a reality principle (alert to a text's secret patterns of power, exclusion, and surveillance). The more traditional idea that literature does embody social meanings – not surreptitiously, but openly in order to teach the general reader, or to provide broad ethical guidance, or to offer models for civic behavior – has come to seem a quaint and bankrupt enterprise.

Perhaps that has is not all to the bad. After all, given how often complex texts were presented as a calculus of interest and sacrifice that reduced their brilliant *textuality* (rhetoric, narrative, even sheer sound) to simple moral algorithms, one can understand the allergic reaction and recoil. But there has been a loss, and the fascinations of ethical questions in literary texts have refused to slumber indefinitely. Recently, readers have become more open about a practice that never really waned, despite Nabokov's fierce adjurations. For literature does engage us in ethical

considerations willy-nilly, if only because its frothy concoctions present even the most outlandish of fictional figures acting in ways we quietly approve or disapprove. We can try to avoid that engagement, but for those drawn to understanding it, the issue becomes simply this: how does one invoke the ethical domain without becoming reductive? How can we find nuances beyond the precept invoked by Martha Nussbaum, that novels worth reading “are written in a style that gives sufficient attention to particularity and emotion, and [therefore] involve their readers in relevant activities of searching and feeling”? (48) So broad a prescription begs more questions than it answers, not least why we should then want to read novels or poems at all, rather than particularly well-written philosophy. And the hardest question of all remains: is there room at this table for Nabokov’s “aesthetic bliss”?

Among the messier proving grounds for such questions is the pressure to think of what to say to undergraduates, who almost always want to treat textual characters as culpable people, independent of any fancy literary strategies that put them there on the page. Invariably, students start by rejecting an association of literature with the more abstract, apparently non-representational arts like music or dance. Yet treating novels that way, as they soon realize, makes the whole array of literature’s characters finally too much the same, archetypal citizens of a uniform fictional universe. Making Falstaff half-brother to Oedipa Maas, or either even distantly related to Ahab, is to reduce each to something less than they so distinctly are as creatures of Shakespeare’s or Pynchon’s or Melville’s imagined world. The idiosyncratic diction, the stilted syntax, the lush grammar of an author’s creation is what commands attention to the gestures, talents and feelings his characters display. Favored moments in literature occur not as philosophical set-pieces removed from the exact twists and turns of their formation, but as emblems of both certain kinds of actions and the certain kinds of narratives that bring them to life. Here, then, is a first nuance: we read literature ethically *because* we read aesthetically, delighting in moral dilemmas that engage us by the very textual terms in which they are presented.

Pause over some favored moments of mine: Henry Adams recalling himself as a boy vehemently opposed to attending school, being walked by his aged grandfather, the former President John Quincy Adams, down a long dusty road to the schoolhouse, silently, patiently, irrevocably: “this act, contrary to the inalienable rights of boys, and nullifying the social compact, ought to have made him dislike his grandfather for life”. (13) But it didn’t, even if his grandfather seemed “a tool of tyranny”. The

exorbitant tone, the melodramatic staging, the quiet resolve, are not only part of Adams' continuing outsized bewilderment through *The Education* at a world gone horribly awry, but as well a self-deflating account that captures the need for stalwart resolution even in matters so juvenile.

Or consider Cash Bundren responding in Faulkner's *As I Lay Dying* to a question about his broken leg – "How far'd you fall Cash?" "Twenty-eight foot, four and a half inches, about" (90) – illustrating an absurd meticulousness that nonetheless allows him to control the grief at his mother's death by giving it a form, unlike his brother Darl, who simply goes mad.

Or consider the blithe lawyer in Melville's "Bartleby, the Scrivener", bewildered in the face of a recalcitrant employee, blind to the limits of his own benevolence as he recalls Christ's injunction to love one another: "Yes, this it was that saved me. Aside from higher considerations charity often operates as a vastly wise and prudent principle – a great safeguard to its possessor". (88) So calmly intoned a trust in prudence is undermined for the reader in its very expression, and offers scant comfort in the face of Bartleby's radical challenge to the limits of Christian charity.

Or consider the scene in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*, when the slave Sixo explains why he walks thirty miles each night to visit his love: "She is a friend of my mind. She gather me, man. The pieces I am, she gather them and give them back to me in all the right order". In a world that denies the slave bodily possession of himself, where houses magically come alive and ghosts return full-bodied from the past, Sixo's characterization of himself as "the pieces I am" (272) now gathered in bonds of affection offers chattel slavery its most profound refutation.

Or one last scene: Isabel Archer's return to Gardencourt at the end of Henry James's *Portrait of a Lady*, standing in the same room she stood in when the novel began seven years before, "nervous and scared – as scared as if the objects about her had begun to show for conscious things, watching her trouble with grotesque grimaces". (614) Curiously, James complements Morrison's vision of a world animated by one's own enslaved diminishment, even though the intonations, the setting, the transformation Isabel imagines are each characteristically different for the two authors, and for the characters they create.

These moments resonate for reasons having as much to do with their specific textualized form as with the ostensible pre-diegetic scene lurking somehow beyond diction and syntax. Before awarding Nabokov a gold medal, however, it is worth remembering the powerful undergraduate

bias that assumes reading is charged with assessing actions, with exploring the ethical implications of making a certain choice. The plastic arts (painting, photography, architecture) rarely require that of us, and certainly not with the same force or terrible detail. Instrumental music cannot pose dilemmas or solicit judgments (even if some claim otherwise). This is rather the province of philosophy or history or law, each of which engages aspects of what humans might do, or have done. The only arts that consistently bridge a divide between human form and human choice (in the process inciting a schizophrenic response) are literary. Even works that try deliberately to avoid ethical scrutiny – *Sister Carrie*, say, or *Waiting for Godot* – force us to reconsider why their fictional characters should *not* be questioned about what we persist in assuming are “their” choices. Ethics keeps blundering in, which may be unavoidable. But that is not to agree that either John Gardner or William Bennett offer satisfactory models in their requirement that literature provide moral reassurance. At a minimum, literary works would seem to pose unsettling questions about ethical categories. But while this may be a more nuanced approach, is it enough? For even in interpretations approaching this skeptical mode, the actual payoff with practitioners of an “ethics of reading” tends to be long on ethical claims, short on attentiveness to specific aesthetic wonders.

So is there room at the table for aesthetic wonder? For George Steiner, they seem to occupy every seat, though his objection to mere ethics takes an idiosyncratic form. Forty years ago he argued that an ethics of reading was a bankrupt idea, a will-of-the-wisp for intellectuals long before Matthew Arnold made the case for “the best that has been thought and said”. Steiner, troping Arnold, contended that the Holocaust discredited any assumption of literature’s capacity to humanize. “The simple yet appalling fact”, he wrote, “is that we have very little solid evidence that literary studies do very much to enrich or stabilize moral perception, that they *humanize*. We have little proof that a tradition of literary studies in fact makes a man more humane. What is worse – a certain body of evidence points the other way”. (60-1) By which he meant the notorious example of cultivated Gestapo officers reading poetry in the concentration camps. Yet Steiner’s point is even more radical than the suspicion that literature does little to cultivate true moral feeling. For him the specter looms that literature may indeed be actively *unethical* and *immoral*, inuring us to outrage, easing our revulsion from horror in the phenomenal world. And unnerving as it is to take Steiner seriously, he strikes at the heart of what it is we do in teaching a novel, poem, or play. “Unlike Matthew Arnold and unlike Dr. Leavis” Steiner observes:

I find myself unable to assert confidently that the humanities humanize. Indeed, I would go further: it is at least conceivable that the focusing of consciousness on a written text which is the substance of our training and pursuit diminishes the sharpness and readiness of our actual moral response. Because we are trained to give psychological and moral credence to the imaginary, to the character in a play or a novel, to the condition of spirit we gather from a poem, we may find it more difficult to identify with the real world, to take the world of actual experience to heart. (61)

As he adds (in an image at once unthinkable and eerily persuasive),

thus the cry in the poem may come to sound louder, more urgent, more real than the cry in the street outside. The death in the novel may move us more potently than the death in the next room. Thus, there may be a covert, betraying link between the cultivation of aesthetic response and the potential of personal inhumanity. What then are we doing when we study and teach literature?

The question is meant to haunt us, as Steiner himself is haunted by the Holocaust and the lack of restraints felt by cultured, book-loving men and women bent on genocide.

In the end, there is no adequate response to Steiner, except to acknowledge that art does not inoculate against immorality, every time, once and for all. His more troubling intimation is that art itself helps cultivate immorality by encouraging a fuller responsiveness to imagined ills than real ones, or by providing a *hortus conclusis* to which we can retreat. But this can be turned on its head, as many have long realized: that literature represents more possibilities for a life than we might otherwise imagine. When we normally narrate our lives, our accounts are flat, uninflected, straightforward (as in the casual excuses we offer up, or the legal pleas we contrive, or the philosophical examples we formulate), without the resonance we expect from fiction or poetry. Someone cuts in front of us on the freeway, or changes their mind about a promise, or bothers us impetuously for this or that favor, or fails to live up to their evaluation: in these and dozens of other daily instances, we mostly respond through dismissive narratives. And what opens us up to implications in our own and others' behavior are the nuanced or unexpected emotions, the responses explored in fiction, drama, and poetry – the possibilities,

in short, that we regularly overlook or shortchange. The philosopher Bernard Williams has expressed this view succinctly. "In seeking a reflective understanding of ethical life", he states, philosophy "quite often takes examples from literature. Why not take examples from life? It is a perfectly good question, and it has a short answer: what philosophers will lay before themselves and their readers as an alternative to literature will not be life, but bad literature". (*Shame* 13)

This does not deny how repugnant it is when the cry in the poem becomes "more urgent" than "the cry in the street outside". But poetic anguish does not inevitably create this response. We simply do not know what effect a refined appreciation of literature has on our conduct, for good or for ill. We cannot tell whether a thoughtful reading of *The Golden Bowl*, say, or *The House of Mirth* will alter how a reader copes with a flawed marriage or face-losing social decline, much less the larger issues that prompt Steiner's dismay.

Which leaves those of us still interested in ethical inquiry stripped of global absolutes, or of the need to answer questions like: Do works of art foster or impair possibilities for moral behavior? Can we gain reliable knowledge on how best to live? What we are left with instead is a second nuance, a reduction in scale, involving immediate queries about the relative strength of different *kinds* of ethical reading. Limiting the field this way does not simplify the case or ease discussion, however, if only because critics committed to ethical readings of literature begin with very different notions of what such a reading might involve, which itself becomes a thermometer for measuring moral fervor. Steiner, for instance, who looks to literature for self-transformation, values novels that directly assault one's deepest assumptions. "What we must have", he says citing Kafka, "are those books which come upon us like ill-fortune, and distress us deeply, like the death of one we love better than ourselves, like suicide. A book must be an ice-axe to break the sea frozen inside us". (67) Michael Levenson, on the other hand, in an incisive account of modernism, argues the contrary – for disinterestedness as a moral good – and invokes the example of Conrad's Marlow and James's Strether to underscore his point. Martha Nussbaum prizes the condition of being "finely aware and richly responsible" (borrowing her phrase from James), and looks to characters like Maggie Verver as a model for our lives. The ethical precepts with which readers begin tend to dictate which novels get read, and how they perform. Being transformed is not here an issue.

Interestingly, that is one of the issues we rarely pause to address: whether we are predisposed to texts that provide the answers we already

know and prize. And the converse question then would be whether some texts evade certain ethical considerations more readily than others. Is there something about a recondite style or a convoluted narrative structure that makes general ethical analysis more or less promising? Consider two very different kinds of texts – James’ *The Ambassadors* and Maurice Sendak’s *Where the Wild Things Are* – each of which engages us on both an aesthetic and ethical level. Still, it’s not at all clear that Sendak – whose book consists of a mere twenty-one lucid sentences, “so he was sent to bed without eating anything” – is more transparent ethically than James. More to the point, Chad Newsome’s abandonment of Mme. de Vionnet and Max’s rejection of his mother – when stripped to bare essentials – are essentially similar actions. Yet if each author represents these scenes of abandonment very differently, neither one reduces that action to something “merely wrong”, however large ethical considerations loom in each. We respond to these characters with varying degrees of approbation or disapproval, as we do in life. We mull over fictional decisions and actions, we scrutinize invented intentions and fanciful consequences, once again as we do in life.

The difference is that literature, unlike life, is already so thoroughly *textualized* that two things tend to occur: first, decisions and actions are mitigated by the forms in which they are represented, making them less straightforward, thus more open to contested interpretations. And second, those verbal forms themselves begin to dazzle the eye more fully than the worlds they supposedly represent. In short, the more complex a story (the less flat it is as account), the more our attention shifts from what used to be called “story” to “discourse”, from signified to signifier – or from Joe Friday’s “Just the facts, ma’am” to imagery and characterization, to narrative plotting and descriptive power: to Max in the book’s illustrations, not Max the admonishment of bad character. It is not that we forget moral rules, but that we become lost in wonder at the artistry involved in making words (and images) move so brilliantly. After all, only a moral simpleton or the most tone-deaf reader would want to ban, say, Humbert Humbert from literature simply because his reprehensible activities are rightly banned in life.

What clinches Humbert’s escape from silence in *Lolita* is the self-consciously literary merit of the novel, its “aesthetic bliss”. Any reservations we have about Humbert’s character or the ways he acts are displaced by our awe at his voice, which so often gets us to laugh out loud. Take only one example, when he considers marrying Charlotte Haze in order to secure her daughter, “and boldly imagined . . . how eventually I might blackmail” – no, that is too strong a word – mauvemail big Haze into

letting me consort with little Haze". (71) The slick play on words here, like the coarse disjunction of emotional tones, evokes humor despite our horror at Humbert's blatant intentions. The intensely comic timbre of so much of his confession (surprising, even shocking us, as we read) depends on this crossing of distinct verbal registers, which coalesces in an experience utterly beyond paraphrase. Humbert's plangent voice induces emotional extremes independent of the scenes it describes, reminding us of what literature demands at both its ethical *and* aesthetic poles. One might even claim that awe before the words of a text – the attention we pay to the written forms in which characters emerge – constitutes the single ethical position all art requires. Elaine Scarry argues this point (in defiance of Steiner), that attentiveness *is* translatable to the real world and our actions in it. We are more likely to notice, to become engaged, because we are schooled in noticing. Careful reading *becomes* a good in itself, in the attention spent on recalcitrant details, the lingering over verbal nuance, the inventing of generous but scrupulous readings – treating texts as individuals, with their own distinctive requirements. From this point of view, a reader's inattention to words on the page registers an ethical flaw, just as much as flat-footed projections *onto* the text. A narrow interpretation of the ethics of reading, in other words, would be simply to become as sympathetic a reader of texts as we are of each other, responsive to idiosyncrasies, resistant to imposing our views, flexible in the face of contradictions, and so on.

To value how things hold together in complex forms is to come a bit closer to understanding the convergence of the aesthetic and the ethical, in the process alerting us to the problem involved in paraphrase. I won't rehearse Cleanth Brooks' notorious New Critical indictment of paraphrase, or the commentary he inspired on interpretation as a necessary reduction of the text. Still, while worth recalling that any reading always compels us to paraphrase complicated images into conventional categories, the test of great literature is its ability to get us to accede momentarily, imaginatively to reversals in our own ways of thinking. Necessary as paraphrase is to interpretation, then, part of what literary achievement means is resistance to such co-optation, to such absorption by the reader, whether into simply reductive forms or into another domain altogether, of philosophy, say, or history, or politics. Great art achieves its status by compelling our attention, even inspiring us with admiration for characters, scenes, motives, and achievements that in more normal waking moments we would never countenance. As Wendy Steiner remarks, "What art *can* do, and do very well, is show us the relation between what we respond to and what we

are, between our pleasure and our principles. As a result, it inevitably relates us to other people whose pleasures and principles either do or do not coincide with our own". (59) This, then, is one important aspect of reading as an ethical activity: to compel us to slow down, to pay attention, to foster an attitude of respect, at least, for people, places, things, attitudes, emotions, actions off the radar screen of our daily lives.

Yet there is another half of the equation to which I keep returning, exemplified in the figure of Humbert Humbert, and that is that we *do* bring to *Lolita* the moral baggage that makes any reading of him an unsettling one. We live not simply in the details, in the brilliant passages of excoriating prose, but in the connections as well that those details make with ideals of how we want to live. That is not to agree with John Ray, Jr. M.D., who brings a "moral in tow" to his reading of the novel. But we *are* made aware of how irrepressible the impulse is when even those opposed to ethical readings end up importing ethics via another route. Recall that Nabokov himself, that notorious aestheticist, described "aesthetic bliss" as the "sense of being somehow, somewhere, connected with other states of being where art (curiosity, tenderness, kindness, ecstasy) is the norm". (314-15) The sequence of four descriptive nouns entered appositely, parenthetically ("curiosity, tenderness, kindness, ecstasy") registers a curious recursion of the ethical back into the novel, and in so doing offers the terms by which a reading of Humbert should be pursued. After all, "kindness, curiosity, tenderness" each represent virtues Humbert lacks in his cruel possession of Lolita.

Here is where literature anticipates conclusions arrived at by more recent moral philosophers: most centrally, that our values clash, and that no overarching ideal aligns them or redeems one at the cost of another. What we are left with are choices among contested values, among irreconcilable goals, and any choice well may involve irreparable loss. All we can do, as Isaiah Berlin observed, is to "engage in what are called trade-offs – rules, values, principles must yield to each other in varying degrees in specific situations". (17) And they must yield not to the abstract and general, but to the specific and local. Or as he says, "The concrete situation is almost everything. There is no escape: we must decide as we decide; moral risk cannot, at times, be avoided". (18) In short, a comprehensive harmony exists no more in ethical contexts than literary ones, with no common standard of measurement allowing us to adjudicate some *summum bonum*. Human life (as one of Berlin's explicators notes) "is something invented, and perpetually reinvented, through choice, and it is plural and diverse, not common or universal". (Gray 23) This is a far cry from Kant's conception

of a categorical imperative, which defines a single moral standard to be applied in all situations. In fact, no such standard *could* apply, any more than Esperanto could displace our different languages, and that is as we would have it. "We determine our fate in the end", Jeff Stout observes, "not . . . by finding the right general principle of acceptability, but by drawing the line here or there in countless particular cases, given our sense of the daily detail". (242)

This focus on the local and particular informs a strong strand of moral philosophy, which rejects those who would reduce ethics to certain blanket virtues, and in the process erode competing notions of what constitutes human well-being. As Bernard Williams points out, in a comment that extends well beyond moral philosophy, "Theory looks characteristically for considerations that are very general and have as little distinctive content as possible, because it is trying to systematize and because it wants to represent as many reasons as possible as applications of other reasons." (*Ethics* 116). He goes on to observe, however, that the opposing need to make one's rules seem feasible requires examples, examples that are realistic, and the more detail one adds to make such realism convincing, the more the example tends to dissolve. This tug-of-war between theory and practice never ends, of course, though to credit too fully their irreconcilability is to be reduced to all-embracing moral platitudes on the one hand or to the incoherence of vivid detail on the other.

The point of this excursion is to show that at least some moral philosophers themselves are hesitant before the kind of sweeping ethical claims often made by literary critics. My earlier description of the "ethical" readings offered by Levenson, Nussbaum, and Steiner suggests that even better critics fall into a trap of offering up normative views of idiosyncratic episodes. And it would be easy to cite other examples on both sides of the aisle, not only of those committed to salutary readings of literature but of those indignant at the thought, unwilling to have their pleasures marred by any moral considerations at all. Nabokov's extremism on behalf of unadulterated bliss can quickly come to seem as partial and misguided an account of what we do when we read as that of his straw man, John Ray, Jr., Ph. D. To appreciate how misguided this exclusive attention to aesthetic effect can be, listen to Stanley Fish describe his response to a line of Milton:

For me the reward and pleasure of literary interpretation
lie in being able to perform analyses like this. Literary

interpretation, like virtue, is its own reward. I do it because I like the way I feel when I'm doing it. I like being brought up short by an effect I have experienced but do not yet understand analytically. I like trying to describe in flatly prosaic words the achievement of words that are anything but flat and prosaic. I like savouring the physical "taste" of language at the same time that I work to lay bare its physics. I like uncovering the incredibly dense pyrotechnics of a master artificer, not least because in praising the artifice I can claim a share in it. (110)

There is much to agree with in Fish's description of the delight we get in reading, but there is also a certain oddness in talking so narrowly about aesthetic pleasure in the case of Milton, one of the more morally rigorous of our canonical writers. It is as if Fish were self-consciously holding back from the most obvious pressures Milton applies – a Milton he himself had read early in his career as willing to surprise the reader into sin.

This is, if not a barren, at least a bad-faith gesture, resulting from the kind of absolutism expressed earlier by George Steiner: that since great literature *did* not prevent the Holocaust, it *cannot* reliably frame ethical sensitivity. Or as Katha Pollit has declared, "Books do not shape character in any simple way, if indeed they do so at all, or the most literate would be the most virtuous instead of just the ordinary run of humanity with larger vocabularies". (210) Yet we might well retort that no one is arguing that literary sophistication is at one with propriety. And it seems deeply miscalculated to ask of literature that it take a larger role in the shaping of character than we grant to any other cultural force. Especially given the complicated tensions that shape each of us, it is hard to know what might *count* as ethical suasion in a poem or a novel, or what the connection between a text and our given behavior may be. This extends from sermons to self-help manuals, from parental injunctions to national narratives, from laundry lists to lectures.

Or perhaps that is not quite true, which is where the difficulty begins. For it is in its oscillating quality that literature *becomes* literature – in the fluctuation between form and content that rarely matters in the kinds of generic examples I've just named, and that allows a novel to become both philosophic example *and* aesthetic icon. The more discursively flat the text (the less distinctively "literary" it seems), the less attention it draws to its own forms at the expense of some represented world. This is not meant to suggest that an abstruse style like Henry

James's succeeds by its very abstruseness more than Hemingway's, say, or Raymond Carver's. In all three cases, style itself *is* the issue, with rich rhetorical tones measured not by subordinate clauses or metaphorical play but by the attention each author draws to the surface of his prose, the constructed nature of his fiction. The more self-reflexive and obviously stylized a text (that is, the less directly representational), the readier we are to read it aesthetically, in terms not of a human dimension but of sheer forms, sounds, colors, and so on. And by the same token, to the extent that a novel or story *is* conventionally representational, it invites us to map it against accepted understandings of the way things work, of how objects appear, of why people behave as they do. *That* is where ethical questions become pertinent.

Literary texts create tension between representational and non-representational, which has sometimes been understood (wrongly I think) as a tension between paraphraseable content and inimitable form. There are very few instances of literature that are fixed solidly in one camp or the other: so transparently representational on the one hand as to have nothing "literary" about them (like a news account, or a legal indictment, or the kind of bad philosophic examples Bernard Williams had in mind); or, on the other hand, so fully non-representational that words fall on our ears as nonsensical phonemes (like dadaesque drama or concrete poetry, but thankfully short-lived). The best literature tends to fluctuate instead between these two spheres, holding human beings up for inspection in language that can occasionally verge on pure sound, as if created in a self-contained system of symbolic relationships. And the alleged "literary" quality that interests us in these texts consists of features that paradoxically turn our attention away from mortal activity, away from the world itself, toward the pleasures of narrative closure, of verbal legerdemain, of linguistic complexity (or its converse, zero degree writing). These privileged texts perform a fragile balancing act, focusing on the kinds of knotty personal situations that always involve moral considerations – of vengeance, self-sacrifice, ambition, marriage (and adultery), indecision, and so on. We continue to wonder about those powerful narrative considerations, whether it is Hester Prynne's supposedly originating sin, or Ahab's maniacally destructive ego, or Huck's shabby treatment of Jim, or Daisy Buchanan's "carelessness", or Ike McCaslin's troubling renunciation of his legacy (and this is only to select from American literature). But what compounds our wonder are the ways these texts *lose* their transparency, almost as if the words that fleshed out the lives of characters we imagine became somehow colored, shaped, electrified, or otherwise transformed

into marvelous patterns and strange effects. And this process is as true for John Updike as for Robert Coover, for Richard Wright as for Ralph Ellison, for any *realist* author as for any *magical* realist.

Of all these, Nabokov is our most self-conscious artist, eager to immerse us in the troubling oscillations of literature. Why else choose the most scabrous of themes (pedophilia compounded by nominal incest) only to transmogrify it into a novel that keeps us aglow with delight in its verbal pyrotechnics? Deliberately conceiving the most extreme version of the “literary”, Nabokov encourages the reader into moral considerations that seem at last irrelevant, since the murderous Humbert is so obviously only the effect of his “fancy prose style”: “Lolita, light of my life, fire of my loins. My sin, my soul, Lolita”. (9) Exploiting this artful fictional stance to pose the literary against itself, Nabokov allows Humbert to alternate between self-indulgent stylistic excess and a self-conscious effort at realistic transparency that seems equally constructed. Humbert’s framing of his first physical encounter with Lolita is representative, stated with a concern for the reader’s response that curiously deflects our outrage: “I want my learned readers to participate in the scene I am about to replay... So let us get started. I have a difficult job before me” (57).

Humbert’s narrative self-consciousness confirms Nabokov’s sly awareness of the way we process fictional accounts, projecting judgments onto the page as we do in everyday life, filling out details, presuming a larger pattern that involves conventional moral and aesthetic ideals. Yet Nabokov turns the tables, never quite allowing us to conceive of Lolita, Humbert, Quilty, or anyone else as actual or even wholly fictional characters. Whatever outrage we feel at Lolita’s victimization is deflected by the delight the novel takes in its own extravagant wordplay, its mix of literary allusion and lyrical depiction, of parody and puzzling cross reference. Like *Alice in Wonderland*, the novel creates a realm in which letters (e.g., Q) and numbers (e.g., 342) enjoy the same full (or rather impoverished) “reality” as characters. Gruesome events become mordant occasions for humor we would never otherwise countenance.

Yet however much comparison with *Alice in Wonderland* makes Nabokov’s novel seem exceptional or aberrant, we should keep in mind on the contrary how eminently representative it is of the “literary”, in arousing ethical considerations it fails to resolve but never ignores. The novel’s “ethical impact”, like that of any other novel, derives not from a lurking “general lesson” (as John Ray Jr, M.D. asserts), but from its focus of our attention on what Nabokov identified as “curiosity, tenderness, kindness”. Or rather, the *absence* of these qualities looms larger as we

learn of Humbert's narcissistic subjugation of Lolita – a subjugation we ironically reinforce in our own delight at his dazzling verbal skill. All literature taxes us in this strangely paradoxical fashion by transforming human life into something as interesting for its verbal representations as for its represented experience, as interesting for its aesthetic as for its ethical qualities. Sensitivity to the one may help sensitize us to the other – as Leavis, Trilling, and Nussbaum believe – but no more certainly than any of countless other activities. Part of the problem is simply that far less clarity exists about ethical than aesthetic issues. The ethical more often becomes a translation out of the text into another realm, a supposedly untextualized space where values do not seem to clash and where a *summum bonum* is presumed to exist.

To give a short answer to my title, then, books good, bad, and indifferent all illuminate the conventional virtues of generosity and grace under pressure, of tolerance and curiosity, of self-knowledge and mutual respect – virtues so rare these days as to seem no longer conventional. But true literary triumphs illuminate such virtues through contestation and ambiguity, elaborating them in forms neither easily paraphrased nor readily translatable into our daily rounds. What one may gain from reading them is a continuing desire to be more “finely aware and richly responsible” in circumstances that allow perilously little of either – circumstances outside as well as within the text. That desire for an ethical clarity we never quite achieve is, along with a verbal exhilaration we never quite expect, at the heart of all great literature. And the reason we keep returning to books we count as canonical is because they challenge us, ethically *and* aesthetically, so unremittingly. More fully than others, those books refuse to let us be, even though (or especially because) we never quite get them right. And that is what makes them good books.

References

- Adams, Henry (1973). *The Education of Henry Adams* (1918) Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Bennett, William (ed.) (1993). *The Book of Virtues: A Treasury of Great Moral Stories*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Berlin, Isaiah (1992). *The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas*. New York: Vintage.

- Faulkner, William (1990). *As I Lay Dying* (1930), The Corrected Text. New York: Vintage.
- Fish, Stanley (1995). *Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change*. Oxford: Clarendon P.
- Gardner, John (1977). *On Moral Fiction*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gray, John (1996). *Isaiah Berlin*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- James, Henry (1984). *The Portrait of a Lady* (1881/1908). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Leavis, F. R. (1962). *The Great Tradition: George Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad* (1948). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Levenson, Michael (1991). *Modernism and the Fate of Individuality: Character and Novelistic Form from Conrad to Woolf*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Melville, Herman (1967). *Billy Budd, Sailor and Other Stories*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Morrison, Toni (1988). *Beloved* (1987). New York: Plume.
- Nabokov, Vladimir (1991). *The Annotated Lolita: Revised and Updated* (1955), Alfred Appel, Jr. (ed.). New York: Random House, Inc.
- Nabokov, Vladimir (1980). *Lectures on Literature*, Fredson Bowers (ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Nussbaum, Martha C. (1990). *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature*. New York: Oxford UP.
- Pollitt, Katha (1992), "Why Do We Read?" in Paul Berman, *Debating P.C.: The Controversy over Political Correctness on College Campuses*. New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell, 201-211.
- Scarry, Elaine (1999). *On Beauty and Being Just*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Sendak, Maurice (1963). *Where the Wild Things Are*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Steiner, George (1970). *Language and Silence: Essays on Language, Literature, and the Inhuman*. New Haven: Yale UP.
- Steiner, Wendy (1995). *The Scandal of Pleasure: Art in an Age of Fundamentalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stout, Jeffrey (1988). *Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Belgrade BELLS

Trilling, Lionel (1951). *The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society*. New York: Viking.

Williams, Bernard (1985). *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard UP.

Williams, Bernard (1983). *Shame and Necessity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stephen Regan
University of Durham, UK

AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND MEMOIR IN MODERN IRELAND

Abstract. Autobiography and memoir have been remarkably prolific and popular forms of writing in modern Ireland. For many authors, the subjective account of an individual life is frequently and inseparably entwined with the troubled life of the nation. Frequently in Irish autobiography, the unfinished business of a writer's life is coterminous with an uncertain political future, so that notions of identity, for both self and nation, take on a curiously suspended form. In recent autobiographical writing, especially since the 1990s, the intense relationship between the psychology of the self and the politics of nationhood has been rendered through a powerful and experimental preoccupation with place and time in narrative. The essay looks at a number of contemporary Irish autobiographical works, including Seamus Deane's *Reading in the Dark* (1996), John Walsh's *Falling Angels* (1999) and John McGahern's *Memoir* (2005), and it considers the ways in which new modes of narrative have been fashioned to serve the difficult and often painful processes of understanding identity in a nation still haunted by its traumatic political past.

One of the familiar conventions of autobiography is its revelation of an individual life through a compelling first-person narrative voice. To work upon its readers most effectively, autobiography needs to present the life in question as both unique and typical; it must offer an appealing account of an existence that is special enough and significant enough to warrant attention, but it must also sustain that attention through an insistence on common human dilemmas and a shared sense of endeavour. At the same time as presenting a single life as unfolding and uncertain, shaped by that which can only be dimly discerned, the work of autobiography can, with hindsight, be immensely assured and authoritative about the way things turned out. The reader's gratification is intimately connected with the process by which the individual life, in all its stumbling

unpredictability and waywardness, is given shape and structure. There is a special pleasure, too, in being persuaded that the autobiographical narrative is a truthful record of events, while knowing all along that what we are reading is an elaborate, stylised fiction. Memoir similarly suggests a recollection of actual events and experiences, with an implicit trust in the faithfulness of memory being shared by author and reader. The term implies historical knowledge, an informed account of one's own life and times, but the distinctions between autobiography and memoir are not easy to establish and maintain. Memoir often brings with it the personal, emotional intensity of autobiography, and it is just as likely to employ the devices and techniques of fiction.

For many Irish writers, autobiography inevitably takes on the kind of public, historical aura associated with memoir, for the simple reason that the individual life is so frequently and so inseparably entwined with the troubled life of the nation. The awakening of consciousness is also therefore an awakening to the political urgencies of a particular place and time. For late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century memoirists in Ireland, the unfinished business of one's own life is coterminous with an uncertain political future, so that notions of identity, for both self and nation, tend to take on a curiously suspended form. Autobiographical fiction finds its consummate form in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, and Stephen Dedalus, flying by the nets of language, nationality and religion, remains the exemplar of the Irish artist struggling to create anew the conscience of his race. For a later generation of writers, the memory of growing up in Ireland carries with it the powerful imprint of revolution, civil war and partition, and the violent repercussions of that convulsive history extend across the later twentieth century and into the autobiographical writings of the present time. Those writers born in the 1930s and 1940s are, not surprisingly, acutely susceptible to seeing their own coming to maturity as unavoidably implicated in the difficult and traumatic passage of the nascent Irish Free State and its eventual transformation into the Irish Republic in 1949.

Most autobiographies and most memoirs rely very heavily on a vividly realised account of place and time. These are the structural co-ordinates through which the self is most obviously recreated and refashioned. In recent Irish autobiography, however, the intense relationship between the psychology of the self and the politics of nationhood has been rendered through an especially powerful and experimental preoccupation with place and time. One of the unusual and distinctive features of this writing has been its tendency to highlight

its own spatial and temporal complexities as a way of denoting the problematic nature of identity. A strong commitment to the co-ordinates of place and time might well be expected in nationalist memoirs and autobiographical writings by Irish writers, but place and time are figured with a new intensity and self-consciousness in recent Irish migrant or second-generation autobiographies, which have increasingly become a special category or sub-genre in the study of modern Irish literature.

John McGahern's starkly titled *Memoir* (2005) opens with a vivid account of the lanes and fields of Co Leitrim, where he walked as a boy in the nineteen thirties and nineteen forties, and where he returned to live in the 1970s. Despite its poor soil, that landscape possesses a primal power for McGahern: 'My relationship with these lanes and fields extended back to the very beginning of my life'.¹ It is also as near as he gets to imagining heaven, as he recalls his mother naming the flowers for him as they walk to school. There is a touching candour in McGahern's insistence on his own abundant happiness on these occasions, almost as if he challenges his memory to prove otherwise: '*I must have been* extraordinarily happy walking that lane to school' (4; my emphasis). With that one simple sentence we get an immediate sense of the complexity of any autobiographical narrative that seeks to capture both the intensity of childhood feelings and the more circumspect nature of adult recollection. It is not surprising, therefore, that initially McGahern appears to invoke the romantic idealism of Wordsworth, for whom the child is father of the man:

There are many such lanes all around where I live, and in certain rare moments over the years while walking in these lanes I have come into an extraordinary sense of security, a deep peace, in which I feel that I can live for ever. I suspect it is no more than the actual lane and the lost lane becoming one for a moment in an intensity of feeling, but without the usual attendants of pain and loss. These moments disappear as suddenly and as inexplicably as they come, and long before they can be recognized and placed (4).

If the passage acknowledges Wordsworthian spots of time, it also acquires a more modern, existentialist outlook, reminiscent of Edward Thomas, for whom the lane was a fitting place for meditating on beginnings and endings. The crucial point, however, is that the lane, which might

¹ John McGahern, *Memoir* (London: Faber, 2005), p. 3. All further references will be given as page numbers in the text.

otherwise function as a paltry image of Irish pastoralism, takes on a dynamic, cognitive role as memory and imagination begin to interact. The lane serves as a vital point of entry into and exit out of the buried life of the feelings; it becomes a major structuring element in the memoir, leading us towards the magnificent final pages in which McGahern imagines a tender reunion with his mother, gently reconciling her unquestioning belief with his own unshakeable disbelief: 'If we could walk together through those summer lanes, with their banks of wild flowers that "cast a spell", we probably would not be able to speak, though I would want to tell her all the local news... I would want no shadow to fall on her joy and deep trust in God. She would face no false reproaches. As we retraced our steps, I would pick for her the wild orchid and the windflower'(272).

If the Irish countryside and a caring mother offer peace and security, what they contend with in McGahern's life is political conflict and a violent father. Outside the reassuring lanes with their wild flowers are the army barracks, where the father is stationed as a young sergeant in the new Free State. The life that McGahern recounts so movingly is one in which the Civil War has left a bitter legacy of hatred that erupts irrationally and finds its destructive expression in the father's violence and cruelty. The barracks are a brutal, stifling and enclosing place, the memories of which are associated with childhood humiliation and abject misery. Against the spirit of freedom that informed The Easter Proclamation of the Irish Republic in 1916, the State that emerges is 'a theocracy in all but name' (210). By 1950, the Church has come to exercise power over much of civil life, including education and entertainment, and McGahern's sense of enclosure and confinement is once again defined in terms of buildings: 'the hospitals, the orphanages, the juvenile prison systems, the parish halls' (210).

Even for a later generation of writers, the Civil War casts a long shadow. Hugo Hamilton, in *The Speckled People* (2003), recalls his father explaining the events that took place in west Cork in the 1920s:

He tells us about the time when the British soldiers came to their house in Leap, threatening to burn it down because they thought the rebels were shooting from the upstairs window...And then the very same thing happened again after the British had gone and the Irish started fighting among themselves, because that's what they had learned from the British. Then one day they had to leave the house a second time when Irish Free State soldiers said they would

burn it down, because they were sure they saw IRA snipers in the upstairs window.²

Hamilton adopts the kind of *faux naïf* voice and perspective that makes for comedy, but as with Frank McCourt's *Angela's Ashes* (1998) this wide-eyed credulity is apt to become monotonous and the comic effects can soon wear thin. Where *The Speckled People* excels is in its exploration of 'new' Irish identities: 'My father says we have nothing to worry about because we are the new Irish. Partly from Ireland and partly from somewhere else, half-Irish and half-German. We're the speckled people...' (7). What is striking in terms of technique is the representation of this uncertain identity through radical spatial and temporal shifts which are nevertheless in keeping with a child's view of the world: 'When I was small I woke up in Germany... Then I got up and looked out the window and saw Ireland. And after breakfast we all went out the door to Ireland and walked down to Mass' (1). At the end of the book, after their father's death, the children stand with their German mother on the road, unsure of where home might be.

The Speckled People presents itself as a memoir rather than an autobiography, and this is how it was generally treated in reviews. Even so, several reviewers paid tribute to its inventiveness and its storytelling vivacity. There was greater uncertainty about whether Seamus Deane's *Reading in the Dark* (1996) was memoir or fiction. Blake Morrison, in a sensitive and discerning review in the *Independent on Sunday*, paid tribute to 'Seamus Deane's marvellous memoir, or novel, about growing up in Derry in the 1950s'.³ Morrison sees the book modulating between the *Bildungsroman*, a novel of early life and development, and 'a kind of whodunnit', though he nevertheless insists that its strength and control of storytelling make questions about fiction and non-fiction seem irrelevant. For Edna Longley, writing in *Fortnight*, *Reading in the Dark* was autobiographical fiction, 'less a novel than an essay in sensibility of a type more common at the turn of the century', a work full of the epiphanies and self-communings of Joyce's Stephen Dedalus.⁴

Reading in the Dark evades any easy categorisation in terms of its narrative style. Its structure seems simple and obvious, with chapters and parts conforming to the written conventions of narrative, but its use of

² Hugo Hamilton, *The Speckled People* (London: Fouth Estate, 2003), pp. 35-6. All further references will be given as page numbers in the text.

³ Blake Morrison, *Independent on Sunday*, 1 September 1996.

⁴ Edna Longley, *Fortnight*, November 1996.

episodic tales and its colloquial, anecdotal technique owe much to the oral tradition of storytelling. The book consists of three parts, each containing two chapters, with each chapter subdivided into numerous short episodes. These episodes are precisely dated, from February 1945 to July 1971, creating the impression of a diary or journal, though in many ways they resemble snapshots that become increasingly fluid and cinematic. The faded photograph on the dust jacket shows Seamus Deane and his brother, arms folded, celebrating their first holy communion. As if simultaneously inviting and denying the suggestion of autobiography, the book cover also reveals a cracked photographic plate.

The unnamed narrator of *Reading in the Dark*, about five years old in 1945, is the third of seven Catholic children growing up in the city of Derry. Despite its seemingly chronological trajectory, the book repeatedly and obsessively turns back on itself, both starting and ending at the foot of the stairs in a house overlooking the cathedral. There is no single linear narrative, but instead a proliferation of narrative possibilities that have to do with the absence of any secure knowledge. The mental and emotional torment that fuses these different narrative strands arises when a boy so loves his parents that he wants to know everything about them, and in seeking to acquire that knowledge he uncovers a secret that bitterly divides him from them and ends up destroying the love he cherished. The most prominent and poignant verb in the book is the verb *to know*, and while in some ways a universal, archetypal infinitive, it cannot in this instance be abstracted from the cultural and political pressures under which the boy's psychology is so tragically thwarted.

As Edna Longley's review makes clear, *Reading in the Dark* shares with *The Field Day Anthology of Irish Writing* an interest in memoir and autobiography as significant narratives of Ireland. In his introduction to a section of the *Anthology* titled 'Autobiography and Memoirs 1890-1988', Deane declares his interest in 'what gives the self definition'. Autobiography, he suggests, is never simply about the self, but also about 'the hostile or liberating energy' which 'made the self come into consciousness and thereby gave to existence a pattern or the beginnings of a pattern of explanation'.⁵ *Reading in the Dark* has its origins in precisely this kind of speculation about selfhood and identity. In a colonial or neo-colonial context, Deane continues, the oppressive agencies with which the self contends are 'multiple and blatant', and so the writing of an

⁵ Seamus Deane (ed), *The Field Day Anthology of Irish Writing*. 3 vols. (Cork: Field Day, 1991), Vol. 3, pp. 383, 380.

autobiography or memoir produces an unusually intense enquiry into the nature of identity, personal or national. The growth of consciousness in such writing is not likely to be registered as a smooth and uninterrupted process but one of profound unease and disturbance. This, Deane asserts, is 'one of the obsessive marks of cultures that have been compelled to inquire into the legitimacy of their own existence by the presence of another culture that is forever foreign and forever intimate'.⁶

In the context of political repression, the autobiographer or writer of memoirs is likely to ask if identity can be more securely established or otherwise simply abandoned and forgotten. What is articulated in the process of self-examination is a familiar relationship between 'Edenic' and 'utopian' responses, one pushing back to a condition of primal innocence, and the other looking forward to some ideal resolution. What most often prevails, however, is 'a radical privation ... the sense of a missing feature or energy'. *Reading in the Dark* is a meditation on that missing agency, an anguished search for some alternative to what Deane terms 'the obduracy of existing conditions'.⁷ The boy's act of reading in the dark is one of both existential necessity and political expediency, a matter of 're-imagining all I had read, the various ways the plot might unravel, the novel opening into endless possibilities in the dark'.⁸

A further explanation of the generic indeterminacy of *Reading in the Dark* is evident in Deane's searching and appreciative review of Terry Eagleton's *Heathcliff and the Great Hunger* (1995). Here, Deane reflects on the cultural forms appropriate to a society in which the conflict between modernity and tradition has been unusually fraught. In literary terms, there is the imaginative world of the realist novel, with its temporal, everyday rhythms, but there is also 'that other world, variously described as the legendary, the mythical, the timeless'. One of the distinctive features of Irish literary culture, according to Deane, is its simultaneous perception of these different dimensions or cultural chronologies. Irish fiction is endowed with a facility for incorporating 'canonical realist forms ... and other forms subversive of or merely different from them'.⁹ *Reading in the Dark* possesses this facility for sliding subtly and uncannily

⁶ Ibid, p. 5.

⁷ Ibid, pp. 383, 380.

⁸ Seamus Deane, *Reading in the Dark* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996), p. 20. All further references will be given as page numbers in the text.

⁹ Seamus Deane, Review of Terry Eagleton, *Heathcliff and the Great Hunger*, *London Review of Books*, 19 October 1995.

between different imaginative discourses or dimensions. If it embraces the everyday rhythms of realist fiction, it is also powerfully imbued with the rhythms of Gothic supernaturalism. Ostensibly a novel about growing up in a particular place at a particular time, it is also an excursion into the realm of the fantastic, a harrowing story of hauntings, possessions and exorcisms.

The opening episode of *Reading in the Dark* establishes a strange and uneasy conjunction between exactness and ineffability, between that which can be physically measured or registered by the senses and that which lies beyond recovery or comprehension:

On the stairs, there was a clear, plain silence.

It was a short staircase, fourteen steps in all, covered in lino from which the original pattern had been polished away to the point where it had the look of a faint memory. Eleven steps took you to the turn of the stairs where the cathedral and the sky always hung in the window frame. Three more steps took you on to the landing, about six feet long (5).

The look of the lino and the loss of its original pattern exert a powerful metonymic and characteristically realist effect at the outset of a narrative obsessively concerned with the processes of memory. At the same time, the unsettling description of silence as being clearly and plainly there 'on the stairs' prepares us for the appearance of a shadow that the boy and his mother can feel but not see. The strict denotation of realist narrative subsides into the ghostly imprecision of the Gothic: 'The house was all cobweb tremors' (6). Accompanying the immediacy of the child's enthrallment is the adult narrator's retrospective assessment of the mother-child relationship: 'I loved her then', a plain and sorrowful declaration of the breakdown that follows. Similarly, the dialogue presents the shadow as 'something there between us', obdurately and tragically anticipating their separation (5).

The collusion of realist narrative and elements that subtly undermine it produces a highly distinctive and striking prose style. A clean, spare diction and simple, uncluttered syntax reminiscent of journal narratives suddenly opens into a richly embellished and heavily adjectival prose. The opening of the episode, dated '*November 1947*' is characteristic:

It was a fierce winter, that year The snow covered the air-raid shelters. At night, from the stair window, the field was

a white paradise of loneliness, and a starlit wind made the glass shake like loose, black water and the ice snore on the sill, while we slept, and the shadow watched (9).

Here, a passage that specifies the season, the year and the post-war environment modulates into a world of strange and supernatural occurrences.

Reading in the Dark takes its epigraph from a popular song, 'She Moved Through the Fair': 'The people were saying no two were e'er wed / But one had a sorrow that never was said'.¹⁰ The disjunction between what is said in public and what is not said in private is just one point of contact between the book and the song. The quotation acquires significance as the marriage between the narrator's parents begins to founder on his mother's agonising and obstinate silence. The reluctance or inability to speak about disturbing events is a common affliction in the book, and the narrator himself frequently confides, with shame and frustration, that 'I said nothing'. In a more general way, the epigraph points to the persistence of popular cultural forms, including folklore, songs and legends.

The early episode titled 'Disappearances' establishes the significance of myth, superstition and illusion in the narrator's developing consciousness: 'people with green eyes were close to the fairies, we were told; they were just here for a little while, looking for a human child they could take away'. Catholic doctrine asserts a different, though no less compelling, mythological notion of destination and disappearance, prefiguring hell as 'a great whirlpool of flames' where 'you disappeared forever' (7). In the same episode, we encounter Bamboozelem, a magician with Duffy's Circus, who performs a celebrated disappearing act. The child at the circus hesitates between the power of magic and the rational explanation that Bamboozelem has slipped through a trapdoor: 'Everyone was laughing and clapping but I felt uneasy. How could they all be so sure?' (8).

So often, in the narrator's perceptions, mythic or magical incidents have their counterparts in actuality, though the diverse episodes in the book are so neatly imbricated that no easy distinction between the imagined and the real can be drawn. It is typical of Deane's skilful intercutting of scenes that the 'Disappearances' episode should be followed immediately with the story of 'the big shoot-out at the distillery between the IRA and the police, when Uncle Eddie disappeared'. The story of Uncle Eddie's

¹⁰The words are by Padraic Colum. See Stephen Regan, *Irish Writing: An Anthology of Irish Writing in English 1798-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 395.

disappearance is one among many, but its exact dating – April, 1922 – firmly links it to the founding of the Irish Free State and the subsequent events of Irish political history. The repercussions of Eddie’s involvement in the Republican movement produce the secrecy and silence that dominate the family life of a later generation: ‘Certainly he had never returned, although my father would not speak of it at all’ (9).

A powerful instance of realist chronology intersecting with the mythic can be found in the episode titled ‘Field of the Disappeared, *August 1950*’. The narrator and his brother, Liam, are taken by their father to see a ‘stretch of green’ close to the sea. The father explains that the souls of all those from the area who had disappeared, including lost fishermen, would gather on certain feast days like St Brigid’s Day or Christmas Day, ‘to cry like birds and look down on the fields where they had been born’ (53). The narrator suspects that there is ‘something more to be told’, but his father says nothing. Then the boy intuitively makes the connection with his father’s lost brother: ‘Is this, I wondered, where Eddie’s soul comes to cry for his lost fields?’ (54).

‘Field of the Disappeared’ is a startling instance of Deane’s simultaneous apprehension of different cultural chronologies. What it suggests, however, is that the hybrid realism of *Reading in the Dark* is founded not just on intersecting temporal dimensions but on intersecting spatial dimensions as well. One of the most impressive aspects of the book is its sense of place, its meticulous way of mapping cultural and political anxieties on to the city of Derry and its rural environs, at the same time dissolving the boundaries between the real and the legendary. All of the principal places in the book, including the stairs on which it opens and closes, appear to cast a shadow. The Field of the Disappeared, the ruined distillery, the lost farmhouse, and the old fort of Grianan are all exactly realised and all imaginatively elevated as legend.

‘We begin to think where we live’, as Raymond Williams was fond of remarking, and that observation has a special acuity if the place happens to be Derry.¹¹ The contradictory impulses which Derry provokes in the mind of the young boy growing up there are hauntingly and beautifully evoked by Deane in an episode titled ‘Fire’. ‘It was a city of bonfires’, the narrator tells us, and he goes on to recall how ‘Fire was what I loved to hear of and to see. It transformed the grey air and streets, excited and exciting’ (33). Of course, the bonfires also inflame the deep sectarian divisions within Derry (‘The Protestants had more than we had’), keeping

¹¹ Raymond Williams, *Resources of Hope* (Verso, 1989), p. 32.

alive a bitter history of triumph and defeat: the 'liberation' of Derry from besieging Catholics in 1689 or the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. Fire also plays a significant role in the events of 1922 and the burning down of Watt's distillery. The occupation of the distillery by IRA gunmen was 'a last-minute protest at the founding of the new state' (35). What remains is 'a burnt space in the heart of the neighbourhood' (36). Place, then, is not a neutral entity or simply a convenient setting for the narrative in *Reading in the Dark*. It is where the long, protracted struggle for meaning and definition goes on.

Deane shows the complex interaction between spatial relations and social relations in a brilliantly evocative and highly animated way. The passage that follows conveys the sights, smells and sounds of the city, but also that complicated experience in which intimate belonging and sullen disenchantment seem inseparable:

The dismembered streets lay strewn all around the ruined distillery where Uncle Eddie had fought, aching with a long, dolorous absence. With the distillery had gone the smell of vaporised whiskey and heated red brick, the sullen glow that must have loomed over the crouching houses like an amber sunset. Now, instead, we had the high Gothic cathedral and the parochial house, standing above the area in a permanent greystone winter overlooking the abandoned site that seemed to me a faithless and desolate patch, rinsed of its colour, pale and bald in the midst of the tumble of small houses, unpaved streets and the giant moraine of debris that had slid from the foot of the city walls down a sloping embankment to where our territory began. In the early winter evenings, people angled past like shadows under the weak street lights, voices would say goodnight and be gone. (34)

Deane's recreation of the city is both majestic and desolate. The scattered streets and the 'tumble' of houses suggest a casual, unplanned filling of space, and yet the lines of territorial possession are clearly demarcated. Even as a child, the narrator is in no doubt about 'where our territory began'. The contradictory response that Derry elicits is evident, too, in the relentless personification with which it is invested. Its 'heart' is a burnt space, its streets are 'dismembered', and yet its will to live is irrepressible: 'The town lay entranced, embraced by the great sleeping light of the river and the green beyond of the border. It woke now and then, like someone startled and shouting from a dream, in clamour at its abandonment' (36).

This romantic evocation, reminiscent of Wordsworth's London in his sonnet 'Composed Upon Westminster Bridge', is brutally undercut with the recollection of a St Patrick's Day riot, when 'the police had baton-charged a march and pursued us into our territory'. The episode ends with another fire – a burning police car – and a sudden spatial distortion: 'The whole street seemed to be bent sideways, tilted by the blazing hoardings in to the old Gaelic football ground' (36).

The Derry of *Reading in the Dark* is possessed of those equal tugs of attachment and disavowal that Deane describes so well in *The Field Day Anthology*: 'To the extent that the world, especially the world of childhood and youth, is restored in writing to its full presence, there is a corresponding sense of its inadequacy. It is always something to escape from'. The search for an alternative, Deane suggests, is 'one of the symptoms of a culture that believes itself always to be provincial, always to be in need of a metropolitan world elsewhere'.¹² Like Gar in Brian Friel's *Philadelphia, Here I Come!*, the narrator of *Reading in the Dark* dreams of American cities: 'Chicago was a place I longed to see' (37). As the boy reaches adolescence and prepares for university, the crisis Deane describes seems imminent. The provincial city must be left, and yet there is no other place that can be as fully realised.

Along with the ruined distillery, there are two other places of deep significance in the geography of the child's imagination. He dreams of a lost farmhouse and longs to go there, but his dream is disrupted by the repercussions of a family feud and by the revelation that Uncle Eddie was interrogated there before he 'disappeared'. The other place is the ancient fort of Grianan (the Fort of Light), where the sleeping warriors of the legendary Fianna are thought to rest. According to the prophecies of St Columcille, the sleeping Fianna will awake to a trumpet call and fight the last battle somewhere between Derry and Strabane, 'after which the one remaining English ship would sail out of Lough Foyle and away from Ireland forever' (57). The old stone ring of Grianan is one of those symbolic places that Deane describes as 'romantic' ruins, signifying 'not only loss but also the native endurance that will prevail even over and through the destruction of the buildings it once created'.¹³ Once again, however, these places of dream and legend and imagination are found to be implicated in the harsh political actualities of the present. The narrator discovers

¹² Seamus Deane (ed), *The Field Day Anthology of Irish Writing*, Vol. 3, p. 383.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 381.

that Grianan is where his Uncle Eddie was shot by fellow Republicans on suspicion of being an informer.

So much of *Reading in the Dark* exemplifies what Fredric Jameson calls 'cognitive mapping', an exploration of socio-spatial relations and their political causes and consequences.¹⁴ The landscape where the narrator grows up is 'border country', physically marked by bridges and streams, but also indelibly scored in the mind. A stream, crossed by a hump-backed bridge, marks 'part of the red line that wriggled around the city on the map and hemmed it in to the waters of Lough Foyle'. At one end of the bridge, 'the Free State began – a grassy road that ran straight for thirty yards' (49). The physical and mental contours of the narrator's territory are compactly described in a single sentence: 'So there it was, our territory, with the old fort of Grianan on one hill overlooking Lough Foyle, the feud farmhouse on another hill, gazing on Lough Swilly, the thick neck of the Inishowen peninsula between, Derry gauzed in smoke at the end of Lough Foyle, the border writhing behind it' (59).

Across the border, Donegal exerts its own distinctive cultural rhythms, while in Derry the pace of modernity is quickening. By the end of 1958 a firm called 'Birmingham Sound Reproducers' has opened a factory for making record-players. Whereas previously it was the women who occupied the jobs in the local shirt factory, it is now the men who take the available work. As the narrator observes, 'It changed the whole pattern of movement in the neighbourhood' (219). On a crucial day when the narrator's father is about to reveal what he knows of Uncle Eddie's death, he takes the boy and his brother to one of his favourite childhood haunts. Across the river from Culmore Point, the British Oxygen plant is being built, and his father explains that the whole embankment is going to 'disappear' in a short time. The ironies here are multiple. It is not just that the Birmingham record-player company and British Oxygen are perceived to be modernising agents that have come from 'outside' and are therefore indicative of a continuing cultural and economic incursion into the area, it is also that one hints at the replaying of a familiar historical record, while the other manufactures oxygen in a place of continuing suffocation.

Given the narrator's sensitivity to the politics of place, it is hardly surprising that his own family's tragic break-up and dispersal should be construed in terms of spatial relations. Dwelling on the broken links of the family and his father's agonised suppression of speech, the narrator reflects: 'I felt we lived in an empty space with a long cry from him ramifying

¹⁴ Fredric Jameson, *Modernism and Imperialism* (Cork: Field Day, 1988), p. 18.

through it. At other times, it appeared to be as cunning and articulate as a labyrinth, closely designed, with someone sobbing at the heart of it' (43). At the end of the book, the narrator leaves Derry for a university education in Belfast, recognising acutely that there is already an unbridgeable gap between himself and his family: 'I had created a distance between my parents and myself that had become my only way of loving them' (225). The boy realises, too, that there is wisdom in Crazy Joe's conundrum: 'There's a place where a man died but lived on as a ghost, and where another man lived as a ghost but died as a man, and where another man would have died as a man but ran away to live as a ghost. Where would that place be?' (221). The melting of solid forms into shadows finally afflicts the boy and his mother. 'She was nearly gone from me now', he remarks towards the end of the book, 'Now the haunting meant something new to me – now I had become the shadow' (217). If the image of the shadow suggests an encroaching darkness and an unremitting sense of guilt and complicity, it also recalls the uncanny resemblances between the missing Uncle Eddie and other family members, as if they are all in some way implicated in his fate.

It is entirely in keeping with the complicity of private and public grief in *Reading in the Dark* that the narrator's mother should suffer a stroke and lose the power of speech at the onset of the Troubles in October 1968. The closing episode, simply titled 'After', shows a community reeling under gunfire, explosions and the smashing of batons on riot shields. On the day the narrator's father dies, a curfew is called and armoured personnel carriers move through the streets. The narrator stays awake until dawn and is roused by the noise of horse-hooves. He watches 'a young gypsy boy jog sedately through the scurf of debris astride a grey-mottled horse'. Although the curfew is still going on, the boy rides through the streets, holding on to the horse's mane. The narrator recalls how 'The clip-clop of hooves echoed in the still streets after he had disappeared' (233). That striking image of the boy on horseback functions on a number of levels. It carries with it the stirring energy of Jack B. Yeats's equestrian paintings, challenging and resisting authority and conformity, but like the painter's fabulous horsemen and their horses it seems to be conjured up out of the imaginative remnants of an older Ireland. Like so much in *Reading in the Dark*, there is a powerful sense of presence in the very acknowledgement of absence and disappearance.

In its moving depiction of a community caught between modernity and tradition, *Reading in the Dark* sedulously avoids both sentimentality and dogmatism. It is all too well aware of that naively utopian plenitude of selfhood

and nationhood that seems to beckon in such desperate circumstances. The book does not allow a simple-minded politics of identity to offer itself as cause and explanation, but nor does it cynically or despairingly relinquish the processes of self-definition and interpretation. If reading in the dark is a way of making sense of history, of infusing interpretation with imagination, so too is the writing of fiction. The boy who reads in the dark is effectively inventing fictions of his own and quietly learning the subtle distinction between telling it as it is and telling it as it might be.

A self-reflexive concern with reading and writing, and with the nature of artistic vocation, provides the strongest point of contact with Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. Like Stephen Dedalus, the narrator of *Reading in the Dark* comes to consciousness amidst a competing and bewildering array of aesthetic, religious and political imperatives, and there are moments when he has to announce, 'I will not serve'. An education with the Christian Brothers provides Deane's narrator with some magnificent opportunities for ribald comedy and satirical deflation. Like Joyce's novel, *Reading in the Dark* makes its difficult way between the politics of affiliation and attachment and the politics of disavowal and denial. In the process, language, nationality and religion are exposed and titled 'Political Education, November 1956', and a priest in British Army Uniform tells a group of schoolboys that in comparison with the great threat of Communism, 'Our internal disputes are no more than family quarrels'. The boys wonder if it is the Germans, the Russians or the IRA who are causing all the problems. 'Global vision', the narrator muses, 'I needed that' (197).

Where Seamus Deane's autobiographical novel explores the consciousness of a Catholic, Republican community in a border town in Northern Ireland, John Walsh's memoir *The Falling Angels* is much more obviously concerned with the fate of migrant or diasporic Irish communities, and in particular the uncertain identities of the émigré Irish middle class. In stark contrast to Deane's emphasis on working-class Derry, Walsh (the son of an Irish doctor) gives us what at first appears to be a picture of comfortable affluence in Battersea, South London. But if Walsh finds space for comedy in his anatomy of Irish migrant identity, he is also alert to the painfulness of division and separation. Like *Reading in the Dark*, *The Falling Angels* is about family disintegration and it, too, records the loss of the narrator's mother and father and the bleakness of trying to reinvent and redefine oneself in the emptiness that is left behind. Walsh's memoir is subtitled 'An Irish Romance', but that love of romantic Ireland is severely undercut by the narrator's persistent sense of displacement.

The Falling Angels gives us an opportunity for examining diasporic Irish identity, especially that of second generation Irish children growing up in England. Aidan Arrowsmith's analysis of displaced Irishness is helpful here, though as Liam Harte points out, it needs to be modified with reference to the peculiarly indeterminate or suspended identity that second-generation children acquire.¹⁵ Arrowsmith's model is based on a tripartite pattern of development. The uncertainty of identity associated with second-generation affiliation to a lost homeland leads initially to a rejection of parental heritage, involving a desire to conform to English cultural norms. This is followed by a reassessment of cultural origins and by nostalgia for some authentic ideal of Irishness. This nostalgia then mutates into a more mature and enquiring third position, in which the displaced subject begins to question whether there can ever be an authentic state of being and comes to accept the provisionality and hybridity of identity.

What is unusual about *The Falling Angels*, according to Liam Harte, is that it seems to bypass this linear, progressive model of identity and instead shows us different notions of identity co-existing in a much more problematic and unresolved way.¹⁶ Walsh, who studied English Literature at Oxford and then Irish Literature at University College Dublin, and who now writes for the *Independent* newspaper, has a powerfully engaging rhetorical style in which he is able to expose and ridicule the obvious stereotypes of romantic attachment to Ireland while simultaneously suggesting just how strong and seductive those ideals of Irishness actually are. At the same time as revealing that second generation Irishness entails a whole range of possible identities that might be performed or improvised, the memoir also continues to yearn for some fixed point of security in the old ancestral homeland.

It is towards the west of Ireland, the place of myth and folklore and Irish language, that the memoir is drawn. The title recalls another literary work of indeterminate genre, John Millington Synge's book, *The Aran Islands*, in which the Irish playwright in the guise of anthropologist encounters the denizens of those far flung islands. In his account of his visits to Inishmore, the largest of the islands, Synge recalls how he met an old blind fisherman called Mairtin Conneely, who told him the story of how Satan and his angels were thrown out of heaven, and how one of the archangels pleaded with

¹⁵ See Aidan Arrowsmith, 'Plastic Paddy: Negotiating Identity in Second-generation "Irish-English" Writing', *Irish Studies Review* 8. 1 (2000), 35-43 and Liam Harte, "'Somewhere beyond England and Ireland": Narratives of "Home" in Second-generation Irish Autobiography', *Irish Studies Review* 11. 3 (2003), 293-305.

¹⁶ Harte, 297.

God to spare some of Satan's followers. The old man explains to Synge: 'those that were falling are in the air still, and have power to wreck ships and to work evil in the world'.¹⁷ Walsh finds a compelling parallel with those exiled Irish, like himself, who seem cursed to spend their lives in a state of suspense, caught between Ireland and England. He seizes on the image of falling angels to explain the predicament of those who are 'eternally in transit between one place and another, deprived of a sanctuary, denied a final refuge, never finding a real home'(30).

What complicates Walsh's already confused sense of identity is the powerful attraction of 1960s popular culture in London in his teen years, with the Beatles and the Rolling Stones now competing with the traditional Irish music enjoyed by his parents and their Irish friends. For much of the memoir, the narrator oscillates between the need for assimilation in middle-class English culture and the powerful attraction of Irish otherness, seeking an identity that will somehow embrace both nationalities. After the death of his mother, Anne, the narrator takes a long journey through Ireland, a rite of passage in which he hopes to find a secure sense of origin and belonging, but to no avail. At the funeral of his mother's sister, his Aunt Dolly, he talks to a nun about his search for home:

I fell into conversation with Sister Brid, from the Presentation Convent in Athenry. We talked about Dolly's in-between status – how neither she nor Anne could quite stay, or grow, or become 'rally themselves' in England; but neither could they go back to what they'd known and rejected in Ireland. I told the nun about my own wonderings about where my home was.

'It's very simple,' she said. 'Wherever your parents may be buried, your true home is with the next generation. So with you it's London, where your children are growing up. But the human heart allows itself to have *sacred spaces*, where you feel most alive, even if they're not your home.'

That sounded about right. But I still hadn't found the home I sought, somewhere between London and Galway, sharing the essences of Englishness and Irishness, somewhere beyond both (279-80).

¹⁷ John Walsh, *The Falling Angels* (London: Harper, 1999), p. 29. All further references will be given as page numbers in the text.

Although Sister Brid's distinction between one's 'true home' and the 'sacred spaces' of the human heart provides a flexible model of attachment and identification, it still invokes the binary categories of England and Ireland, of 'here' and 'there'. It insists too strongly on generational divides as the final arbiters of what constitutes home.

The narrator's search for somewhere beyond both London and Galway takes him further west and back out to the Aran Islands, following the footsteps of John Millington Synge. He discovers in his reading about the islands that there was an English military presence there in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and that the people of the islands are not the pure-bred Irish that Synge and Yeats believed them to be. The Aran Islands, a place once thought to be the repository of authentic Irishness, turns out to be a more heterogeneous, hybridised place than Ireland's writers imagined. It provides a space in which English and Irish identities might be joined and transcended. In a moment of reconciliation strongly reminiscent of Wordsworth turning to his sister at the end of 'Tintern Abbey', the narrator addresses his sister, Madelyn, both suggesting a recovered sense of unity and allowing the memoir to end with a question:

I looked to the right, where the Cliffs of Moher bulked in the sunlight, showing a more friendly, piebald aspect than ever before. I looked left and saw the edge of Connemara, the great lunar landscape of Galway rock, from where the airplane would soon land to take us back to civilisation. The Cliffs and the stone desert, my favourite sights in Ireland, seemed suddenly drawn together, forming a mystic triangle, somewhere beyond England and Ireland. Here, where Synge's fishermen believed that angels were always falling through the air and wreaking havoc in the world, here was the place where they might fall to earth at last.

'Madelyn,' I said. 'How'd you like to build a house here?' (281-82).

Looking to the right and then looking to the left are gestures of caution, but the west of Ireland landscape, for all that it retains suggestions of being beyond 'civilisation', even 'lunar' in its remoteness, is friendly and inviting. The question remains, however, whether this is the real home that the narrator has repeatedly sought. We are asked, perhaps, to consider the difference between a house and a home, and to reflect upon the possibility

that a house is only a temporary structure. Liam Harte's reflections on the nature of the house are instructive here: 'this implied preference for fixity over flux is counterbalanced by the sense that this will be no ordinary or earthly house, but rather one which embodies an idea of "home" as site specific yet free floating, earthed yet deterritorialised, concretely bounded yet transcendently open'.¹⁸

One of the most remarkable features of Irish autobiographical writing since the 1990s has been its readiness to depart from the usual and familiar conventions through which the self is represented in literature. Often this has involved a flagrant mixing of generic codes, or a self-conscious literariness and allusiveness, so that the fictional component of memoir or autobiography is made more than usually explicit. This unsettling of traditional autobiographical modes has tended to bring with it a strong sense of identity held in abeyance, painfully thwarted, strangely suspended. More striking still has been the extraordinary preoccupation in Irish autobiography and memoir with the spatial and temporal structures through which the self is habitually known and understood. There is no easy rite of passage from childhood to adulthood, even in those works that call upon comedy to relieve the troubling question of what it is to be Irish. John McGahern's country lanes in some ways hold secure the memory of a child happy in the presence of his mother, and they guarantee, as well, an enduring image of Ireland. His *Memoir* seems to move, finally, towards reconciliation and fulfilment by returning us to those lanes in Co. Leitrim. From the outset, though, those leafy lanes are 'a maze... a green tunnel pierced by vivid pinpoints of light' (2), and what they seem to signify in the end is only a momentary security, a momentary magic. What Irish memoir brings home to us with more than usual intensity is the urgent need to converse with the dead and the impossibility of ever doing so: 'If we could walk together through those summer lanes, with their banks of wild flowers that "cast a spell", we probably would not be able to speak...' (272).

References

- Arrowsmith, Aidan (2000). "Plastic Paddy: Negotiating Identity" in Second-generation 'Irish-English' Writing" in *Irish Studies Review* 8.1: 35-43.
- Deane, Seamus (ed.) (1991). *The Field Day Anthology of Irish Writing*, Vol. 3, Cork: Field Day.

¹⁸ Harte, 303-04.

- Deane, Seamus (1995). "Review of Terry Eagleton, *Heathcliff and the Great Hunger*" in *London Review of Books*, 19 October 1995.
- Deane, Seamus (1996). *Reading in the Dark*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Hamilton, Hugo (2003). *The Speckled People*. London: Fouth Estate.
- Harte, Liam (2003). "'Somewhere beyond England and Ireland': Narratives of 'Home' in Second-generation Irish Autobiography" in *Irish Studies Review* 11.3: 293-305.
- Jameson, Fredric (1988). *Modernism and Imperialism*. Cork: Field Day.
- Longley, Edna (1996). *Fortnight*. November 1996.
- McGahern, John (2005). *Memoir*. London: Faber.
- Morrison, Blake (1996). *Independent on Sunday*. 1 September 1996.
- Regan, Stephen (2004). *Irish Writing: An Anthology of Irish Writing in English 1798-1939*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Walsh, John (1999). *The Falling Angels*. London: Harper.
- Williams, Raymond (1989). *Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism* (edited by Robin Gable). London and New York: Verso.

Veselin Kostić
University of Belgrade, Serbia

SHAKESPEARE'S BORROWINGS

The traditional picture of Renaissance literature as a product of spontaneous flowering of creative energy is still rather widespread, although this is a view directly contradicted both by the dominant critical theory of that time and by numerous Renaissance works, including the plays of Shakespeare himself. Few principles were emphasised so consistently and persistently in critical theory as the principle of imitation – not in the Aristotelian sense of the imitation of nature (*mimesis*), but in the Horatian sense of the imitation of other authors (*imitatio*). It was an idea built into the foundations of the humanist movement from its beginnings and it continued to be advocated – at least at the level of learned criticism and theory – throughout the Renaissance and well into the seventeenth century.

Several factors contributed to the establishment and lasting influence of that principle. The theory and practice of Latin literature, which was based largely on Greek precedents, was an authoritative example. The revival of the classical heritage, which was an essential part of the programme of humanist and Renaissance scholars, implied a careful study of classical works. The teaching in sixteenth-century schools was so oriented that it imbued the idea of great stylistic models into the minds of pupils from an early age. Some authors made even larger claims for this principle and maintained that the wish to imitate was innate in man, that it could not be curbed and that therefore each writer should imitate other authors (Bembo 1954: 40).

Although the principle itself was universally acknowledged, there were differences of opinion, especially in later stages, as to the exact importance imitation should have in a literary work. Some critics held extreme views and declared that originality should be eschewed: "Epithets... are an ornament of verse and should be taken from poets

rather than invented... for no one will find so apt, so suitable and so elegant ones as those in classical writers" (Parthenio 1560: 16). It is no wonder, therefore, that invention and originality were considered by some critics almost as a literary sin: "Those who do not want to imitate anybody and aspire to become famous not taking anything from anyone, lack energy and vigour in writing" (quoted in Sabbadini 1885: 39).

Not all critics, however, demanded such strict and slavish following of other authors. Some speak of another kind of imitation, which does not consist of mechanical inclusion of external elements from the works of other writers, but is a kind of literary education and assimilation of the spirit of great poets. Actually, this more general view of the role of models gained increasing currency as the sixteenth century advanced. Thus Du Bellay, writing in 1549, recommends the imitation of good writers – not only Greek and Latin, but also Italian, Spanish and others – but he says that in doing this, the author should always take care that what he takes from others should serve his own purpose and intention (Du Bellay 1904: 194). Giambattista Giraldis is also against close imitation and says that a literary work should always preserve a certain autonomy. In his opinion, imitation can be a channel for the transmission of inspiration to successive generations of writers. It frequently happens, he explains, that the same spirit which moved the poet to write begins to work upon the person who reads his work and kindles in him the flames of inspiration (Giraldis 1864: 34).

This view of imitation as a generative power is combined in some Renaissance theories with another important idea – the idea of emulation. Advocates of this view maintain that imitation should lead to the creation of a better work than its model. "And we ought to bear in mind", says a sixteenth century critic, "that we do not imitate to remain always inferior to the author we follow, but to surpass him." (Parthenio 1560: 107; cf. also Giraldis 1864: 178).

In general literary practice, the main effect of the principle of imitation was that it established an attitude which justified and prompted the adoption of borrowed matter – not only from classical authors, but also from mediaeval and contemporary, renowned and obscure writers. In this sense, it may be said that its main consequence was not so much to direct contemporary writers to classical models, as to give legitimacy and provide a favourable climate for the general practice of imitation and borrowing.

Shakespeare did not differ from his contemporaries in this respect. Like the majority of Elizabethan playwrights, he did not restrict himself to classical models. His plays are based on material borrowed from very diverse sources – Tudor chronicles, old legends, Italian *novelle*, classical historical texts, legendary histories, earlier English plays and narrative works of his predecessors.

Some of the fifty-odd works which have been suggested as Shakespeare's sources were not available in English translation at the time when he made use of them, and we do not know whether he read them in the original, or used some intermediary version, or again got to know them from oral communication.

What is important, however, is not so much the trajectory of a borrowing from one work to another as what happens in the final lap of that progress, when it passes through the creative mind of the appropriating author – and that is in fact a stage which is frequently ignored (cf. Whitaker 1941: 377). For a passage containing an imitated element can be a valuable source of information about the author, about his aims and purposes, and about the influence exercised upon him by his social and historical context. The choice of a borrowing may in itself be a record of the author's taste or of his perceptiveness for literary potential; an addition or a modification may provide a clue to his intentions, and an omission may be indicative of a critical principle at work.

When Shakespeare came to London, the most popular play in the public theatres was Kyd's *Spanish Tragedy*, a Senecan work that established the vogue of the so-called revenge play. It is no wonder, therefore, that the aspiring playwright turned to Kyd as his model when he began writing his first tragedy. The way he went about it shows that he held that imitation should be competitive. It also shows that he shared with some Elizabethan authors a specific view of this combination of imitation and emulation that may be called "quantitative" because it seems to have been based on the belief that the imitated model could be surpassed by the amplification or multiplication of the elements deemed contributory to its popularity or literary worth (cf. Kostić 1959: 72-73). In the case of style, for example, that view favoured the proliferation of epithets, the heightening of tone, or the intensification of imagery. The same tendency to augment is also apparent at the level of structure and characterization. The result is that some works look like comparatives of the models on which they are based, and this holds true for Shakespeare's *Titus Andronicus*.

Kyd's *Spanish Tragedy* revolves round the efforts of the Spanish court marshal Hieronimo to avenge the murder of his son Horatio, and it incorporates a number of elements that delighted the audiences in the London public theatres – suspense, outbursts of rage and passion and numerous sensational events. Another attraction was the fact that Kyd presented *coram populo*, the bloody events that make up a large part of the plot, and thus outdid his model Seneca, who had them reported by messengers. Before the grisly grand finale – which contains the exposition of a corpse, the biting off and spitting out of a tongue, three murders and two suicides – the spectators were treated to scenes showing a ghost, an allegorical figure, a hanging, preparations for a burning at the stake, a napkin soaked in blood, a letter written in blood and several outbursts of mental derangement.

Kyd's style, also modelled after Seneca, was another feature that delighted Elizabethan playgoers. His play is full of clashing rhetoric, heavily elaborated speeches, vehement and unusual images, anaphorae, epiphorae, parallelisms, oxymorons, alliteration and various other devices.

Shakespeare's wish was obviously to surpass Kyd. At this early stage, however, he did not have much discipline and critical judgment. What he seems to have lacked most was a sense of proportion and the skill to match style with the dramatic moment. This can be illustrated by a comparison of two similar speeches spoken by Kyd's Hieronimo and by Shakespeare's Titus. The first is Hieronimo's lament over the loss of his son:

Where shall I run to breath abroad my woes, --
My woes whose weight hath wearied the earth,
Or mine exclaims that haue surcharged the aire
With ceasles plaints for my deceased sonne?
The blustering winds, conspiring with my words,
At my lament haue moued to leaueless trees,
Disroabde the medowes of their flowred greene,
Made mountains marsh with spring-tides of my teares,
And broken through the brazen gates of hell;
Yet still tormented is my tortured soule
With broken sighes and restles passions,
That, winged, mount, and houering in the aire,
Beat at the windowes of the brightest heauens,
Soliciting for iustice and reuenge.
But they are plac't in those imperiall heights,
Where, countermurde with walles of diamond,

I finde the place impregnable, and they
Resist my woes and giue my words no way.

(III.7.1 ff.)

The other is Titus's reply to his brother's advice that he should use his reason and try to suppress his anguish and despair:

If there were reason for these miseries,
Then into limits could I bind my woes:
When heaven doth weep, doth not the earth o'erflow?
If the winds rage, doth not the sea wax mad,
Threat'ning the welkin with his big-swoln face?
And wilt thou have a reason for this coil?
I am the sea; hark, how her sighs doth blow!
She is the weeping welkin, I the earth:
Then must my sea be movéd with her sighs,
Then must my earth with her continual tears
Become a deluge, overflowed and drowned:
For why? my bowel cannot hide her woes,
But like a drunkard must I vomit them.

(3.1.220-232)

The emulation is obvious, but it can hardly be called successful. Kyd's images, hyperbolic enough, have become absurdly overblown in Shakespeare's version, or even, as in the case of the last one, downright repellent. What we have here is obviously a misguided application of the "quantitative" conception of imitation, and the attempts of some apologetic critics to explain such passages as only partly Shakespeare's, or as parodic, or even as the Bard's secret gibe at the coarse taste of his public (Bloom 1999: 60; Dover Wilson 1964: xxxii) are understandable, but do not seem convincing.

Shakespeare made much better use of his model in his early *Comedy of Errors*. The basic story of that play is taken from Plautus' *Menaechmi*, in which the comic situations are spun out of the mistaken identities of a pair of twins. True to the "quantitative" conception of imitation, Shakespeare added another pair of identical twins to his plot, thus doubling the number of characters who cause comic misunderstandings, which begin much earlier, are more numerous and culminate in general befuddlement at the end.

But Shakespeare did not merely increase the comic potential of Plautus' story. Another important alteration was that he added a serious, almost tragic frame to his comic plot, and thus imparted a considerably greater range to his play. This frame is provided by the story of the impending execution of old Aegeon with which the play begins and ends. Other changes, such as the increased role of women, the consequent introduction of romantic interests, and the praise of marriage as the full spiritual and physical union, extend still further the emotional and psychological scope of the Plautine material.

The question whether Shakespeare created the English history play or followed the example of Marlowe's *Edward II* must remain open until more reliable evidence of the chronological relationship between Shakespeare's chronicles and Marlowe's play is discovered. In any case, the process itself of shaping historical events into a dramatic plot unquestionably posed a great challenge to the young playwright. In dealing with it, Shakespeare showed a sure grasp of dramatic architecture. From the very beginning he adapted quite successfully the amorphous material culled from the hefty Tudor chronicles and made it suit his dramatic purpose. He condenses incidents, adds fictional characters or situations, gathers up chronologically distinct moments into dramatic focal points, articulates disparate historical developments into integrated dramatic segments and invests them with a verbal garb that suggests the general and timeless significance of the staged relations and events. As we follow the chronological sequence in which he wrote his history plays, we can see how he gradually discards the plodding style, weighed down with drawn-out comparisons, far-fetched images and crowded formal ornaments, characteristic of the *Henry VI* trilogy, and begins to adjust his phrasing more closely to the character or the situation. This was a slow process, and as late as *Richard III*, his fourth chronicle, natural utterances, expressive of the individual characteristics of the speaker, alternate with passages of highly formalized rhetoric or ritual-like incantation.

The matter borrowed from the Tudor chronicles did not offer much opportunity for a variety of tone and mood. Developments bearing upon the fate of the state or its ruler demanded a serious tone, and their agents came from the highest segment of society. Their interest was political, and their actions were set in palaces of the great or on battlefields on which issues of great dynastic moment were decided. Comical elements could be introduced only occasionally, mostly in the form of interpolated episodes.

In the meantime, in writing plays belonging to other genres, where constraints of the subject were not so severe, Shakespeare was

learning how to deepen the meaning of his dramas and make them emotionally richer and generally roomier by interweaving borrowings from several sources or by introducing new characters into a borrowed story. His tragedy from that period, *Romeo and Juliet*, is based mostly on a single source, a novella by Matteo Bandello in Arthur Brooke's translation, but his modifications of it are, as might be expected, much freer than is the case of his historical dramas. These alterations are not merely the result of his endeavour to shape a narrative into a drama; they transmute considerably the basic tenor of the borrowed plot. Moreover, they introduce new characters or fully fleshed-out versions of secondary characters barely sketched in Bandello, who advance their individual points of view and thus broaden the social, emotional and psychological compass of the staged story.

The presentation of multiple points of view, which is one of the most outstanding features of Shakespeare's mature art, becomes even more apparent when the borrowed matter is derived from more than one author. An early example is *Love's Labour's Lost*, whose main plot cannot be ascribed to a single source, incorporates deposits of a number of individual modes of speech known from various works fashionable or popular at that time. In *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, another comedy written at about that time, the basic plot is also devised by Shakespeare himself, but the characters appearing in it are convened from such diverse domains as classical literature, French romance, Celtic legends and earlier English works and traditions. As a result of the skilful interweaving of these distinct filaments, the central theme of love is presented in a multiplicity of contexts and exhibited in a number of aspects, from the grotesque to the menacing.

This new skill in combining borrowings from different sources was put to excellent use when Shakespeare came to write the two Henry IV plays. They differ markedly from the earlier chronicles in that they are not focused mainly, like the Henry VI trilogy or *Richard II*, on the aristocratic world and the problems of high politics. Although likewise based on the material taken from the Tudor chronicles, they also incorporate material from a primitive anonymous play, *The Famous Victories of Henry V*, which deals with the dissolute life of Prince Hal and his companions from the Elizabethan underworld. As a result, the Henry IV plays range socially from thieves and prostitutes to the monarch; tonally from flippancy to gravity; morally from robbery to heroic idealism – and yet they remain faithful to the gist, and sometimes even to the details, of their historical sources.

The sketch of Shakespeare's use of borrowed material in the early phase of his career offered here should not be taken to imply that it is

possible to trace a clear line of development in his treatment of sources – a consistent movement from the concentration on one model at the beginning to the use of an increasing number of sources in the later years of his career. The chronology of Shakespeare's works does not support such an assumption. Of the mature tragedies, *Othello* and *Macbeth* are based mainly on a single source; the Roman plays do not deviate much, as far as the plot is concerned, from Plutarch's *Lives*. No change of method is noticeable in this respect in Shakespeare's final period either. The entire plot of *The Winter's Tale* is borrowed from R. Greene's *Pandosto; Pericles* and *Cymbeline* combine material from several sources; and the *Tempest* belongs to the few plays by Shakespeare with an original main plot, although it contains muted echoes from other works – ideas or characters suggested by the memory of, reaction to, or association with something familiar remembered from an earlier work¹.

We can obtain a better glimpse of Shakespeare at work if we explore his modifications of the borrowed matter, regardless of its origin in a single or several works. If we analyze his dramatic practice from this angle, we may say that the most characteristic and most consistent feature of his method is the elaboration of the borrowed material. It may involve several procedures, but the two most important ones are interiorization and the introduction of problematical issues that elicit complex responses. This implies a convincing rendering of inner emotional and mental processes and the presentation of distinct individual attitudes to the staged events.

The case of *Hamlet* illustrates this approach most clearly. As mentioned before, this play and the early *Titus Andronicus* belong to the tragedies of revenge. According to the established pattern, the tragedy of revenge had two focal points – the crime of the negative hero and the punishment of the crime by the avenger. This logical causal structure imposes, however, considerable dramatic difficulties. Between the initial focal point, the murder which demands revenge, and the final scene, in which vengeance is wreaked, there is a gap which is difficult to fill in a satisfactory way. Much depended on how many attention-riveting events the author succeeded in building into that interval. In the earlier plays of this type the gap was filled with an accumulation of sensational scenes. In Shakespeare's own *Titus Andronicus*, for example, Titus's daughter Lavinia walks on to the stage moments after she was raped, her tongue torn out, and her hands cut off. And that happens fairly early in the play (II.4).

¹ Cf. E.g. the discussion of the complicated web of humanist ideas woven into this play in Stanivuković (2006).

The horrors continue to pile up. According to a critic, who counted them (Hulse 1979: 19), the play has "14 killings, 9 of them on stage, 6 severed members, 1 rape, 1 live burial, 1 case of insanity, and 1 of cannibalism—an average of 5.2 atrocities per act, or one for every 97 lines."

When Shakespeare undertook, about ten years later, to write *Hamlet*, his second tragedy of revenge, the way he used the inherited dramatic pattern clearly showed how much his art had progressed in the meantime. The advance is apparent in all the elements of the play, from the style, which bears no trace of the earlier straining after overblown rhetorical effect, to characterization, variety of moods and breadth of moral and philosophical vision. Shakespeare also brilliantly solved the most important structural problem of the revenge play by interiorizing the delay of the vengeance and making it directly dependent on the character of the avenger (Kostić 1982: 17 ff.). The gap between the two focal points is not filled with crowded external happenings or by outbursts of thundering rhetoric, but by the even more absorbing inner conflicts of the hero. Hamlet's dilemmas are presented with so much dramatic power and psychological insight that the spectator or reader is constantly engrossed in them. As J.R. Brown rightly remarks: "We are interested in the hero's inner consciousness at least as keenly as we await the fulfilling of barbarous revenge" (Brown 1992: 17).

The shift of emphasis from external events and relations to the inner domain leads to similar, though less far-reaching modifications of the borrowed matter in *Macbeth*. Here Shakespeare uses elements of two episodes from his main source, Holinshed's *Chronicle* – the murder of Duncan by Macbeth and the murder of Duff by Donwald.² It is immediately apparent that in adapting these episodes Shakespeare reduces the importance of the social context in order to bring into sharper focus Macbeth's individual anguish as his soul dissolves under the pressure of the committed crimes. In both episodes, as related by Holinshed, the murderer has some grounds for his acts and he is helped by accomplices and supporters. The murder of Duncan is the result of a conspiracy initiated not only by Macbeth but also by a number of his supporters, by whom he is proclaimed king later. The murder of Duff, on the other hand, is executed by four servants sent by Donwald. In Shakespeare's version,

²The relevant passages from Holinshed are reprinted in Bullough (1957-75), Vol. III. Excerpts used by Shakespeare are also available on the internet - <http://www.clicknotes.com/macbeth/Holinshed/welcome.html>

Macbeth has no outward cause for the murder of Duncan: he is moved by his ambition only, and he has no accomplices apart from his wife.

The influence of the murderer's wife is a detail which is found in both episodes in Holinshed and which is also of great importance in the early scenes of Shakespeare's play. It is, however, the relationship of Shakespeare's hero with his wife that demonstrates most clearly the isolating power that the interiorization of the plot entails. At the beginning, Macbeth and his wife are very close. The murder of Duncan is their plan, jointly made and jointly carried out. But this act causes profound changes in their minds, and their mutual relationship is destroyed. When Macbeth plans his second murder – the assassination of Banquo – he says nothing to his wife, and before his third murder he confers with the witches, not with her. In fact, after the appearance of Banquo's ghost at the feast, Macbeth and Lady Macbeth are never seen together again. They continue their progress into spiritual emptiness separately, and that progress is illuminated by their self-absorbed and searching soliloquies rather than by external events or by their relations with each other.

Interiorization is also responsible for a certain discrepancy between plot and character observable in Shakespeare's plays that make use of time-honoured fairy-tale motifs that had floated for generations in folk literature, traditional stories and legendary lore. Once such motifs gained currency, they were freely used in later variants, and their probability was not called into question. In some plays by Shakespeare, however, the inner reality of character seems disconcertingly at odds with such conventional motifs, and one has the impression that rational and true-to-life human beings have been made victims of irrational or improbable narrative structures. Would any level-headed and wise girl like Portia, one may justly ask, consent to be put up as the prize in a lottery such as the choice of the right casket? Or how is one to believe that the sensitive and discrete Helena, who is portrayed with so much human warmth and psychological insight in the first part of *All's Well that Ends Well*, could propose such a stratagem as the bed-trick?

Another remarkable general feature of Shakespeare's treatment of his sources is the enhancement of the female element. The effect of this intensification is manifold: besides expanding the emotional range of the play, it humanizes the action and provides for a greater variety of attitudes. In *1 Henry IV* the interludes with Mortimer and his wife (who appears in Shakespeare's source only as "the daughter of the said Owen"), or with Percy and his wife (all that Holinshed has to say about her is that she was the lady whom "the lord Henry Persie had married") introduce

tones of romance, of touching tenderness and of teasing playfulness into the grave world of political intrigues and contentions. In Plutarch's life of Coriolanus, the protagonist's wife Vergilia is mentioned briefly and only once; Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*, though a very masculine play, has an important scene featuring female characters only, which not only sheds important light on the character of the absent hero, but also contains such an exquisite portrayal of Vergilia that it made John Ruskin proclaim her "the most lovely of Shakespeare's heroines" (Ruskin 1906:105). Again, in the crucial scene under the walls of Rome, the tender words with which Coriolanus greets Valeria, who gets only a passing mention in Plutarch, is one of the most poetic passages in the play.

Interesting indirect evidence of the author's artistic intentions is also provided by the characters who are not merely more developed and individualized than their models in the sources, but who are Shakespeare's own additions. In the *Comedy of Errors*, Adriana's sister Luciana, who has no counterpart in Plautus, is largely responsible for the diffusion of a mood of lyricism, of respect and idealization of women, which is wholly alien to Roman comedy. The introduction of new characters may complement or call into question the values and attitudes of the borrowed plot in other respects, too. Lodge's *Rosalynd*, the source of *As You Like It*, is a conventional pastoral romance which glorifies the Arcadian ideal, quotes Latin *dicta* and makes allusions to classical heroes and heroines. Its atmosphere is unrealistic, its characters are stereotyped, and its speeches are artificial. The new characters whom Shakespeare introduces into this bookish world – Jacques, Touchstone, William and Audrey – in fact undermine the sentimentalism of Greene's story. Their speeches, behaviour or mere presence establish individual dissenting or desentimentalizing perspectives on pastoralism and love – the two basis themes in the play. Moreover, each of these perspectives is shown as acceptable at a certain level and to a certain degree.

Similarly, the main plot in *Much Ado About Nothing* is based on a story retold, among others, by L. Ariosto, M. Bandello, E. Spenser and G. Whetstone. Yet Shakespeare's version is chiefly valuable, as has been observed (Lewis 1964: 82), for the characters of Benedick and Beatrice, and Dogberry and his fellows, who are his own additions to the borrowed story. This gallery of amplified or completely new characters who impart additional verve, vitality or depth to the borrowed matter includes numerous other picturesque or well-known inhabitants of Shakespeare's dramatic world – Falstaff, Mrs. Quickly, Doll Tearsheet, Bottom and his companions, the Fool in *King Lear*, Laertes in *Hamlet* and many others.

In addition to new characters, Shakespeare often incorporated new episodes into the plots he borrowed. They are sometimes mere comic interludes included for no other reason but to provide an opportunity for the comedian of the company to show his skill, but more often they are built into the structure of the play and contribute to the better portrayal of character or fuller statement of the central theme. Sometimes these added scenes are among the most memorable moments of the play – the soliloquy of Brutus before the assassination of Caesar; Lady Macbeth's invocation of the evil spirits, her sleep-walking, or the knocking at the gate of Macbeth's castle; the coming to life of the statue in *The Winter's Tale*; the account of Falstaff's death and the comic episodes with Fluellen and other captains in *Henry V*; the play within the play, Ophelia's madness and the gravediggers scene in *Hamlet*; the death of Talbot and his son in the *First Part of Henry VI*, a scene which brought tears, as Thomas Nashe tells us³, to the eyes of thousands of spectators in Elizabethan London, etc. – the list could be greatly extended.

Shakespeare's borrowings also testify to his extraordinary ability to perceive the latent dramatic potential in a text. One can frequently watch the plain seed from an earlier narrative work coming to luxuriant flower in his play. The plot of *The Winter's Tale* follows quite closely Greene's *Pandosto*. In one passage, Greene mentions a rural festivity in which Fawnia (Shakespeare's Perdita) also took part:

It happened not long after this, that there was a meeting of all the Farmers daughters in Sycilia, whither Fawnia was also bidden as the Mistresse of the feast, who hauing attired herselfe in her best garments, went among the rest of her companions to the merrie meeting: there spending the day in such homely pastimes as shepheard's vse.⁴

It is from these few lines, which apparently do not stand out in any respect in Greene's rather plodding and vapid narrative, that there sprouted

³ "How would it have joyed brave Talbot (the terror of the French) to think that after he had lye two hundred yeares in his Tombe, he should triumphe againe on the Stage, and haue his bones newe embalmed with the teares of ten thousand spectators at least (at several times), who, in the Tragedian that represents his person, imagine they behold him fresh bleeding" – Thomas Nashe, *Pierce Penilless His Supplication to the Diuell* (1592) (quoted in Schoenbaum 1987: 160).

⁴ The text of *Pandosto* is reprinted in Pafford 1963, 181 ff. The quoted passage is from p. 202.

the famous sheep-shearing scene, one of the longest in Shakespeare, full of varied interest, rich in poetry and imbued with symbolism.

In dramatizing Holinshed's account of Henry V's French campaign, Shakespeare transformed the chronicler's simple comment on the siege of Harfleur: "And daily was the town attacked" into the stirring hortative speech, known today to every English schoolboy, beginning "Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more..." (III,1). Similarly, few would disagree that the orations of Brutus and Mark Antony above the dead body of Caesar (III,2) mark one of the great dramatic moments not only in *Julius Caesar*, but also in the whole of Shakespeare's work. And yet, Shakespeare found the inspiration for this great scene in a couple of desultory remarks in Plutarch, who mentions that Brutus used a cogent Lacedaemonian style, while Antony tended to express himself in a florid, "Asiatic" manner (Kostić 1994: II, 129).

Finally, we can mention instances in which Shakespeare does not develop or add to a borrowing, but uses an idea of another author in a changed stylistic garb. In such cases one can often see how a simple phrase, even when closely followed, gains unexpected vividness and forcefulness by the use of a striking image or crisp phrasing. Examples could be quoted at length. In Lodge's *Rosalind* the heroine advises the conventionally disdainful shepherdess that she should requite the love of the shepherd Montanus. Her admonition is couched in neatly balanced and highly artificial euphuistic prose:

What, Shepherdess, so fair and so cruel? ...Because thou art beautiful, be not so coy: as there is nothing more fair, so there is nothing more fading... be ruled by me, while thou art young, lest thou be disdained when thou art old. Beauty nor time cannot be recalled, and if thou love, like of Montanus: for as his desires are many, so his deserts are great.

Shakespeare rephrases this passage thus (III, 5):

Who might be your mother,
That you insult, exult and all at once
Over the wretched? What, though you have no beauty –
As, by my faith, I see no more in you
Than without candle may go dark to bed
Must you be therefore proud and pitiless?...
But, mistress, know yourself: down on your knees,
And thank heaven, fasting, for a good man's love!

For I must tell you friendly in your ear,
Sell when you can, you are not for all markets.

One of the frequently anthologized passages from *The Tempest* are Prospero's words after the disappearance of his magic vision (IV, 1):

Our revels now are ended. These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits and
Are melted into air, into thin air:
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Ye all which it inherit, shall dissolve
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.

In this case, too, we can point to the passage which stirred Shakespeare's imagination. It occurs in *Darius*, an obscure verse drama written by William Alexander, the first earl of Stirling (1570-1640), a few years before Shakespeare's romance:

Let greatnesse of her glascie sceptres vaunt;
Not scepters , no, but reeds, soone brus'd, soone broken:
And let this worldie pomp our wits inchant,
All fades, and scarcie leaves behind a token.
Those golden pallasces, those gorgeous halles,
With furniture superfluouslie faire!
Those statelie courts, those sky-encountering walles
Evanish up like vapours in the aire.⁵

Sometimes the difference between Shakespeare's lines and a possible source is so abysmal that one hesitates to suggest even a remote connection. In George Gascoigne's tragedy *Jocasta* (1587) Antigone, broken by grief because of the death of her brothers and the suicide of her mother, declares:

⁵ The passage (from the 1603 edition of Alexander's play) is quoted in Furness 1892: 284.

In these affrightes this frozen heart of mine,
By feare of death meinteynes my dying life.⁶

Although the similarity of these lines to Hamlet's musings on suicide in Shakespeare's best-known soliloquy is very slight, the possibility that they provided a spark which kindled Shakespeare's imagination should not be ruled out.

In his life of Mark Antony, Plutarch writes that Caesar Octavius sent a messenger to Cleopatra asking her to leave Antony. She received the messenger very kindly, which aroused Antony's wrath. Whereupon,

Antonius caused him to be taken and well favouredly whipped, and so sent him unto Caesar: and bad him tell him that he made him angrie with him, bicause he shewed him selfe prowde and disdainfull towards him, and now specially when he was easie to be angered, by reason of his present miserie.⁷

Taking over this passage from North's translation of Plutarch, Shakespeare expresses the same sentiment, and even uses some identical phrasing, but his verses let a deeper shaft of light into the inner state from which Antony's utterance wells up:

Get thee back to Caesar,
Tell him thy entertainment: look thou say
He makes me angry with him, for he seems
Proud and disdainful, harping on what I am,
Not what he knew I was: he makes me angry;
And at this time most easy 'tis to do't,
When my good stars, that were my former guides,
Have empty left their orbs, and shot their fires
Into the abysm of hell. (III.13.139-147)

One can go thus from passage to passage in this play and note how Shakespeare enhances the nobility and vigour of the style of North's Plutarch, making it more meaningful and associating individual speeches with the thematic coordinates of the play. Perhaps the most illustrative in this respect are Plutarch's and Shakespeare's accounts of Cleopatra's

⁶ Child 1848:245.

⁷ The relevant parts of North's translation of Plutarch are reprinted in Ridley 1954: Appendix V. The above passage is on p. 279.

sailing down the Cydnus to meet Antony, too long to quote here, in which it is possible to observe, almost line by line, how great prose is transmuted into great poetry.⁸

The concluding part of this tragedy, and particularly the scene of Cleopatra's death, has always been greatly admired. John Masefield is particularly eloquent in his praise of it (Masefield 1931: 207):

Her death is not the greatest, nor the most terrible, but it is
the most beautiful scene in all tragedies. The words –

Finish, good lady; the bright day is done,
And we are for the dark.

and those most marvellous words, written at one golden
time, in a gush of the spirit, when the man must have been
trembling –

O eastern star!
Peace, peace!
Dost thou not see my baby at my breast,
That milks the nurse asleep?

are among the most beautiful things ever written by man.

This rhapsodic eulogy of Shakespeare's spontaneous outburst of inspiration was written in 1911. It was only several decades later that the plain grains of sand round which this precious poetic pearl was secreted became known. In 1952 attention was called to two passages which Shakespeare probably remembered when writing these lines. One occurs in G. Peele's play *Edward I* (1593), in which Queen Elinor kills the mayor's wife by applying a snake to her breast and saying:

Why, so; now she is a nurse – Suck on, sweet babe.

The other is a sentence from Thomas Nashe's *Christ's Tears over Jerusalem* (1593-94):

At thy breasts (as at Cleopatraes) aspisses shall be put out
to nurse.⁹

⁸ *Antony and Cleopatra*, 2.2.190-218. Plutarch's description is reprinted in Ridley 1954: 262.

⁹ Ribner 1952: 244-246; Reeves 1952: 441; Reeves 1952: 441. Cf. Ridley 1954: 231 (note on 5.2.308-310).

Although it has not been possible within the scope of this paper to attempt an exhaustive treatment of the subject and offer sufficient illustrative evidence, some general conclusions regarding Shakespeare's treatment of his sources may be attempted. One is that at the beginning he was impressed by the highly rhetorical plays of Marlowe and Kyd, and sought to emulate them by giving even greater emphasis to the most salient features of their style. The result was not particularly fortunate, and he gradually abandoned such extravagances of dramatic diction and began to incorporate borrowings from other writers with a surer creative instinct and a greater sense of purpose. The changes he made in the borrowed matter can therefore provide valuable indirect evidence of his artistic intentions. One modification which is almost always observable is elaboration and the introduction of problematic issues which require interpretation beyond the obvious content of the story. A similar approach can be seen in his fashioning of the major characters taken over from earlier writers. Under his pen they acquire a rich, but perplexing inner life; they behave with absolute psychological clarity and credibility in concrete situations, but certain aspects of their general nature are deliberately left indeterminate, equivocal or doubtful. We are never at a loss with Saxo Grammaticus' Amleth as we are with Shakespeare's Danish prince; the Ensign in Giraldi's story "Un capitano moro" is a transparent and uncomplicated villain: "the motive-hunting" of Iago's malignity is still going on. In the case of both plot and character, Shakespeare's creative treatment of the borrowed matter contributed to a quality which is one of the most essential features of his art and which we never find in his sources: the amazing hospitality to a variety of interpretations.

References

- Alexander, William (1603). *The Tragedie of Darius*. Edinburgh: Robert Waldegraue.
- Bembo, Pietro, e Pico della Mirandola (1954). *Le epistole 'De imitatione'*. A cura di G. Santangelo. Firenze: L.S. Olschki.
- Bloom, Harold (1999). *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human*. New York: Riverhead Trade.
- Brown, John Russel (1992). "Multiplicity of Meaning in the Last Moments of Hamlet" in *Connotations* 2.1: 16-33.

- Bullough, Geoffrey (1957-75). *Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare*, 8 vols. London: Routledge and Paul; New York: Columbia University Press.
- Child, Francis James (ed.) (1848). *Four old plays: Three interludes: Thersytes, Jack Jugler and Heywood's Pardoner and frere: and Jocasta, a tragedy by Gascoigne and Kinwelmarsh*. Cambridge: G. Nichols. [Elektronsko izdanje: <http://books.google.com/books?id=nn40AAAAMAAJ>]
- Du Bellay, Joachim (1904). *La Deffense et illustration de la langue francoyse*. Ed. critique par Henri Chamard Paris : [s.n.].
- Furness, Horace Howard (ed.) (1898). *The Tempest (A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare, Vol. IX)*. Philadelphia: J.B.Lippincot Co.
- Gibaldi, Giambattista. (1864), *Scritti estetici*. Milano: Daelli e Comp.
- Hulse, S. Clark (1979). "Wresting the Alphabet: Oratory and Action" in *Titus Andronicus. Criticism*, 20/2, 106-18.
- Kostić, V. (1959). "Spenser's Amoretti and Tasso's Lyrical Poetry" in *Renaissance and Modern Studies*, 3, 51-78.
- Kostić, V. (1982). *Šekspirov „Hamlet“* [Portret književnog dela]. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike.
- Kostić, V. (1994). *Šekspirovo stvaralaštvo*. 2 vols, Beograd: Srpska književna zadruka.
- Kyd, Thomas (2004). *The Spanish Tragedie* [Project Gutenberg, EText-No. 6043 <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/6043>]
- Lewis, C.S. (1964). "Hamlet: The Prince or the Poem?" In P. Alexander (ed.) *Studies in Shakespeare*. London, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lodge, Thomas (1910). *Rosalynde or, Euphues' Golden Legacy*. [The Project Gutenberg Ebook of Rosalynd <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17181/17181-8.txt>].
- Masefield, John (1931). *William Shakespeare* (Home University Library). London: Williams and Norgate.
- Pafford, J.H.P.(ed.) (1963). *The Winter's Tale* (The Arden Shakespeare). London: Methuen.
- Parthenio, B. (1560). *Della imitatione poetica*. Venezia: Giolito.
- Reeves, John D. (1952). "A Supposed Indebtedness of Shakespeare to Peele" in *Notes and Queries*, 197/21: 441.
- Ribner, Irving (1952). "Shakespeare and Peele: The Death of Cleopatra" in *Notes and Queries* 197/12: 244-246.

- Ridley, M.R. (ed.) (1967). *Antony and Cleopatra* (The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare). London: Methuen.
- Ruskin, John (1906). *Sesame and Lillies: Three Lectures*. London: George Allen.
- Sabbadini, R. (1885). *Storia del ciceronianismo e di altre questioni letterarie nell'età sulla Rinascenza*. Torino: E. Loescher.
- Schoenbaum, S. (1987). *Shakespeare: A Compact Documentary Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Skeat, Walter W. (1880). *Shakespeare's Plutarch: being a selection from the lives in North's Plutarch which illustrate Shakespeare's plays*. London: Macmillan. <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Plut.+Ant.+25>.
- Stanivuković, Goran (2006). "The *Tempest* and the Discontents of Humanism" in *Philological Quarterly* 85: 91-119.
- Whitaker, V. K. (1941). "Shakespeare's Use of His Sources" in *Philological Quarterly* 20: 377-389.
- Wilson, John Dover (ed.) (1948). *Titus Andronicus* (New Cambridge Shakespeare). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vladislava Gordić Petković
University of Novi Sad, Serbia

THE HOME OF THE CHARACTER: REMARKABLE HEROINES WITHIN THEIR FICTIONAL SETTINGS

Abstract. This paper examines various narrative strategies which serve to represent characters within their historical, social or political settings. Authors belonging to different literary, historical and social backgrounds such as Geoffrey Chaucer, Sarah Waters and Douglas Coupland are chosen so as to provide a multicultural context for the analysis. Where the home of the character is, and how the setting affects their progression and development, are some of the issues discussed in the paper.

What has traditionally been central to theories of character is the concept of identification, which mediates between literary character as a formal textual structure and the reader's investment in it (Frow 1986: 243). What readers invest is interplay of inference, deduction and interpretation. However, this interplay largely depends on the process of narration, conducted by the omniscient narrator or a character involved in the story, and on the proper construction of the story's setting.

This paper attempts to explain the ways female characters act within their settings. We focus upon the works of those writers, men and women, classic and modern, who treat their characters either as functional devices of the plot or as fully shaped personalities dealing with their milieu. Our aim is to show both the psychological impact of the setting upon the character and the functional role of the character in portraying the setting.

Characterization is often vaguely described as "the depicting... of clear images of a person", his or her "actions and manners of thought and life", or as the portrayal of someone's "nature, environment, habits, emotions, desires, instincts" (Thrall and Hibbard, pp. 74-75). According

to Aristotle, artists imitate people involved in action, not independent existents of the text. The formalist and structuralist critics of the twentieth century also argue that a character is functional and simply doing what the story requires her or him to do. Some structuralist critics have gradually moved away from the functional approach to character, claiming, as is the case with Tzvetan Todorov, that a narrative text can either be *plot-centered* (apsychological), or *character-centered* (psychological), where the former focuses on the plot and the latter focuses on the character. Roland Barthes gradually shifted from the functional view of character, adopted in the sixties, to a psychological one, embraced late in the seventies, admitting that at that in some narratives characters play a more significant role than elsewhere.

The categories of masculinity and femininity have recently emerged as discursive constructs and socially determined categories important for character analysis. Whether a female is always associated with the submissive and passive and a male characterized as dominant and assertive is to be shown in our analysis of literary texts coming from various historical, social and literary contexts.

Characters in their own utopia

One of the most refined women's voices articulated in recent Serbian fiction, Mirjana Novaković challenges and redefines issues of female recluse and the estranged society. Her literary career started with *The Danube Apocrypha*, two stories united within a gothic frame: one of them is *The Gospel According to A Thirsty Woman*, set in a nameless city, distantly resembling Belgrade with its street plan and traffic connections, but otherwise devoid of flair and identity. The story tells of social and religious turmoil in the near future, and a bitter and long struggle with an enemical, Orwellesque social setting.

The Gospel According to A Thirsty Woman casts a bleak and sarcastic dystopian perspective upon a society which advocates equality but actually encourages its citizens' total loss of identity; personal or proper names are forbidden whereas plastic surgery and genetic modification are advised so that individuals might remove all bodily marks and character traits that prevent them from fitting into the homogenous community. This dismal state, dubbed Open Society, requires self-sufficiency and the dissolution of family ties, but is confronted with a group of female misfits who celebrate a nameless goddess and the religious creed of an unquenchable thirst

for knowledge. The thirst in which they trust is a travesty of the Biblical motive, as their deity is an inverted parallel to Christ: the followers of the cult of Her are not meant to be peaceful and content once they have accepted a religion. The first and foremost thing the thirsty women fight for is a name. The identification of the character precedes the search for one's identity and thus in the society of the nameless the awakening starts with confiding your name to your soulmates.

The all-male death squad called the Human Rights Representatives gets dangerously close to eradicating the tribe of the thirsty, but the creed persists, owing to Catherine, the anonymous female narrator whose name we learn at the very end, after she wrestles with the demons within and without and earns the privilege to spread the word of the Thirsty Woman. Instead of committing suicide after she betrayed her goddess, Catherine decides to live and tell: "Seemingly it makes no sense to take my leave without leaving an explanation or a message behind." (Novaković, p. 48). The story she prepares to tell is the one we have been listening to all along, both a fable and a testimony. Thus the word of the character defies an enemical social and political setting.

Although Novaković has never publicly sided with the feminist movement, the plot and the characters from *The Gospel* take us back to feminist texts such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman's *Herland*, and the belatedly acclaimed *The Yellow Wallpaper*. Gilman never thought of herself as a feminist either; it was her standpoint of social Darwinism that led her to criticise society as androcentric and male-oriented at its core. Her firm conviction that women should be a part of the economic order of the world is advocated in various ways, both in her Utopian fiction about a land of females, and the gothic story of female frustration and liberation that has become a true feminine gospel.

The haunted home

Novaković's alternative history of female networking parallels the seclusion and liberation of Charlotte Gilman's nameless protagonist in *The Yellow Wallpaper*. This story deals with the social resistance to male domination through a testimony of a female patient, who is both captured and being cured by her husband. *The Yellow Wallpaper* is set in a colonial mansion which has been empty for years, perceived as "queer" and "haunted" by the heroine, and her mixed feelings of awe and

enchantment echo the reaction to the setting in a typical gothic novel. Her room resembles a scary version of Virginia Woolf's "a room of one's own", a room which should be a woman's prerequisite for artistic creation, not physical incarceration. With its barred windows and iron bed, the room resembles prison and mental asylum: this is not a place to nurse the ailing or control the criminal, but rather a bleak quarter which induces sickness, derangement and madness.

The story gives voice to rebellion against patriarchal society, but it also deals with highly ambivalent issues of maternity and female creativity, seeing these two as inevitably clashing. The main character's fixation upon the yellow wallpaper could be interpreted both as her rebellion against patriarchal society and male-centered writing. The story dramatizes the concept of female captivity, the house and the room symbolizing a woman's body and her wish to break free from its restrictions. Being treated as an invalid and a prisoner, the heroine has to recover her freedom first. The vision of a female Utopia as a rescue for all subdued women is yet to come, after the personal conflict is resolved.

The female protagonist is denied reading and writing, allegedly for her own good, the same way the Open Society denies the right to feel and think. Therefore her fascination with the ugly wallpaper turns into an obsession with a woman captured behind it. The namelessness of the protagonists in the stories by Novaković and Gilman signals that the bitter struggle for equality starts with acquiring identity and adopting a name. It is only then that a woman can join hands with other women.

The house divided

According to an analysis by evolutionary psychologists presented recently in *The Guardian*, the despicable acts of Count Dracula, the unending selflessness of Dorothea Brooke in *Middlemarch* and Mr Darcy's personal transformation in *Pride and Prejudice* helped to uphold social order and encouraged altruistic genes to spread through Victorian society. Their research suggests that classic British novels from the 19th century not only reflect the values of Victorian society, they also shaped them.

The psychologists, led by Joseph Carroll at the University of Missouri in St Louis, claim that the novels from the period "extolled the virtues of an egalitarian society and pitted cooperation and affability against individuals' hunger for power and dominance", citing the examples of George Eliot's Dorothea Brooke, who turns her back on wealth to help

the poor, and Bram Stoker's *Count Dracula*, who represents aristocratic dominance at its worst and asserting prestige by taking people over and absorbing their life blood.

What the team of evolutionary psychologists did was to apply Darwin's theory of evolution to literature by asking 500 academics to fill in questionnaires on characters from classic Victorian novels. The respondents were asked to define characters as protagonists or antagonists, rate their personality traits, and comment on their emotional response to the characters. They found that the leading characters mirrored the cooperative nature of a society, whereas individual urges for power and wealth were suppressed for the good of the community. It seems that in Victorian novels, dominant behaviour is stigmatised and the antagonists obsessed with ambition lack a cooperative nature and pro-social behaviour.

A few characters were judged to have both good and bad traits, such as Heathcliff in Emily Bronte's *Wuthering Heights* and Jane Austen's Mr Darcy. The conflicts they demonstrate reflect the strains of maintaining such a cooperative social order. The researchers believe that novels have the same effect on society as oral cautionary tales of old. "Just as hunter-gatherers talk of cheating and bullying as a way of staying keyed to the goal that bad guys must not win, novels key us to the same issues," said Christopher Boehm, a cultural anthropologist at the University of Southern California. "They have a function that continues to contribute to the quality and structure of group life."

Studies of Victorian novels have substantially changed throughout the decades. They are no more associated with simplistic and reductive models of morality or famous but elusive "Victorian values", or condemned as racist, imperialist or misogynist. The Victorian novel is seen as complex as the culture it comes from, and the Victorians are seen more empathetically.

Wuthering Heights is a novel in which setting and mood are closely intertwined, to the extent that the characters become helpless in the face of nature and their own uncontrolled emotions. The novel focuses upon the dynamic and often turbulent relationship between the passion and freedom of the mansion called "Wuthering Heights" and the socially structured conventionality of "Thrushcross Grange". Being large and isolated, also dark and foreboding at times, both houses are reminiscent of a gothic novel. They both depict isolation and separation, each creating its own galaxy with its house rules.

“Wuthering Heights” is perched on a high ridge, overlooking a wasteland, inhabited by harsh and gloomy characters who made it a world of passion and ferocity long before it became the property of the demonic lover and passionate avenger, Heathcliff. Throughout the novel, “Wuthering Heights” is the stage of both unrequited and unconditional love, violence, brutality, child molestation, and inexplicable greed. While suggesting the extreme states of mind we encounter in the novel, the name of the mansion also marks the sense of aspiration to something supreme. On the other hand, “Thrushcross Grange” is a symbol of social institutions and conventional values, the possibility of freedom and happiness for Catherine and her road towards both femininity and social status. She tries to love both the wild Heathcliff and the mild Edgar Linton, and tries to make both houses her home.

The first indication of Heathcliff’s savage personality is found in the opening chapter of the novel when Heathcliff’s dogs attack Mr. Lockwood and are called “a brood of tigers” and “fiends”. Heathcliff growls in unison with their snarls, easily and uncontrollably displaying his animal essence, a society reject even after turning into respectable land owner. Civilized only outwardly, Heathcliff remains demonic, and the increase of wealth and power never changes him substantially. His violent images and use of hyperbole express an impetuous will that cannot accept opposition. His rhetoric hardens as it gathers momentum towards a language of absolute imperatives, his logic dependent on a refusal to admit any compromise with passion, any form of mediocrity.

The distinctions between “Thrushcross Grange” and “Wuthering Heights” (between Edgar and Heathcliff) parallel those between Catherine and Heathcliff. The isolation of “Wuthering Heights” represents the isolation of Catherine’s heart; the warmth and security of the Grange represent the domesticity and status that Catherine desires. The two men in her life have turned into exact replicas of the power of the respective houses they live in.

Chaucer revisited

In *Canterbury Tales* there is no plot for the characters to act in, so they cannot be considered agents; there are no houses to represent their moods and feelings, so they cannot be symbolically connected to their setting. Chaucer’s characters do not engage in any kind of activity except story-

telling. Their only acts are speech acts, and the lack of action hampers any development or change in their nature. This is partly because the concept of a developing character is not common in the literature of Chaucer's time; traditional story-telling calls for no growth of character, no progressive or temporal change. Although the portraits of Chaucer's characters cannot indicate a change in mood or the flow of thought, they are still rich in detail and very vivid, owing to direct narrative statements about the characters which name personal traits and inform us about their physical appearance, habits or biography. The reader is faced with an abundance of detail, drawn either from the narrators' outer perceptions or from their omniscient glimpses into the interior of the other characters. Thus the *what*, denoting a particular narrator's focus and interest, can be subdivided into personal *traits* (whether physical or psychological), *habits* and biographical *facts*. The *how* or Chaucer's way of characterization can be described as more rhetorical than psychological. Nothing is *shown* in action, everything is *told*, either by the omniscient author, or by the characters themselves.

The structure of *Canterbury Tales* is paratactic, since the work juxtaposes individual portraits and tales connected only by the pilgrimage motif. The *Canterbury Tales* provide their reader with a representative panorama of fourteenth century society, starting from the top of the social scale and the highest point of the moral scale, going downward.

The two female characters in *Canterbury Tales* are not quite typical of their class and status. The Prioress's grace, elegance, affectation of speech and manners, as well as the Wife of Bath's five marriages, apparently do not fit into mediaeval stereotypes. Chaucer depicts a prioress in terms and traits borrowed from the medieval romance, whereas an artisan woman from Bath resembles a matriarchal goddess. Chaucer contrasts feelings embodied in the Prioress with the senses of the Wife of Bath. While the former embodies fastidious sensibility, the latter is the pole of elemental vitality. The Prioress represents a woman who has submitted to the institution of the Church, trying to fit her temperament into it, but she also subtly violates the laws of her order by keeping pets, overdressing and taking on a pilgrimage. Opposed to Egline's passivity and subtlety are the Wife of Bath's outspokenness, aggressive demonstration of her instincts, appetites and will to power. The Wife of Bath makes the institutions of church, pilgrimage and marriage serve her temperament: her radix trait is an uninhibited appetite for physical love and travel, which is seen in the first word in her prologue, *experience*, which is also the key to her morals and values. Another code of her personality is the desire

for *mastery*, which is the dominant motif of her tale. The Wife of Bath's doctrine of marriage is based on female supremacy, never stated openly but rather functioning as a reaction to the traditional view of marriage imposed by the church fathers and common law.

Chaucer manipulates the mode of medieval romance in the characterization of his heroines: while the Prioress physically resembles a romance heroine, the Wife of Bath uses a romantic setting in her story of the magical hag and the rapist. Both ways of using romance are tinged with irony. A prioress is not expected to look romantic, whereas the Wife of Bath uses the romantic setting in order to disguise the idea of female supremacy. Her prologue and her tale are two versions of one story: both Jankyn and the rapist knight treat women with violence, and both are taught to do better than that; they win the woman's kindness and affection once they come round to her way of thinking.

The Wife of Bath is well acquainted with Holy Scripture, and she deconstructs it in the greatest part of her prologue, picking and choosing the quotations and episodes which support her way of thinking. Her skillful handling of Scripture in the comic debate on marriage shows that she is a knowledgeable woman, but the issues of religion bring up another substantial contrast between the Wife of Bath and the Prioress: while the Wife of Bath embodies empirical knowledge of facts, the Prioress embodies blind religious faith. The latter is a person of limited mentality, credulous enough to accept naively a legend of a horrible murder of a child committed by Jews, and to recount it. No matter how cruel her story might seem, it is mostly an act of worship. This devoutness and piety is something the worldly Wife of Bath is incapable of.

While the Wife of Bath *possesses* excessive sex-appeal, the Prioress is feminine, generally an embodiment of feeling. Her suppressed maternal instincts turn to the nearest object upon which she can lavish her natural affection – to pets. Chaucer vividly describes her appearance, her habits, likes and dislikes, but we learn practically nothing of her background. What we get are just *traits* and *habits*, but no *facts*! Does this lack of biographical fact suggest that the Prioress is a lifeless, unreal being? And, since we have a Molly-Bloom-like story of husbands and marriages, could we make another opposition, and say that the Prioress symbolizes an ideal versus the real woman, who is deliberately called *Wife* of Bath?

For the Wife of Bath, her tale is her own setting. Much has been written about the “legendary tale of wonder” dealing with a knight who has to pay dearly for doing wrong to womankind, but we cannot say that

the problems of the narrative have been solved. Some passages in the Wife of Bath's tale admirably befit the teller, but her heroine is not Alison in disguise. We can compare Alison's methods of winning sovereignty with those of the loathly lady in her tale, but Chaucer's character lacks reasonableness and persuasiveness of the loathly lady. The Prologue tells us something of Alison's tactics before and after marriage: by her shrewishness she reduced her husbands to complete submission and obedience, all except the fifth, the former "clerk of Oxenford". Her struggle to subdue her partners does not make her a feminist figure, rather a figure of fun, since the issue of female supremacy was taken to be either blasphemous or ridiculous, and Chaucer chooses the latter option.

The Wife of Bath's Tale consists of three sections: in the first, a knight from King Arthur's court rapes a girl and is condemned by the Queen to find within a year and a day the answer to the question, what is the thing that women most desire. The second section describes the knight's encounter with an ugly hag who offers to solve the riddle on condition he should do whatever she asks: she demands marriage in turn for the answer, which is "sovereignty" (sovereynete). The final part of the story shows the knight in dismay on his wedding night, when his wife offers him the choice between having an ugly but faithful spouse or a beautiful but faithless one. He yields the choice to her, and seeing her sovereignty acknowledged, she promises to be both faithful and beautiful.

The riddle motive is closely connected with the theme of sovereignty. The old hag poses a challenge to the protagonist. Her very existence is a contradiction: she is a *puella senilis*, both fair and loathly, both young and old, and she makes demands falling outside the pale of the tolerable, if not of the possible. The sovereignty she demands means domestic rule, but she needs the man, her counterpart in order to settle to her task and her nature. Thus Chaucer sends the message of contradictions united in greatness – the message more complex than his seemingly simple techniques of characterization.

The world of the homeless: Generation X

Douglas Coupland's novels deal with an "accelerated culture": his characters are desperately trying to cope with rapid material changes in everyday life and lame spiritual insights offered to account for them. Focused upon the mass cultural phenomena (such as pop icons or the fallout of yuppies)

and those genuinely tragic (such as high school shootings), Coupland is also interested in technology as a substitute for the divine, so that two of his novels present lives and opinions of Silicon Valley computer experts (*Microserfs*) and the offspring of the Google age (*JPod*).

Coupland's characters share their creator's awareness that the world changes much faster than human perspectives of it. Lost and confused, underemployed and overeducated, Coupland's twenty-somethings find their mantras in pop songs and seek salvation in awkward possessions. Charming and sensitive Claire of *Generation X*, one of the most remarkable and sensitive female characters Coupland has ever written, goes to incredible lengths to get such a bizarre thing as a collection of racks of antlers: dozens of them lie tangled in her flat, in "the room that technically *ought* to have been the dining room instead of an ossuary that scares the daylights out of repairpersons come to fix the appliances" (Coupland 1991: 85). Claire even places ads in the local paper, presenting herself as an artist, and "nine times out of ten the respondent is a woman named Verna, hair in curlers, chewing nicotine gum", a woman who wants to get rid of the things left behind by her ex.

Coupland's characters indulge in endless contemplation of their anomie, mostly seeking refuge in platonic friendships, cartoon heroes, and funny memories. Families and relatives are usually estranged or on bad terms. Abe, one of the Silicon Valley programmers from *Microserfs*, claims to have come from "one of those 'zero kidney' families" – the family which made the agreement that if one of its members needed a kidney, they would react with: "Well, sorry... Been nice knowing you." (Coupland 1995: 190). Although jaded and cynical, this young man earnestly mourns the lost values. Rereading his favourite Tin Tin books, Abe notices that the Boy Detective's life lacks "religion, parents, politics, relationship, communion with nature, class, love, death, birth" (Coupland 1995: 191), and admits that he is curious about this either invisible or non-existent content.

The recurrent pattern of "the family of friends", borrowed from sitcoms and soap operas, serves the purpose of creating safe surroundings for the unstable young men and women. Coupland has suggested on various occasions that inspiration for some of his novels might have come from teenage soap operas of the eighties such as *Melrose Place*. The self-confessed computer nerds of *Microserfs* call themselves addicts of the series: "We like to pretend our geek house is actually *Melrose Place*." (Coupland 1995: 65). Shopping malls and pop music have been attached to the ideological framework of Coupland's novels almost naturally.

Such cultural background of the characters ranging from the not-quite-fabulous threesome in *Generation X* to the star-crossed teenage spouses in *Hey, Nostradamus!* might make them look two-dimensional and devoid of depth. However, Coupland's protagonists show some signs of progress or change, in spite of the fact that they never manage to change at the rate the accelerated world requires. *Hey, Nostradamus!* shows how painful and ineffective changes can be. A little before her tragic demise in the shooting in a Vancouver high-school cafeteria, pregnant and secretly married Cheryl Anway writes on her school binder the words "GOD IS NOWHERE GOD IS NOW HERE", and thus anarchy and faith are put together with a little help coming from unreliable linguistic signs, language being only one battlefield of many. In their post-trauma or post-mortem quest for truth, the departed Cheryl, her loving husband Jason, Jason's religious father Reg and Jason's hopelessly loyal girlfriend Heather tell stories of paranoia, angst or religious zeal, desperately trying to untangle their lives. Misguided and shattered, they cope with their tragic losses the only way they can.

Although engaged in an in-depth analysis of profound crises and urgent problems, Coupland has often been accused of creating cartoon-like characters. His critics forget that the growth of the character which traditional novel calls for is somewhat impeded in the works of fiction which tend to be slowed by minute reflection or endless and often pointless discussions in the manner of either Raymond Carver or Quentin Tarantino, in the books and movies which, similar to *Generation X*, abound in static first-person narrative reports of an immobile reality.

Estranged and bizarre characters either float from one cheap thrill and weird hobby to another, or stay immobile, unwilling to take risks. What we find in Coupland's books is a genuine "technology" of character casting which is difficult to define. It is not easy to decide whether his protagonists suffer from inarticulateness, disillusionment and disenchantment, or emotional numbness.

The Victorian home revisited

In her four novels, Sarah Waters has dealt with lesbian characters positioned in history, either in the Victorian age as in her first three novels unofficially marked as "the Victorian trilogy", or in the Second World War setting of her latest book. Her recreation of a distant epoch

has been urged by writing lesbians into the history of urban life and its various subcultures. Thus the title of her first novel *Tipping the Velvet* uses a cryptic jargon for physical intimacy in order to show that every period in history has its subterranean ethics of living. Her main heroine Nancy Astley, a young woman in the late 1880s who develops a passionate crush on another young woman, constructs her own lesbian identity owing to the twilight demimonde of late 19th century London with its paragons of virtue and lust. London plays a crucial role in this hybrid narrative of complicity and critique of Victorian society.

The view of London, and the metropolis in general, as an acting board and a visual show was rather common in the early nineteenth century: "We see in the 1820s a society that regarded the metropolis as a stage on which to perform and witness its own civility, grandeur, and ebullience. The image of theatre is crucial to urban representation in the early nineteenth century, for it suggests not only entertainment and performance but also a relationship of distance and tentativeness between spectator and the action on the stage. The urban spectator of this period, whether writer or imagined subject, experienced the sights and people of the streets as passing shows or as monuments to be glimpsed briefly or from afar. This distance helped to obscure and control all that was seen, however arresting or unsettling, and it helped, too, to ensure that whatever did unsettle the spectator would not be understood as a symptom of some larger social disturbance." (Epstein Nord 1995:20).

Meeting the late 19th century London and its artists, perverts, lesbians and socialists, Nancy creates her own creed. First of all, she has to win her territory: by the end of the nineteenth century, the streets of London had become accessible to women, in their role of charity workers, with a degree of freedom that previously had only been unquestionably granted to prostitutes. Nancy's evolution towards self-discovery and fulfillment runs parallel to her physical and metaphorical "journey against the current" towards and within the metropolis: from Whitstable to London and from the glittering West End theatres to the East End slums. On her journey of self-discovery, Nancy interacts with different social classes and experiments with dramatically different lifestyles. As a scholar specialised in Victorian literature, Waters was well aware of the theatrical elements in the urban representation: thus her heroine uses the city as her stage, obliterating the gender boundaries and bridging the gap between her authentic and stage identity.

The analysis of fictional works dating from a variety of epochs and literary contexts points out that female characters have something

in common. Whether it is a certain kind of inarticulatedness, a persistent air of disillusionment and disenchantment or a tendency to suffer from emotional numbness, it is not easy to determine. Victorian or postmodern, traditional or experimental, characters in the literary works we have tackled in this paper do establish a genuine female paradigm of traits.

References

- Chatman, Seymour (1978). *Story and Discourse*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Coupland, Douglas (1991). *Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Coupland, Douglas (1995). *Microserfs*. London: Flamingo.
- Gordić, Vladislava (1996). "Recent Approaches to the Theory of Character: Some Aspects of Characterization in Chaucer's Canterbury Tales". Novi Sad: Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, XXIV: 99-103.
- Epstein Nord, Deborah (1995). *Walking the Victorian Streets. Women, Representation, and the City*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Frow, J. (1986). "Spectacle Binding: On Character" in *Poetics Today*. Vol. 7.(2): 227-250.
- Malone, Kemp (1962). "The Wife of Bath's Tale". *The Modern Language Review*, Vol. 57, (4) Oct. : 481-491.
- Novaković, Mirjana (1996). *Dunavski apokrifi*. Novi Sad, Matica srpska.
- Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith (1983). *Narrative Fiction*. Routledge: London and New York.
- Simple, Ian (2009). "Victorian novels helped us evolve into better people, say psychologists" in *Guardian*, 14 January. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2009/jan/14/victorian-novels-evolution-altruism>
- Thrall, William, and Addison Hibbard (1936). *A Handbook to Literature*. New York: The Odyssey Press.
- Walkowitz, Judith R. (1992). *City of Dreadful Delight. Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London*. London: Virago.
- Waters, Sarah (1999). *Tipping the Velvet*. London: Virago.

Zoran Paunović
University of Belgrade, Serbia

LEOPOLD BLOOM'S MEAGRE MEAL: FOOD AS METAPHOR IN JOYCE'S *ULYSSES*

Abstract. In the intricate web of intertwined metaphorical meanings that constitute the overall multi-layered significance of Joyce's *Ulysses*, metaphorical aspects of food have a very prominent function in the novel. The paper deals with those aspects, mainly through brief analysis of Leopold Bloom's attitudes towards food. Bloom, the protagonist of *Ulysses*, has several meals in the course of the novel – each of them marked by different, complex feelings and different metaphorical meanings. The paper explores these meanings, especially those that are connected with themes of sexuality and marriage.

Although notorious for his sometimes appallingly ingenious acts of cruelty towards his characters, James Joyce was always very meticulous and considerate in the matters of their nutrition: from the festive dinner in 'The Dead', through the similarly bountiful Christmas gathering in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, to late-night meals in *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce's characters consume vast amounts of food. It is no wonder, then, that food is one of the last strongholds in the life of Leopold Bloom, the protagonist of *Ulysses*. His life indeed is 'out of joint', seemingly for good, but in spite of all the details that suggest its disorder and chaos, it is still characterized by commendable eating habits and regular meals. It is quite obvious on June 16th 1904: even in his tragicomical odyssey, during aimless wanderings through Dublin, fuelled not by yearning to come back home as soon as possible, but by the wish to stay outside his so-called home for as long as possible, he finds temporary shelters in the modest rituals of breakfast, lunch and dinner. It is, in fact, in the kitchen that we meet him for the first time, while he is preparing his only non-exilian meal on that day. Quite accordingly, the first facts we get to know about him deal with his gastronomic inclinations:

Mr. Leopold Bloom ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls. He liked thick giblet soup, nutty gizzards, a stuffed roast heart, liver slices fried with crust crumbs, fried hencods' roes. Most of all he liked grilled mutton kidneys which gave to his palate a fine tang of faintly scented urine.¹

Such a detailed list of Bloom's favourite meals constitutes a strong physical counterbalance to the metaphysical elevations of Stephen Dedalus who in the previous three chapters, hindered by the gigantic wings of his artistic ambitions, with painstaking effort and true disgust tries to walk on solid ground. Bloom, on the other hand, yearns for those heights where the inscrutable beauty of Wagner's harmonies and Shakespeare's verses reign, but he stands firmly on the ground with both his feet: the best proof of that is provided by his belly. That is why, quite appropriately, in his kitchen he does not think about Renaissance drama or German classical opera, but about kidneys. His considerably neglected body, for quite a number of years deprived of pleasure in his marriage bed (as well as in all the other beds), finds relief in his imagination, in which sexual fantasies are often connected with food. Symbolically and literally, in the fourth episode it is most strikingly shown during the scene in the butcher shop, where Bloom admires the 'hams' of an appealing young woman from his neighbourhood, so much so that upon leaving the shop he adjusts his step to hers, so that he can enjoy the sight for a little longer. Bloom's ensuing breakfast – when kidneys from his mind materialize first in the frying pan and then on the plate – will be almost as glorious as his voyeuristic experience.

His lunch, however, will be far less spectacular. That modest meal will provide a symbolical counterpart of his devastated marriage: it amounts to a glass of Burgundy wine and a gorgonzola sandwich. It is the meal of a man who eats not with an ambition to enjoy his food, but with an aim to satiate his hunger; it is a meal that should help him function through several hours between equally tedious tasks of breakfast and dinner.

It is, therefore, at the time of lunch that we discover Bloom's new attitude towards food, rather unexpected after what we have witnessed at his breakfast: he loathes it. He loathes food, just as he loathes his marital life, which in fact expelled him to the street where he is to spend his June 16th from morning till night, in order to leave as much time as possible to his unfaithful wife Molly to have a sexual encounter with her lover, and as little time as possible to himself to think about her adultery. In accordance

¹ James Joyce, *Ulysses*, Oxford University Press, 1993, Oxford, p. 53.

with that, in Joyce's system of structural and essential parallels with Homer, the episode centered by Bloom's lunch (Episode 8), corresponds with the story about the Lestrygonians in Homer's *Odyssey*. The Lestrygonians are cannibals,² and that fact symbolically suggests the reasons for Bloom's negative attitude towards food. Food is here also closely connected with sexuality – this time in the negative context of Molly's adultery. It is not yet clear who will eat whom in that marriage triangle – but Bloom is the one who feels sick in advance.

That sickness is present from the very beginning of the episode, when with certain disgust Bloom watches a 'sugarsticky girl shoveling scoopfuls of creams for a christian brother' (144). Then in his characteristically unpredictable manner he thinks about 'lozenge and comfit manufacturer to His Majesty the King', only to finish that course of thought in remembering the English anthem: 'God. Save. Our. Sitting on the throne, sucking red jujubes white'. (144) Thus in the mind of a man whose life is bearable only because it is interesting (and it is interesting mostly because he does not know where his next thought might lead him), God and King are blasphemously being connected by the motif of gluttony. Blasphemy, however, does not end there: gluttony will quickly turn into bloodthirstiness, when a member of Y.M.C.A shoves a leaflet with the words 'washed in the blood of lamb' into Bloom's hand. Then Bloom starts thinking about bloodthirstiness of the state and the church: 'Birth, hymen, martyr, war, foundation of a building, sacrifice, kidney burnt offering, druids' altars'. (144) The Lestrygonians from the assumed title of this episode thus attain an unexpected contemporary incarnation, while Bloom's affection for food turns into repulsion over cannibalism.

Therefore, the permanent disgust that Stephen Dedalus feels towards the overall spiritual baseness of the world, seems to have its counterpart in Bloom's repugnance over certain physical aspects of that world. If Bloom and Stephen are, as some critics say, the body and spirit of one being,³ then during Bloom's lunch that being feels a strong urge to throw up. There is no help from an altruistic gesture towards animals as a feeble attempt to change the course of his thoughts: Bloom throws pieces of cake to the seagulls, but their rapaciousness reminds him of the

² In book 10 of *The Odyssey*, Odysseus and his men reach the island of the Lestrygonians, whose king is a giant and a cannibal, who eats many members of the crew and leads his people in the attack upon the surviving ones. Odysseus manages to escape, with a part of his crew.

³ See, for example, Richard Ellmann, *Ulysses on the Liffey*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972, pp. 74-77.

fact that those birds are not romantic wanderers, but carriers of horrible infective diseases. And then, in his irreversible metonymical stream of consciousness, he thinks about venereal diseases and, consequently, about the possibility that his wife is at that very moment being infected with some of them in the encounter with her lover, Boylan.

After such thoughts, who would care about going to lunch? Only a person who has to, so as not to die of hunger, or someone who does not know what to do with himself – like Bloom, in his futile attempts to escape from lascivious images produced by his own imagination, with his beloved, sensitive wife Molly and the vulgar, cruel Blazes Boylan as the main protagonists. Things will not get any better with his entrance into a restaurant, where immediately upon arrival he sees the following scene:

Men, men, men.

Perched on high stools by the bar, hats shoved back, at the tables calling for more bread no charge, swilling, wolfing gobfuls of sloppy food, their eyes bulging, wiping wetted moustaches. (...) New set of microbes. A man with an infant's sauced stained napkin tucked round him shoveled gurgling soup down his gullet. A man spitting back on his plate: halfmasticated gristle: no teeth to chewchewchew it.⁴

Such spectacle very vividly explains how someone who so thoroughly enjoyed his fried kidneys for breakfast, can feel so strong an impulse to become a vegetarian. Even becoming a vegetarian, however, cannot be a solution at that point: Bloom has reached such a high degree of repulsion towards any kind of food, that he cannot stand the smell of onions.

Rejection of food is one of the few ways of self-destruction that can be related to Leopold Bloom, whose insatiable lust for life defies all the troubles that fate so lavishly puts in his way: it is as if his father's suicide, the death of his newborn son and slow decay of his marriage only strengthen his awareness of the singularity and preciousness of life. The moments that precede his lunch on that day are the moments of crisis and hesitation, in which with his nihilistic disgust over the sordidness of human nature he closely approaches attitudes similar to those of Stephen Dedalus. That is why the medicine he reaches for is quite in accordance with such disposition: like Stephen, who tries to wash away his repugnance over the world with alcohol (succeeding only in augmenting it, of course), Bloom leaves the restaurant as the site of hideous human gluttony and

⁴ *Ulysses*, p.161.

goes into a pub, where he orders a glass of burgundy wine. Along the way, he resists the temptation to order sardines: in that resistance, he is helped by the first sip of wine, but also by the memory of the nickname 'Mackerel', that he carried in his childhood: eating fish for someone who had such a nickname would be an act of cannibalism. That is why Bloom, whose nature obviously tries to resist Lestrygonian impulses, orders a gorgonzola sandwich. His resistance is further helped by a tender memory of his love with Molly in its early days, and then it becomes clear that his loathing of food is in fact loathing of sexuality. Blazes Boylan has been too much in his thoughts on that day; with Boylan, there went the awareness of Molly's unfaithfulness, and thence the thought of sexual intercourse as something vile and gruesome. Sexuality and hunger are closely connected, both in Homer's tale about Lestrygonians and in Bloom's thoughts in Davy Byrne's pub. This is best testified by his memory, that at first seems so romantic:

Glowing wine on his palate lingered swallowed. Crushing in the winepress grapes of Burgundy. (...) Hidden under wild ferns on Howth. Below us bay sleeping sky. No sound. The sky. The bay purple by the Lion's head. (...) Cool with soft ointments her hand touched me, caressed: her eyes upon me did not turn away. Ravished over her I lay, full lips full open, kissed her mouth. Yum. Softly she gave me in my mouth the seedcake warm and chewed. Mawkish pulp her mouth had mumbled sweet and sour with warm, sticky gumjelly lips. (...) Hot I tongued her. She kissed me. I was kissed. All yielding she tossed my hair. Kissed, she kissed me.

Me. And me now.

Stuck, the flies buzzed.⁵ (167-168)

Bloom is, therefore, trying to escape from vulgar and obscene connotations of food into a romantic memory from long ago, only to find the same aggressive sexuality at its end, followed by a heartbreaking conclusion that he is quite helpless in front of it – especially when it concerns his own marriage. In addition to that, he is being mocked by two flies copulating on the windowpane, and so he quickly swallows the last bits of his so demonstratively asexual sandwich and hurries to the street, fleeing from every possible thought of food and its symbolical meanings. However, the first person he meets upon going out of the pub is Blazes Boylan, a

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168.

lighthearted cannibal whose prey for that afternoon is none else but Mrs. Bloom. Vegetarianism, Bloom realizes at that very moment, may not be the most effective medicine against marital unfaithfulness. Without proper reason and without any effect, he has deprived himself of a proper meal, remaining halfway hungry after that unwanted gorgonzola sandwich, with his dinner so distant somewhere in that day. The only thing more distant than that dinner is Molly's bed, inaccessible and chimerical like Ithaca.

References

- Ellmann, Richard (1972). *Ulysses on the Liffey*. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Joyce, James (1993). *Ulysses*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Vesna Lopičić
University of Niš, Serbia

GTA IV: BREAKING OR MAKING A STEREOTYPE? VIDEO GAME AS PROPAGANDA

Abstract. This paper problematizes the effect of one of the latest Rockstar Games' productions, *Grand Theft Auto IV (GTA IV)*. The alleged intention of this video game developers was to break up the stereotype of a video game character in terms of character complexity and moral dichotomy. They even endowed the main character with a name, Niko Bellic. A brief analysis of his psychological profile leaves doubts as to his originality, but not as to his ethnicity. The stereotype formed on wrong assumptions consequently does not seem to be broken at all, if indeed that was the original intention. Knowing the power of the entertainment industry to influence young players, it seems that Rockstar Games reinforced an erroneous stereotypical image of Serbian nationals that should be corrected rather than reiterated.

While leafing through an old 2008 issue of *Maisonneuve*, a Canadian journal designed with the idea of satisfying eclectic curiosity, my eye was first caught by a series of photographs and then by the title of the article they illustrated. The photographs were all perfect animations of scenes taken, I later realised, from different video games. There were 23 of them and they were all gripping, especially to an unaccustomed eye, which I admit mine is. Apart from the game of *Solitaire*, played a few times many years ago, I have never ventured into the world of video games. Yet, the title of this article, *Can a Video Game Make You Cry?*, drew my attention and made me read the text. It was written by Jon Evans who investigated the genre of video games just as the technological sub-culture is nearing its fiftieth birthday. The article was most informative because Mr. Evans briefly outlined the history of video games from its beginnings with *Pac-Man* in the early eighties to the latest Rockstar Games' production *Grand Theft Auto IV (GTA IV)*, released in 2008.

I was made aware of one of the dilemmas of video games developers, i.e. whether to make their games more narrative or action based. It would be logical that the same impulse that drove humanity to tell stories in the oral tradition, then in books and later in films should control the popularity of video games. Our interest in plot and character seems unlikely to slacken or die. However, one of the Electronic Arts producers, Reid Schneider, explains that there is a great difference between narrative in gameplaying and any other storytelling medium: "The story is non-linear. Game creators don't control the pacing. So the emotional experience of gaming is less about plot and more about the characters" (Evans, 36). Indeed, in the world of video games, the player has ultimate control: he can choose the layers, he can gear the course of the story and he can even decide on the final outcome of the game. It appears that the post-modern novel is very similar to a video game in this respect; yet, though the reader participates and stories often have multiple endings, the reader definitely does not have the same power over the characters as does the video game player. Even Stephen Spielberg is fascinated with video game narratives: "The challenge of story-telling in a non-linear way is very exciting. With a film you start with a story and end a couple of hours later. Games take hours of exploration" (Spielberg).

As a teacher of literature, I found these comparisons most interesting, although Mr. Evans came to the conclusion that all video games share the same simplistic pattern:

...Video games are only about the visceral gratification of solving puzzles and blowing things up: meaningless, escapist entertainment; devoid of gravitas, psychological depth, and vivid characterization. Even story-driven games like *BioShock* provide no actual story, only enough pretext to give the gameplay traction; and who could possibly care about the characters of a pretext? (Evans, 38).

I believe it is for this reason that I was never interested in gameplaying, which comes down mostly to "a series of mazes that players must explore, while killing or escaping bad guys and collecting stuff" (Evans, 38). The visual beauty of the games that precludes my imagination from constructing it, which happens when one reads a novel, however compelling, is further depleted by the lack of a true story with moral complexity. In the world of video games things are usually very simple and the moral dichotomy over-ruling: you are either good or bad, killing or killed. Although gamers may identify with some of the usually unnamed player-characters and

some companion-bonding happens with emotionally wrenching scenes, the characters are like empty templates that the players cannot project onto.

It was like this for almost thirty years before a new game was released. Evans makes sure to explain how *GTA IV* was a watershed in the gaming industry whose huge profits will probably transform the pattern of video games and make them more thought-provoking. The change was brought about by the design of the main character whose appearance was dramatically announced by Jon Evans: "Enter Niko Bellic" (39). The name struck me as very symbolic, Nobody White, which is how it roughly translates into Serbian. Still, I thought it was my overactive imagination that was immediately reading into the text associations from my own culture and language. Reading further, I was made even more curious by the description of Niko:

Rockstar Games has created, for the first time in the history of video gaming, a human character who even non-gamers talk about by name. A sardonic, strong-and-silent veteran of the Balkan civil wars, Bellic arrives in Liberty City – an ersatz New York – searching for the American dream, but instead gets caught up in crime (Evans, 39).

A person from our part of the world has to wonder: Who is this Niko? Which part of the Balkans does he come from? If he took part in the Balkan civil wars, he must be one of us. Ethnic identification in this case is more than significant because in a war a division into Us and Them becomes most important, especially if the war is not mainly economic but runs mostly along the lines of religion, ethnicity, and political options. This may seem as an irrelevant piece of information to a gamer, but the blogs suggest otherwise. There were heated debates revolving round the question of whether Niko was Croatian, Serbian, or Bosnian. Other options had been quickly ruled out. Yet, before I learned about this issue, I first checked Wikipedia to see what was at stake in this game. The synopsis is brief enough. This is how it all started:

Grand Theft Auto IV follows the story of Niko Bellic, an illegal immigrant and veteran of the Bosnian War. After persuasion from his cousin Roman who immigrated to America years prior to the game's opening, Niko leaves Eastern Europe to come to Liberty City, where he hopes to forget his criminal past and pursue the American Dream. After his arrival,

however, Niko quickly learns that Roman's tales of riches and luxury were lies concealing Roman's struggles with debt and gangsters. Niko aids Roman in his troubles while hoping to carve out a new life for himself in the city (Wikipedia 1).

The end is more interesting because it offers a moral choice, which is one of the novelties introduced by *GTA IV*: "The story features two possible endings depending on the choice made by the player at this point in the game. The player can choose to have Niko exact revenge on Dimitri or make a deal with him" (Wikipedia 1).

All this proved to be most appealing to the impatient game players so that success was immediate. "Upon release, *Grand Theft Auto IV* claimed two entertainment industry sales records, posting the best single-day and seven-day sales totals for a video game. The game sold more than 3.6 million copies on its first day of availability (garnering \$310 million in sales), while also selling 6 million copies in the first week of availability (garnering \$500 million in sales)" (Wikipedia 1). The developers, Rockstar Games located at Edinburgh and Toronto, had a good reason to be satisfied, since they had invested a lot. Overall, *Grand Theft Auto IV* took over 1000 people and more than three and a half years to complete, with a total cost estimated at approximately \$100 million, making it the most expensive game ever developed. Clearly, on the very first day the game paid back double. The story writers, Dan Houser and Rupert Humphries, were also overjoyed at the reception of the game which had won many prestigious awards by the end of 2008. *Grand Theft Auto IV* is the first and only game in the series to be awarded a "10" by IGN¹.

Besides superlative praises, there was also some severe criticism. Mothers Against Drunk Driving insisted that the game should be rated for adults only because of the main character's ability to drink and drive. At the beginning of the game there is a brief scene containing full-frontal male nudity, which some may find offensive. "According to the Guinness World Records 2009 Gamer's Edition, it's the most controversial videogame series ever, with over 4,000 articles published about it, which include accusations of glamorizing violence, corruption of gamers, and connection to real life crimes" (Wikipedia 2). Part of the public believes that young players will try to emulate extreme violence, hate crimes, and deliberate sex indulgence they witness in the course of the game. The exploitative

¹ IGN (abbreviated and formerly known as Imagine Games Network) is a multimedia news and reviews website that focuses heavily on video games.

and violent attitude towards women who are mainly represented as prostitutes is also criticised.

However, nobody responded in the manner of Jean-Robert Lafortune of the Haitian American Grassroots Coalition who is quoted as saying that:

“The game shouldn’t be designed to destroy human life, it shouldn’t be designed to destroy an ethnic group,” for this and similar scenarios, including lines in the game’s script such as “kill the Haitian dickheads” during an altercation between the player and a Haitian gang. After the threat for having been sued by the Haitian-American Grassroots Coalition, Rockstar removed the word “Haitians” from this phrase in the game’s subtitles (Wikipedia 2).

Apart from the attitude shared by all, at least given lip service, that human life should not be destroyed, Lafortune’s reaction brings up the issue of violence against an ethnic group. The most obvious form of such violence was the above example from *GTA3*, where the player is invited to kill people only because they are members of a certain ethnic group, while in *GTA IV* that violence takes a more subtle form. “Enter Niko Bellic.”

Niko Bellic is a criminal. Whatever his personal background, whatever his motives for moving to the States, however psychologically sensitive he is, he still kills. “For the first time in the series, *Grand Theft Auto IV* features ‘morality choices’ at several points throughout the game, in which the player is forced to choose between killing a character or sparing their life or killing one of two characters. The game has two different endings, which are determined by deciding which of the two missions to complete. The player can choose between a revenge mission or a deal mission, each leads to a different ending”, claims the synopsis, but in truth the endings do not differ that much. Niko kills either Jimmy Pegorino who first kills his girlfriend, Kate McReary in Version 1, or he kills Dimitri Rascalov who kills his cousin Roman at his own wedding in Version 2. Niko Bellic proves to be a cold blooded murderer, however proud his designers were of their masterpiece.

However, what is more disturbing is not that Niko Bellic is a stock character from a video game or an action movie, but a character with a name and an ethnic background. Evans explains: “Whatever the reason, until the end of 2007, the heroes of most games were literal nobodies: anonymous, inoffensive blank slates” (Evans, 39). The next question

is, why did Rockstar Games decide, this time, to name their new hero and turn nobody into Niko. Were they trying to break the stereotypical representation of an anti-hero as worthless social scum who was denied a name because he did not deserve it or was something else intended? Or maybe they simply wanted to make sure their profits would soar by designing a character with an identity already denigrated simply because he comes from a certain nation? It is impossible to answer these questions with absolute certainty, but establishing the ethnic identity of Niko Bellic might throw some light on the ambiguity of his position.

Before the game was released, the bloggers started fighting over Niko's ethnic identity. The claims that he was either Italian or Russian were quickly dispelled while the debate over his Croatian, Bosnian or Serbian origin lasted longer. His being a Croat or Muslim from Bosnia was also soon ruled out since his family name in that case should have been spelt 'Bijelic' or 'Bjelic', not 'Bellic.' Therefore, he was Serbian. The form 'Bellic' was either incorrectly spelt 'Belic' or maybe the 'l' was doubled on purpose to indicate that it is preceded by a monophthong /e/, since Serbian spelling is phonetical and letters are doubled only in some special cases. It may also be an omission made under the influence of the English language. Further, the family name Belic is more common in Bosnia than in Serbia proper, so it is very likely that Niko Bellic comes from the Serbian region of Bosnia. His first name is the shortened version of Nikola, a very popular Serbian name, which is often abbreviated to Niko in Montenegro or the Republic of Srpska.

When the bloggers started playing the game, there was plenty of evidence testifying to Bellic's Serbian origin. The BradyGames guide, for example, says on page 10: Our story begins aboard the Platypus ... one of the crew is a Serbian national named Niko Bellic. There was also some irrefutable proof in the language Niko was occasionally using, like: "Zdravo, burazeru" (Hi, brother), "Neverovatno" (Unbelievable) or at the very beginning of the game when Niko and Roman are talking, Niko reprimands him saying: "What's wrong, Roman, have you forgotten our language?" and Roman replies: "No, cousin, it's been awhile... speak English, your English is better than my Serbian." If this is not enough, we later learn that his mother's name is Milica, which is definitely related to Serbian heritage. The bloggers stopped discussing this issue since there was no point proving or disproving something so obvious: Niko Bellic is a Serbian national.

There is probably no doubt that all the gamers identified with Niko as their player-character who becomes the means of satisfying various needs: excitement, adrenalin rush, aggression drive, as solutions to the

problems of depression, boredom, dissatisfaction etc. Yet, even if they get emotionally attached to Niko and do not see him as a virtual tool for the gratification of their various desires, Niko still remains a criminal. Their possible bonding with him will most likely not prevent the players from overgeneralising his character into a picture of a typical Serb. That is exactly the danger of this vastly popular video game. If it sold six million copies in the first week, how many millions of young people have by now, a year later, come to the conclusion or rather the confirmation of the stereotypical representation of Serbs created through the inimical propaganda after the beginning of the Balkan wars? There may be some statistics on that, but hundreds of millions have definitely once again seen a Serb in a negative light.

Enter Niko Bellic actually means: Enter Serbians. What are they like? "His father was an alcoholic who bullied him. His mother, Milica, had a maternal and caring nature, and regretted that a decent person like Niko was forced to grow up in such a harsh environment. He grew up during the harsh times of the Yugoslav wars, in which he participated as an angry youth" (Wikipedia 3). The conclusion easily drawn by many unthinking and uninformed young players will be that these Serbs really drink too much, that they are awful fathers, that their women are weak and ineffective as mothers, and that Niko is a victim, an angry and frustrated man who searched for self-realisation in the war. Did he become a hero then? The official description of his character runs further: "Niko witnessed and committed numerous atrocities during the war, which led to his cynical perspective on life, and a certain degree of regret, depression, and emotional detachedness" (Wikipedia 3). Evidently, however victimised Niko was in his childhood, he becomes a war criminal now capable of unspeakable deeds which explains his later psychological profile. He regrets the terrible things he did, he is depressed at the memory of the crimes, and the only way to go is to detach himself from genuine emotions so that what drives him now cannot be love but blood-thirsty revenge. The need for revenge in his case is justified, but if it leaves a person emotionally crippled it is definitely not commendable. Ergo, Serbs are a psychologically damaged nation. He cannot be given even the saving grace of the corrupting influence of America. He went there illegally (therefore as an offender), he got caught up in crime (what else, for a man who never had an honest job), and to top it all, his close cousin and host in the States turns out to be a deceptor and a failure who owes gambling debts to many criminals (as if Niko could have a decent relative!).

For the sake of truth, he is given some positive characteristics: he is protective of his family, he helps various random people, he has a distaste for drugs, he is mature and sensible. At the same time, he manifests typical Serbian attitudes towards America and its values: he is confused and mildly disgusted with American culture, annoyed by its rampant materialism, too sarcastic for the average person and, above all, incapable of letting go of the past. The story is dominated by this weakness of his which again may be by many attributed to all Serbs. Our stubborn adherence to historical tradition, cultural heritage, and out-dated moral norms may be the reason, in the view of the players, for what happened to Serbia as a nation. The fault is somehow with Us, not Them.

Radomirović commented on Niko's character as early as 9 May 2008 in *Politika*:

Serbs have, after a few noted but side-roles as bad guys in Hollywood, finally got their first main character in the American entertainment industry. If we may give him that title, taken into account that the character of Niko Bellic – a killer, violent person and smuggler – is far from the ideal (Radomirović, 7)².

It is fair to say that Niko is a real anti-hero. He admits to killing people and human trafficking as the worst of his crimes besides numerous smaller offences, justifying these atrocities with the 'complexity of life'. There is not a single positive Serbian character in the game except for Florian Cravic, Niko's army friend, who is a homosexual dating the deputy mayor of Liberty City.

It is somewhat disturbing that the first time Serbs are allowed the public stage and huge (video games) audience, they are represented as negative characters, especially if they were previously given as much negative publicity by the media during the civil wars in Yugoslavia.

Going back to the intention of the story writers and the developers, Rockstar Games, Houser said, "In terms of the character, we wanted something that felt fresh and new and not something that was obviously derived from [a] movie" (Wikipedia 1). It is our belief that when one wants something 'fresh' and 'new,' they should not resort to stereotype, which Niko Bellic definitely is. He is a bad guy. They wanted some innovation, they wanted to break the stereotype of an anonymous character-player who is little more than an animated tool. John Lanchester describes it ironically:

² Translation V.L.

The Grand Theft Auto games, for example, are notorious (especially among people who've never played them) for their apparent celebration of random violence. The most recent iteration of the game, however, *Grand Theft Auto IV*, involves the main character having to spend a large amount of time building up his relationships, so that he can have people to help him do his criminal thing; and building up these relationships involves driving to see these people, taking them out to nightclubs, and sitting there with them" (Lanchester, 19).

The irony is that Niko seems to be more human than other characters of the industry, while all his friendship-making efforts are aimed at manipulating people into committing crimes. He is a brazen criminal despite the freshness of his complex psychology and his moral dilemmas. Revenge as his motive is a standard of the gameplay trade so that it does not bring any change either. His committing random acts of kindness does not testify to his perfectibility since he remains a killer to the end. The stereotype of a video game character consequently does not seem to be broken at all, if indeed that was the original intention. The only difference turns out to be his identity as if of all ethnicities in former Yugoslavia, of all Balkan nations, of all peoples in the world, only a fictional Serb held the promise of breaking a deeply-rooted stereotype of the entertainment industry.

Being the easiest place to start the process of learning about a society and defining one's place in it or in relation to it, social stereotypes help develop consciousness and help develop identity. Nevertheless, they are a two-way street: externally and internally imposed, serving both good and bad purposes, and influenced by education and economic prosperity. It is when they take on a life of their own that stereotypes become dangerous commodities. Social representations, frames and stereotypes have a normative power, establishing judgments of value, and stereotypes can also produce constraining and ill-advised behaviours (Radić-Bojanić, 260).

Time will tell whether the storyline will begin to dominate over the character in the video games to come in future. It also remains to be seen if video games will be navigated more towards art than entertainment. If it is known that in 2008 video games overtook music and video, combined,

in the UK, and left book sales far behind, it is very important what sort of content may be found in them. Instead of reading, young people will play games and build their picture of moral values. Maybe Rockstar Games made a significant breakthrough and produced a character out of the ordinary villain-stereotype, but they certainly reinforced an erroneous stereotypical image of Serbian nationals that should be corrected rather than reiterated. By naming their most recent character and endowing him with a definite ethnic origin, they abuse the trust of their players.

Enter Niko Bellic. Beware!

References

- Evans, Jon (2008). "Can a Video Game Make You Cry?" in *Maisonneuve* 30 Winter: 36-41.
- Lanchester, John (2009). "Is It Art? John Lanchester on video games" in *London Review of Books* 31 (1): 19.
- Radomirović, V (2008). "Srbin nasilnik obara rekorde" in *Politika* 9 May 2008: 7.
- Radić-Bojanić, Biljana, Nataša Karanfilović (2009). "American and Canadian Stereotypes as reflected in Popular Culture" in *Culture and Ideology: Canadian Perspectives*. Beograd: Čigoja, 257-262.
- Spielberg, Stephen (2008) in Adam Sherwin, "Grand Theft Auto IV embodies the future of entertainment" in *The Times*, 26 April. http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/gadgets_and_gaming/article3818900.ece
- "Grand Theft Auto IV." *Wikipedia* 1. 7 February 2009 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_IV
- "Grand Theft Auto (series)." *Wikipedia* 2. 22 February 2009 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_\(series\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_(series))
- "List of characters in *Grand Theft Auto IV*." *Wikipedia* 3. 10 March 2009 American Dream IV.

Elzbieta Klimek-Dominiak
University of Wrocław, Poland

**'THEY CAME LIKE A LION' – SARAH
WINNEMUCCA HOPKINS'S LIFE AMONG
THE PIUTES: THEIR WRONGS AND CLAIMS
AS A PERSONAL AND TRIBAL ACCOUNT OF
NATIVE AMERICAN AND EURO AMERICAN
CONTACTS**

Sarah Winnemucca Hopkins is the author of the first personal and communal narrative written by a Native American woman (Ruoff 261). Her *Life Among the Piutes: Their Wrongs and Claims* is believed to be “one of the two or three autobiographies written by Native American women during the nineteenth century” (Wong 134). In contrast to earlier Native American autobiographies of William Apes (Pequot) *Son of the Forest* (1829) and George Copway (Ojibwe) *Life, History, and Travels of Kah-ge-ga-gah-bowh* (1847), Sarah Winnemucca's (Paiute) *Life Among the Piutes* (1883) is not a Christian conversion narrative (Ruoff 261). Instead of spiritual introspection, Winnemucca highlights the emotional, cultural and political consequences of the Native American and Euro American encounters in her life narrative. In order to subvert harmful cultural stereotypes of Native Americans, Winnemucca engages in various discourses circulating in the nineteenth century American society. As a result, her account exhibits a complex hybrid structure revealing her struggle to represent the period of cultural crisis from the perspective of both a Native American woman and a cultural mediator. As she describes mistreatment of the Paiutes by the Euro Americans and her attempts to negotiate between the two conflicted groups, she constructs a tribal self which is not only victimized but also actively resists dispossession and annihilation.

Sarah Winnemucca establishes her authority as the spokesperson of the tribe by invoking her close bond with her grandfather, Truckee, the Paiute leader. Unlike the Native American chiefs featuring in blood-curdling captivity narratives or dime-store novels, Truckee envisioned a peaceful coexistence of his tribe with the white settlers encroaching upon the traditional Paiute land (the areas of present western Nevada and California). Moreover, Truckee encouraged his granddaughter to learn English in order to facilitate the interracial contacts.

Referring to her adult life, Sarah Winnemucca describes her attempts to undo an imminent cultural clash by acting as an interpreter representing her tribe to the white settlers and government officials. In her autobiography, which focuses both on the tribal communal history and on her individual life, Winnemucca continuously undermines stereotypical nineteenth century representations of both Paiutes and white Americans. Although she had a very distinct tribal identity of the daughter of the chief, the woman warrior and the interpreter, as Georgi-Findlay expertly shows in her "Frontiers of Native American Women's Writing," Winnemucca also adopted the romantic pose of "Indian Princess," in order to make her case more appealing to the white audiences (228). At the same time, these strategies of self-fashioning testify to her awareness of the expectations of her white American audience. To resist charges of promiscuity she dissociates herself from the popular image of the "Squaw" and projects a royal image of Native American femininity.

In this way Winnemucca also responds to the charges of her alleged sexual misconduct brought by reservation agents whom she condemned for their mistreatment of her tribe. In a mode similar to slave narratives, Winnemucca's life narrative is framed with the letters attesting to her respectability. Winnemucca frequently subverts the stereotypes of Native Americans as "atrocious savages" and Euro Americans as "benevolent civilizers" by contextualizing the causes of many interracial conflicts over the Paiute land and exposing the corruption within the reservation system. Her descriptions of Paiute tribal and family life, vivid accounts of abuses perpetrated by reservation agents and enumeration of her attempts to negotiate with American government and military officials at times of conflict display her skillful use of oral tradition in her narrative. She frequently recounts the conversations or quotes extensively from her exchanges with government representatives and tribal leaders, presenting herself as a skillful and influential intermediary.

Ironically, Winnemucca's autobiography also shows that her role of a cultural go-between in the times of Euro American expansion made her

vulnerable to being perceived as a “white man’s Indian” by her tribe when the promises of the government officials proved false. She was represented as a stereotypical lascivious “squaw” by the Indian agents, whose frauds she exposed. Winnemucca’s life narrative is both thematically and discursively a unique indigenous account of the profound consequences the American western expansion exerted upon the indigenous community.

Drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of double-voiced discourse, Arnold Krupat has convincingly argued that the Native American autobiography often features a “dialogic model of the self” because it is characterized by “original bicultural composite composition” (*Ethnocriticism* 149). This “bicultural composition” does not only apply to the so called “collaborative” Indian life stories written with the help of white scholars (such as ethnographers, anthropologists, historians) or other Euro American writers as in the case of *Black Elk Speaks* by Nicholas Black Elk (Lakota). Black Elk’s spoken life narrative was translated by his son into English then selections were written down by John.G.Neihardt and his daughter (Wong 135). Significantly, Winnemucca’s narrative is a “self-written” autobiography by a Native American woman. The only changes introduced to Winnemucca’s text as described by Mary Mann in the editor’s preface were those concerning orthography and punctuation. Winnemucca’s narrative was published thanks to generous assistance of the white American reformer, Elizabeth Palmer Peabody. The circumstances of this collaboration as well as the implied readers of this autobiography, the white Americans represent Native American and white American perspectives and thus make this narrative into what Krupat called in *For Those Who Come After* “the textual equivalent of the frontier” (11).

Indeed, Winnemucca’s autobiography is a remarkable example of a complex double-voiced discourse focused on representing the intercultural space of the nineteenth century western borderland. Winnemucca records the struggle for survival of the Paiutes, the members of her tribal community, to the Euro American audience in an attempt to exert influence on changing of the reservation system. In this way she recreates the heterogeneous population of western Nevada and multiple interactions on the frontier.

Heteroglossia (dialogism) enters Winnemucca’s life narrative in the first chapter, describing the arrival of the first white settlers into the area inhabited by the Paiutes. Winnemucca’s story begins with establishing an approximate temporal setting which contextualizes the cultural shock she experienced early in her life with the beginning of a great wave of white emigration to this area: “I was born somewhere near 1844, but am

not sure of the precise time. I was a very small child when the first white people came into the country. They came like a lion, yes, like a roaring lion, and have continued so ever since, and I have never forgotten their first coming" (5). Thus the Native American child perceives the coming of the first Christian emigrants as an event of apocalyptic proportions.

Although this description of the first intercultural contact is immediately framed by the story of her grandfather welcoming the white settlers and helping them because of his vision of "long looked for white brothers," whom he believed to be a part of the family separated because of disagreement, the voice of a terrified young Winnemucca narrates the encounters with whites as recurring traumatic experiences. She vividly evokes the sense of terror that Native American women felt on hearing from other tribes that white settlers, who were coming close to their land, were killing everyone and even turned to cannibalism when surprised by winter in the mountains (probably referring to the Donner party of 1846). In a dramatic scene, which Georgi-Findlay described as "an inversion of the pattern of Indian captivity narrative" (232), the voice of a young Winnemucca conveys her mother's desperate attempt to protect her little daughter from frightening white emigrants by burying her in the sand among the bushes:

Oh, what a fright we all got one morning to hear some white people were coming. Everyone ran as best they could. My poor mother was left with my little sister and me. Oh, I never forget it. My poor mother was carrying my little sister on her back, and trying to make me run; but I was so frightened I could not move my feet, and while my poor mother was trying to get me along my aunt overtook us, and she said to my mother; 'Let us bury our girls or we shall be killed and eaten up.' So they went to work and buried us, and told us if we heard any noise not to cry out, for if we did they would surely kill us and eat us. So our mothers buried me and my cousin, planted sage brushes over our faces to keep from burning them, and there we were left all day. (11)

The extreme fear that the coming emigrants inspire makes Sarah's aunt and mother resort to quite a radical solution to ensure safety of their offspring. For Sarah this event is almost like a near death experience. The scene is followed by her emotional appeal to the readers: "Oh can you imagine my feeling buried alive, thinking every minute that I was to be unburied and eaten up by the people that my grandfather loved so much? With my heart throbbing, and not daring to breathe we lay there all day...Oh, can anyone

in this world imagine what were my feelings when I was dug up by my poor mother and father?" (12). By representing the arrival of unrestrained Euro American emigrants from the perspective of a terrified indigenous child, Winnemucca produces a more complicated discourse. She revises in this way the national narrative of westward expansion embedding within it the fears of annihilation experienced by the indigenous population. Winnemucca ironically uses the binary oppositions associated with the frontier: civilized settlers /primitive savages or Christian/pagan. In this way she subverts the racial stereotypes of civilized white settlers and indigenous "atrocious savages."

The initial image of an apocalyptic threat recurs throughout the whole narrative as Winnemucca portrays the numerous ways in which tribal life was disrupted by the arrival of Euro American settlers. These descriptions include violation of legal agreements by white military officials bringing about the charge of Winnemucca's betrayal of her tribe, dismissal from her position as a tribal interpreter and her temporary stay outside the reservation. Furthermore, Winnemucca's life narrative frequently records the violation of native people. For example, Winnemucca reports the story of the abduction and rape of two Paiute girls by the white men, which gave rise to the war in the 1860. The narrative contains numerous references to threats of sexual abuse of indigenous women by white men. Moreover, Winnemucca herself, her sister and her sister-in-law experienced such sexual assaults:

The last time sister and I were on a visit to our people at our old home, just before I was married, we stopped with a white lady named Nichols, at Wadsworth, Nevada ...Someone tried to break through our bedroom door, and my sister cried out to them, saying, "Get away from the door or I will shoot!" ... This is the kind of people, dear reader, that the government sends to teach us at Pyramid Lake Reservation. (94)

Descriptions of the instances of rape or sexual threats were likely to gain sympathy of the white female readers. Euro American women often viewed themselves as moral guardians. Thus references to such unruly behavior of the male "civilizers" could inspire indignation and perhaps effect change.

Significantly, Winnemucca's life narrative diverges from traditional American autobiographies in many respects. The development of her individual self is not highlighted. Her education at Euro American family

and her short a stay at the convent school are only briefly mentioned. Personal details such as her several marriages (two of them to white men) and marital problems are not given much attention. Even the death of her mother and her sister and Winnemucca's period of living outside the reservation in frontier towns is only alluded to incidentally. No turning points in her personal life story are emphasized. Hence her narrative exhibits a fragmentary structure as events from her life are embedded within the tribal events and concerns. In contrast to Anglo-American autobiographies, as the title of Winnemucca's *Life among the Piutes* suggests, she constantly foregrounds her tribal identity – Winnemucca's communal self is frequently shown in relation to others. She records the tribal history, Paiutes' numerous attempts to coexist peacefully with the encroaching white settlers and the military men; she minutely portrays the Paiutes' struggle to survive in the radically changed circumstances. The numerous removals and final enclosure of the Paiutes within the reservation system are carefully depicted. It is worth noting that Winnemucca's personal narrative voice is often effaced as she incorporates remembered dialogues and speeches made by others. Within this history of her tribe she occasionally inserts the examples of her achievement as a Paiute woman warrior, which signals the discourse of the tribal genre of "coup tale" (Brumble 23). Despite sporadic references to her personal feats of bravery, Winnemucca gives priority to tribal perspective throughout her narrative which at times assumes the status ethnographic narrative.

Autoethnographic discourse is in fact one of the important conventions Winnemucca uses in a subversive way. To appreciate the "cultural work" of Winnemucca's narrative it is useful to refer to conceptualization of the cultural space of borderland as it is invoked by Mary Louise Pratt in *Imperial Eyes*. Pratt uses the linguistic concept of the "contact zone" to describe the "space of colonial encounters" (6) which she defines as "social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination" (4). As Pratt notes "autoethnographic texts" which are written onto the space of colonial encounters "are not ...what are usually thought of as "authentic" or autochthonous forms of self-representation... Rather autoethnography involves partial collaboration with and appropriation of the idioms of the conqueror "(7). Hence the concepts borrowed from the dominant culture are merged with indigenous modes of expression to produce heterogeneous texts. Winnemucca's historicizing discourse on the vindication of her tribe is interrupted in chapter 2, which is focused on ethnographic representation of the Paiutes.

Winnemucca's autoethnographic voice depicts her tribe by describing customs of puberty and courtship rituals, the benevolent upbringing of Paiute children, which she probably knows from lecturing experience to be more acceptable to the white audience. At times she even compares features of Paiutes organization as superior to Euro American political institutions: "We have a republic as well as you. The council- tent is our Congress, and anybody can speak, who has anything to say, women and all." (53) Winnemucca carefully points out that Paiute "women know as much as men do and their advice is often asked" (53) which weighs against Euro American women's lack of political influence over decision-making. In a direct appeal to her implied white readers Winnemucca adds: "If women could go into your Congress I think justice would soon be done to the Indians" (53). She underlines that Paiutes aren't aggressive, don't initiate wars and "never scalped a human being" (54). Moreover Winnemucca refrains from any physical description of Paiute tribal people avoiding the eroticizing effect of typical ethnography.

However, Siobham Senier and Andrew McClure have established that Winnemucca's description of the structure of her tribe is misrepresented. During Chief Truckee's life Paiutes were a loosely connected group of nomadic gathering and hunting people (Senier 113). They did not enjoy much esteem from white emigrants. For example white emigrant women often referred to Paiute Indians as "diggers" because Paiute women often dug for edible roots. In addition to that, due to the warm weather of the Great Basin area and their nomadic life style, Paiutes are said to have lived in grassy shelters wearing very little clothing. Moreover, at the time of the first intercultural contacts with whites, Paiutes are said to have had no tribal structure that included the position of chief. Hence it seems that Winnemucca's maternal grandfather, introduced by her to the readers as the Chief of Paiutes at the beginning of her narrative, may have just enjoyed the status of an important leader of the group. Therefore it seems that Winnemucca's autoethnographic project involved some revisions of white conventions in order to make it into a more persuasive petition against the reservation system. In an attempt to make her crusade against mistreatment and dispossession of the Paiutes more acceptable, Winnemucca participated actively in re-inventing the ethnic identity of her tribe and herself for the white readers. Furthermore, by using such modes as sentimental appeal foregrounding emotional complexity of indigenous population and by adapting some of the tribal conventions of oral tradition, featuring dramatic descriptions of feats of bravery, Winnemucca constructs her narrative self not only as a

victim of American western politics but also as a resisting inventive and adaptable agent in the intercultural space of American frontier.

Winnemucca does not only refer to autoethnographic discourse or appeal to the feelings of her readers. The traumatic experiences of Paiute community caused by cultural and military clashes are frequently represented in dramatic scenes, rendered through indirect speech and dialogues which display Winnemucca's skillful use of oral tradition. Her dialogized narrative thus constitutes a vivid recreation the Paiute and Euro American enforced contacts during the second half of the nineteenth century.

References

- Brumble, David H. (1988). *American Indian Autobiography*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Georgi-Findlay, Brigitte (1993). "Frontiers of Native American Women's Writing: Sarah Winnemucca's *Life Among the Piutes*." In: Arnold Krupat, ed. *New Voices in Native American Criticism*. Washington: Smithsonian 222-252.
- Hopkins, Sarah Winnemucca (1883) *Life Among the Piutes: Their Wrongs and Claims*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Krupat, Arnold (1992). *Ethnocriticism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Krupat, Arnold (1985). *For Those Who Come After: The Study of Native American Autobiography*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- McClure, Andrew S. (1999). "Sarah Winnemucca: [Post]-Indian Princess and the Voice of the Paiutes." MELUS 24 (2): 29-51.
- Pratt, Mary Louise (1992). *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. New York: Routledge
- Ruoff, A. L. Brown, and Jerry W. Ward, Jr. (eds.) (1992). *Redefining American Literary History*. New York: MLA.
- Senier, Siobhan (2001). *Voices of American Indian Assimilation and Resistance: H. Hunt Jackson, Sarah Winnemucca, and Victoria Howard*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Wong, Hertha D. Sweet (2005). "Native American Life Writing" in *Cambridge Companion to Native American Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


***Belgrade BELLS
Interview***

INTERVIEW: DAVID CRYSTAL

**“A NATION WITHOUT A LANGUAGE IS
A NATION WITHOUT A HEART”**

by Katarina Rasulić

David Crystal, OBE, Honorary Professor of Linguistics at the University of Bangor, UK, internationally renowned scholar, writer, lecturer and broadcaster, author or editor of over 100 books (including *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language* and *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the English Language*), gave a lecture at the Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade in November 2008 (courtesy of The English-Speaking Union, Serbia) and kindly took time to give this extensive interview for the inaugural issue of *Belgrade BELLS*.



David Crystal

BELLS: You grew up in a multilingual environment. What was that experience like and to what extent did it influence your interest in linguistics?

DAVID CRYSTAL: Yes, I grew up in the little town of Holyhead, which is in North West Wales. It was a bilingual town, with Welsh and English both spoken, and sometimes a trilingual town, because Irish was spoken, too. The Irish came into Wales in great numbers in the nineteenth century and built the railway along the north Wales coast and then stopped at Holyhead, which was as near as you could get to Ireland without going back there. So there was a strong Irish community and there was Gaelic in town as well. But it was Welsh and English that were the main two.

One of my earliest memories actually is of realizing that I was in a bilingual community without understanding both languages. You see, Welsh was not my home language, English was. I had a Welsh uncle, uncle Joe, who spoke Welsh to me sometimes, but I didn't really understand it. And then in school later I would learn Welsh. But I remember once when I was about three and I was at a Sunday school. The Welsh word for children is *plant*, *p-l-a-n-t*. And I remember the teacher in the Sunday school saying to us all "Nawr, plant", meaning "Now, children", and I remember thinking "Why is she calling me a plant? A plant is a vegetable that grows in the ground?" So I turned to the lad next to me and said, "Why is she calling us a *plant*?" And he knew more Welsh than I did and said, "Oh, stupid, that's *children*, isn't it?" And I suddenly realized, "So there are two languages, or two somethings – I can understand them, but I can't understand them. Why is that?" I remember being puzzled about it at this very early age. And I think that puzzlement was part of the source of my language interest, an early career move to being a linguist.

BELLS: Among the renowned linguists that you worked with, such as Randolph Quirk, Frank Palmer, or Michael Halliday, whose influence was the most significant?

DAVID CRYSTAL: Oh, Randolph Quirk, without a doubt. When I went to university, thanks to having had quite a solid language education in school – I'd learned French and Greek and Latin, and a little bit of German, too, and a little bit on the English language, of course – I knew I wanted to do some language work, and at the same time I was very interested in literature, so I knew I wanted that as well. So I looked for a course where there was a balance between the two. And I found one at University College London, where, in those days, you did ten courses, five of them language, five of them literature. This was perfect for me, this was heaven.

Except that in the first year the language work was really rather boring, I have to say. A lot of it was being taught in the old, traditional, philological way, where you analyzed old states of languages into their sound changes and things like this, and it was all rather abstruse and rather abstract, and I began feeling more and more bored by this. Where was the reality of language behind it? I remember once, when I was learning Anglo-Saxon for the first time, and I encountered the Old English word for king – *cyning* – and I did not know how it was pronounced, I went up to the lecturer and said, “How do you pronounce this word?” And he said, “Well, we’re not entirely sure...” I said, “But can you give me a rough idea?” And he said, “Well, no, not really, because, you see, we know very little about the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon.” I said, “But all I want to know is a rough idea. How is this *y* pronounced?” He said, “Well, it was a front rounded vowel.” So I began to think, “This is a very funny subject. If *Beowulf* is the work that was sung, that was said, how was it pronounced?” They wouldn’t say. So I got rather bored with old language study in the first year and began to think that linguistics was a subject that was distant from reality. It was reinforced by my first linguistics class that I did in the first year. The lecturer decided that the best way to teach linguistics over ten hours – this was an introduction to linguistics – was to give us a long reading list, and the first book on it was Ogden and Richards’ *The Meaning of Meaning*. Now anybody who has read that book knows how difficult and abstruse it is. I would never dream of giving an undergraduate *The Meaning of Meaning* to read. Postgraduates, maybe. But we had to read this. And there were other books of a similar kind. At the end of the course we were given an essay to write on linguistics, and I wrote my essay, and I failed – I got a D for it. I just couldn’t understand it, I wasn’t interested, it was badly taught.

So at the beginning of my second year I was not going to follow a life in language, I was going to study literature, I was going to choose all the literature options. And then one day, we had a course which everybody had to do, called *The History of the English Language*, and it was taught by this person called Randolph Quirk. So we’re all sitting there, pretty fed up with language, really, and in he walks, and one hour later, I am a born-again linguist! It was as simple as that. His energy, enthusiasm, knowledge, persuasiveness, his way of putting the subject across, it just knocked me over. At that point I knew that that was what I wanted to do. Then I started doing phonetics and suddenly everything started to fall into place. So the fact that I am talking to you now is largely due to Randolph Quirk.

BELLS: In your account in *Linguistics in Britain: Personal Histories* (edited by K. Brown and V. Law, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) you wrote: “I learned my generative grammar from Jim Sledd, whose orientation to linguistics – best described as sceptical enthusiasm – has stayed with me.” How would you describe and account for your own orientation to linguistics?

DAVID CRYSTAL: Well, I’ve always found myself first of all to be a descriptive linguist. I don’t see myself as a theoretical linguist. I’m no Chomsky, I don’t do that kind of great model building in linguistics. No. I learned my linguistics from the descriptive aims of *The Survey of English Usage*, which Randolph Quirk eventually developed and where I worked in the early years, and also from the emphases that were in the Phonetics Department at University College London. These were all students of Daniel Jones, people like Gimson and O’Connor. So it was always: Listen carefully, get it accurate, write down exactly what people do, never mind about the theory behind it, get the facts right, and then you’ve got something to talk about. That was the main direction, always.

Very early on I learned there was no one perfect way that would explain all the facts. One model would help explain *this* set of facts, another model explains *that* set of facts. At the time, in London there was Randolph Quirk, there was Michael Halliday, Firth was over the way in the School of Oriental Studies. There were all these theoretical positions attracting interest. And Chomsky, of course, coming in at the time, with Sledd doing the teaching for us. There were all these different insights. It was a bit like going into a garden with all these different flowers competing for your attention. And if somebody says, “Which flower is the best flower?”, well, you can’t answer that question. Each flower has a different colour and a different attractiveness.

So I became very eclectic very early on in my linguistic theory – I would select bits from whichever theory I felt would help illuminate the data. And the second trend, which is just as important really, is that very early on I became an applied linguist, and not a general linguist, so that reinforced that kind of concept.

BELLS: How do you see the distinction between theoretical and applied linguistics? Where do these two meet?

DAVID CRYSTAL: I have a very clear distinction in my mind about the two. Both sides are controversial, of course, there are many opinions, but for

me, applied linguistics is the application of the theories, methodologies or empirical findings of linguistics to the solution of some problem defined by people who are not linguists. The world is a big world and language is everywhere, so language problems are everywhere. One of the first areas of applied linguistics, of course, was foreign language teaching and learning. And I did a little bit of that once upon a time. But looking back over the years, what I found is that the areas that have always pulled me in their directions have been areas where people who are not linguists have come to me and said, "Can you help? We've got a problem. How would you analyze this? We've got this difficulty."

So for me one of the first areas of applied linguistics, as I would now call it, even though it wasn't called that at the time, was in the application of language in the study of religion. This was the 1960s, when the Roman Catholic Church was changing from Latin to the vernacular, and everybody was discussing, "How should we do this? What sort of English should be in the liturgy? Is there anybody around who can advise us on this?" An area of applied linguistics was opening up here, and there were many other aspects of religion that were in the same sort of category. And then a few years later I found myself being approached by people in schools worried about the question of how you teach about the English language as a mother tongue to children of various ages. Another area people would approach us for – I say *us*, because other colleagues were also asked, not just me – was the teaching of reading in schools. There were many different controversies here about which is the best method. Is a phonic approach the best method? There were many different ways and so we would talk about that. A little later I found myself in the clinical world, where clinicians, speech therapists and others were asking questions like "What is the best way of analyzing the language of a language disordered child or a language disordered adult? Can you help?" Once again, you are pulled in that direction. And that's how it has been. It hasn't changed a bit in the last 40 years.

In the last ten years the people who have come to me have been Internet people. I'll give you an example. The advertising world is upset because advertisements on the Internet are sometimes misplaced. So, for example, a few years ago, there was a story about a street stabbing in Chicago. It was a CNN report. The ads down the side said, "Buy your knives here. Get your knives on eBay. We have excellent knives." 'We can stab you better than anybody else' was the implication. Now you can see what happened. The stupid software had analyzed the structure of the page, found the word *knife* being very frequent, looked in the advertising inventory, found *knife* in the context of cutlery and assumed that that was what the page was about.

The advertising industry is embarrassed by this sort of mistake. It happens all the time. So they turn to linguists, they turn to me and they say, "Can you solve this problem?" Yes, of course, I can solve this problem. It's a dead easy problem to solve. All you've got to do is do a proper semantic analysis of the whole page, and you'd immediately find out that *knife* in this sense was collocating with *murder* and *stab* and so on, whereas *knife* in the cutlery sense was collocating with *fork* and *spoon* and so on, and there is no problem so long as you do the analysis. "Oh, thank you very much", they say, "Will you do it for us?" And for the last few years that's exactly what I've been doing – analysis of web pages and so on. That's another area of applied linguistics. So over the years I must have worked in about ten or twelve different areas of applied linguistics, unified by the proposition "We have a problem. The problem involves language and we don't have the expertise to solve it. Can you help?" Usually the answer is yes, and occasionally no.

BELLS: How do you see the role of pragmatics in the study of language?

DAVID CRYSTAL: Well, I think pragmatics is probably *the* most important area of all in language study. But it's so recent that it's difficult to perceive its full potential. Of course, it depends on what you mean by pragmatics. Once again, we are in a controversial area where different people have different views.

For me, pragmatics is the study of the choices that you make when you use language. So inside my head at the moment is all the language I know, and now I have to choose certain words, certain grammatical patterns, certain sounds, certain everything, in order to make what I think is an appropriate conversation with you. And now whether that's right or wrong is a matter of pragmatic judgement. Therefore in studying pragmatics you are studying the person's background, the presuppositions behind what he is saying, his sense of the effect it's going to have on the audience, and all of this. So it's the most wonderful subject, because for the first time one can really arrive at an explanation of why people use language in the way they do. I think pragmatics is the most explanatory subject of all. And then it turns out that there are lots of people interested in pragmatic issues: people interested in the effect of language on a population, like the advertisers once again; or in literature, why does that literary effect work and another one does not; or the choice of shop names, and all those things.

The pragmatics is so important. And yet it's really very little studied at the empirical level. There are plenty of books on pragmatics, very thick

books. But the detailed empirical studies of the pragmatics of English, say, and then the pragmatics of French, say, and then – do English and French pragmatics meet or what are the differences between the two, a sort of contrastive pragmatics... There are hardly any studies of this kind done.

BELLS: How important is pragmatics for language teaching?

DAVID CRYSTAL: I think this is a very important area, and one that governs a lot of the change of direction that I see in language teaching, both foreign language teaching and mother tongue teaching. One of the biggest movements in English mother tongue teaching in schools in Britain at the moment is a switch from straight descriptive grammatical studies to pragmatic studies. Not just *what* grammar is in this text, but *why* is that grammar used in that text. And it's a big change, I think.

The communicative movement in foreign language teaching preceded the movement in mother tongue teaching. For a long time foreign language teachers have been worrying about how you incorporate that sort of pragmatic dimension into classroom work. Now this has never been a main area of interest for me, I've done a bit on the ELT side of things, but I'm not a specialist there. But on the mother tongue side I've done an awful lot. And there I see it over and over again. The exams provide a clear example.

Once upon a time, the typical exam in an English school was like this. You would have a paragraph and the student would be told: "Underline all the passive sentences in this paragraph". So if you knew what a passive sentence was, then you could underline them and you get a 100%, you've done it. That is never examined in that way these days. No examiner would ever do that. The exams these days say: "Find all the passive sentences in the paragraph and then explain why they are there. And explain why the other sentences are not passive. Why did the writer sometimes use the passive and sometimes not?" And that is a pragmatic question which deserves a pragmatic answer. Now that is a much more illuminating approach to the whole thing.

BELLS: In 1984 you decided to leave the academic world and to become, as you said, "a freelance linguist", devoting immense time and energy to popularizing linguistics. Why?

DAVID CRYSTAL: Yes, I became a freelance linguist, though not everybody liked that term. I went to Japan the year after I left the full time academic

world, and they came up to me and said, "So what shall we call you now?" I said, "Freelance linguist." And they were horrified. "We cannot call you that. We cannot. 'Freelance' is for journalists." And they went into a huddle in a corner, and they came back and said, "We shall call you 'independent scholar'!" So that's what I am, I'm an independent scholar now (laughing).

Why did I leave? Because I am primarily a writer, a researcher, a lecturer, a broadcaster – that sort of person. In the university world you have to do, as everybody does, your share of administration. Those duties have to be done. And for the best part of nearly 20 years I did that. I was head of department at one point, and everything was fine, you could have a balance between the two. My time would be perhaps 30% admin and the rest of the time doing the other things. But in 1981 everything changed. Mrs Thatcher formed a government a little earlier. And Mrs Thatcher is remembered as much for the cuts that she started to introduce into the educational system, and everything else, it wasn't just education, but in 1981 all the universities were told that they had to cut, cut, cut. And that meant 'lose staff'. And we were all sent a letter saying "Please, leave." You know, 'Nice of you to have been with us, but bye-bye, and here is a package to persuade you to leave'. I got this letter, and I said, "I'm not leaving. I don't want to leave. I'm happy. I'm developing this new clinical course for speech therapists, and another remedial course for teachers, and I don't want to leave." So I didn't. Some did. But not enough. The next year, 1982, another letter came round from the Vice-chancellor: "Not enough of you have left. Please, leave now." I didn't want to leave. Others did. Not enough. 1983, another letter: "Look, we still haven't got enough people leaving. Please, some more of you, leave now." More people did. I didn't. I didn't want to leave. But then, the year after, you realized what had happened. Hundreds of staff had left and gone to more rewarding jobs in restaurants and hotels, and heaven knows where. As a result, the administrative load that they would have done now fell upon the people who were left behind. And slowly that admin work grew and grew and grew.

By the beginning of 1984, my admin load was 80%. I had been commissioned to write *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language* in 1980. By 1984, I had written about 30 pages of it. In four years. I had to leave, really. My wife Hilary and I had discussed it. We went up to Holyhead, and uncle John said, "Leave!" I said, "I can't leave!" He said, "Leave!" I said, "What would I do?" He said, "Be a consultant." And I said, "There aren't any consultants in linguistics." He said, "Be the first!" So, that's what happened. I quit, just left. We didn't get any package or anything, we just decided I

had enough, and we left. We moved, we went back to Holyhead, and I set up there as a freelance linguist. Within a year, I'd finished *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, you see. It was a risky move, becoming independent. But it all worked out fine.

BELLS: Among your numerous works, the two Cambridge encyclopedias – *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language* and *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the English Language* – stand out in terms of size, complexity and world fame. What would you single out as the most striking experience related to these volumes?

DAVID CRYSTAL: You're quite right, these are the two best-sellers, without a doubt. Interestingly, they nearly never happened. What happened was this. I was asked by a young man, a cousin who was interested in studying language, whether I knew of any books about language with pictures in. There are books about history with pictures in, books about geography, books about archaeology. And I thought, "That's strange. Language is people, you can take pictures of people, language is alphabet, you can take pictures of alphabets. Why are there no books about language with pictures in?" So I thought, "I'll suggest this." And I wrote out a proposal, and sent it in to one of my publishers at the time, Edward Arnold, who said, "No, no, no. This is not a possible book. Books about language with pictures in, it can't be done. Language is theoretical, and abstract, and so on. No, no, no." Turned down. So then I got in touch with Hilary's brother, who was working in the coffee table book area, Octopus Books, and I said to him, "Look, I've got an idea about a book about language with pictures in, what do you think?" They considered it and said, "Oh, no, no, no. It's too abstract. You see, the pictures would be nice, but all the explanation would be far too abstract, no, we can't do it." So I thought, "Oh, blow it", and just put the proposal on the shelf.

And then one day I was at Cambridge University Press, talking about something completely different, and at the end of the conversation the editor there said, "So, what are you doing at the moment?" And I said, "Well, nothing much, I've been thinking of this idea about a pictorial encyclopedia of language". And they said, "Oh, really. Would you like to send in a proposal?" I said, "Well, all right, but I don't think you'll like it." And I sent it in, and they said, "Oh, yes, we rather like this idea. Would you like to work it up?" So I did, and the rest is history, in a sense. Except that even Cambridge was suspicious. If you compare the first edition of *The*

Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language – *CEL*, as we call it – with the second edition, you'll notice a big difference. The first edition has no colour. Or at least it just has one colour. This was because Cambridge were still very uncertain about the project. They said, "Well, we're not sure it will sell, you know. Therefore, we're not going to put too much money into it." I said, "Can I have full colour?" And they said, "No, no, no, we'll give you one colour – red, and any variant on red, but nothing else." And as a result, the first edition is really not very good as a graphic design. You can't do maps with just one colour, you need four colours for maps. And there are lots of illustrations in the first edition where the caption actually has to describe the colours in the picture, because I wasn't allowed to use the colours. But it was a most rewarding experience, because what we had here was a planning operation where Cambridge put in a picture researcher, a person called a visualiser, who'd help you design a page, the actual book designer – we were all sitting around a table discussing the balance of text to picture and how the page should work. You will know that at no point is there a sentence running on to the next page. You know, getting that right, so that the topic ends exactly at the bottom right-hand corner of the right-hand page, all of this was immensely exciting. And of course the fact of having a professional picture researcher was just a joy. You'd just say, "I need a picture of something", and they'd go away and come back with ten possible alternative pictures. And you'd just go, 'Oh, that's a lovely one, that's a lovely one, I'll take that one!' That was the best bit – building together that picture and the text.

Having said that, the first edition of *CEL* was amateurish compared with *CEEL*, *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the English Language*. The difference is obvious. We learned so much from *CEL*, so that by the time we did *CEEL*, we got it right, and the first edition of *CEEL* was just stunning, it was better in all respects. And by that time, *CEL* had sold, Cambridge realized that it was a best-seller. And so for *CEEL*, I was given an open cheque. They said, "Have as many colours as you like, dear boy!" And the cover of *CEEL*, with the face and all the images going across the face, that cover cost 10,000 pounds to do. This was pre-computer, and it was all physical and photography. But they were prepared to put that sort of money into *CEEL* now that they realized that there was a market for encyclopedias of that kind. And then the second edition of *CEL*, ten years later, of course, was in full colour. So now everything was fine. But it was a long and difficult process persuading the publishers that this was a legitimate publishing experience.

**BELLS: Could you share with us your favourite quotation about language?
What can linguists learn from it?**

DAVID CRYSTAL: That's an interesting one! There are so many. The *Words on Words*, that I co-authored with Hilary, was a wonderful year where we just read and read and read, and looked for quotations about language from anywhere – from Shakespeare, from Dickens, from the philosophers, from anywhere. Of course, we found thousands. And it's so difficult to choose. What your favourite quotation is depends really on what topic is on your mind most. And the topic that has to be on any linguist's mind most at the moment, and for the last ten years, and for the next ten years, is the topic of language death, because nothing is more serious. If half the languages of the world are dying, then this is half our data disappearing. And it could be worse than that, it could be 80% of the languages dying.

So the quotations that stay in my mind most at the moment are the quotations to do with language endangerment and language death. And the one that now immediately comes into my mind is a quotation which is actually a translation from Welsh. In Welsh it is *Cenedl heb iaith, cenedl heb galon*, which means *A nation without a language is a nation without a heart*. You'll find a similar quotation in many other languages, too. But that summarizes so much about what it means to have a language and



Hilary and David Crystal

why we should care about language death to the extent of being active about it. You've got the heart and you've got the head, and you need both in order to save a language. So, *a nation without a language is a nation without a heart.*

And Hilary's favourite quotation is: *A word is dead when it is said, some say. I say, it just begins to live that day.* That's Emily Dickinson, the American poet.

BELLS: An important segment of your work is related to endangered languages and language death. Does the global spread of English pose a threat to other languages?

DAVID CRYSTAL: Well, yes, of course it does. But anybody who focuses exclusively on English, as some people do, is missing the point entirely, because it isn't just English that's the threat. Any dominant language is the threat. The evidence is perfectly clear. If you go to South America, where the Brazilian Indian languages have been dying and dying and dying for the last hundred years, and the languages of the rest of the continent, in Peru, Argentina, Chile, and so on, have been dying – what language has taken over there? English? Not in the slightest. Portuguese, of course, and Spanish. Now go to the languages of the former Soviet Union, just to generalize about it, and all the languages that are spoken round the north of Russia, and round the south, and down the Volga, they are all dying out. Why? Because of English? No, because of Russian. So you can go around the world like this and find languages that are dying because of Chinese, languages that are dying because of Arabic – in West Africa, for example, some of the languages of Nigeria are being swamped by Arabic. And now, the interesting thing: go to the middle of Africa and find languages that are dying because of other African languages; Swahili, for instance, is swamping some of the smaller languages in the middle and the south there. And the general point is this: big fish eat smaller fish. If you've got a language that is bigger than yours, you've got to watch out. It doesn't matter whether that language is an African language, or an Asian language, or an Indo-European language, you are in trouble unless somebody manages it as a policy.

So, yes, English caused trouble in Australia, in North America, and in the Celtic fringe of the British Isles, and perhaps it caused more trouble in some areas because of its colonial status, that has to be agreed. But the core problem today is not just the problem of English as a global language. It is a problem of dominant languages swamping smaller languages. And

language planning shows that it's perfectly possible to solve this problem. It isn't inevitable at all that a language is swamped by a bigger language. But on the other hand, it has got to be carefully managed at a political level, otherwise that will happen.

BELLS: How about Welsh?

DAVID CRYSTAL: Welsh is doing very well. Welsh is the only Celtic language of the 20th century to be a success story. All the other Celtic languages are going down and down and down – Gaelic in Scotland, Gaelic in Ireland, Breton in north-west France. Welsh is going up. The statistics are clear. In the 1991 census 500,000 people spoke Welsh, in the 2001 census 580,000 people speak Welsh. Why? Because there was an activism. You need three things for a language to be saved: firstly, there has to be a bottom-up interest, activism on the part of the people, ordinary people must want the language saved; then there has to be a top-down interest, the government must want the language saved; and thirdly, there has to be cash, because it's expensive to save a language, so that's where government and private industry come in. Now in the case of Welsh, all three things happened. The activism of the 1970s was very, very strong. The British government, Mrs Thatcher's government, was eventually persuaded to launch a Welsh television channel, which was the turning point. Suddenly Welsh was institutionalized: you saw it on the screen, you heard it on the radio. Two Language Acts were put in place to protect the Welsh language, so that it is now obligatory to learn Welsh for certain types of public job. And money was put into the situation. As a result, Welsh grows. The other Celtic languages didn't have that kind of threefold opportunity, and so they haven't grown. They are trying now to do better, but it's late for them.

BELLS: The English language has acquired an unprecedented global standing, while at the same time the emergence of New Englishes raises the question of the fragmentation of English. Can the English language accommodate both unity and diversity?

DAVID CRYSTAL: If I could predict the future with language, I would be so happy. It's one thing you should never dare to do. I mean, I will try and do it, but nobody knows. Nobody could have predicted the situation for English. Nobody was predicting it, even 50 years ago they weren't predicting this. Nobody was predicting the language death crisis even

20 years ago. Nobody was predicting the Internet and the effect that it was having on language. So, it's really difficult to know. All one can do at the moment is identify the possible trends and then monitor them to see which of these trends is likely to dominate. Both scenarios could operate, and there is evidence of both scenarios operating at the moment.

On the one hand, there is clear evidence of language diversity, of English breaking up into an English family of languages. And that notion is a perfectly plausible one, we've seen it happen over the centuries, with the Romance family of languages from Latin, so why not now, there is no reason why not. And we've seen it happen: when you go to languages like Tok Pisin in Papua New Guinea or Singlish in Singapore, you find languages that you cannot understand. I mean, I cannot understand them as a native speaker of British English, of course they are perfectly understandable by people there. So, on the one hand, there is evidence of language break-up in that way. And even though the new varieties of English, these New Englishes, may not move so far as to become totally unintelligible, nonetheless as you go around the English speaking world at the moment, what you find in most places is a degree of unintelligibility, so that people who are not part of that particular country find that they have a learning task to do. And that learning task applies equally to native speakers of English and non-native speakers of English. If I go to South Africa and encounter South-African English, I am as puzzled by it as you might be as a non-native speaker of English going to South Africa. So we're equal in that respect. And this is happening all over the English speaking world.

At the same time as that is happening, there is a strong movement towards homogeneity, because language is always driven by two forces. One, the force for intelligibility – we have to understand each other. And the other, the force for identity – we have to identify ourselves with our own country and so on. The diversity is a reflex of identity. Standard English is a reflex of the need for intelligibility. So at the same time as that diversity is taking place, there is an equal pressure on everybody to learn a standard which is going to guarantee opportunities like this one, where you and I speak the same Standard English. There might be a few differences here and there, but 99% of the time we're using the same standard, and therefore we can do an interview like this. Now the question is: How far is that Standard English going to be influenced at all by the localities from which it derives? In particular, for example, we have American Standard English, which is slightly different from British Standard English, and those are slightly different from Australian Standard English, and so on. Now the

question is: What do we mean by slightly? How much difference is there between British and American, Australian and American, Canadian and American, and so on and so forth? Empirical studies are very few, really. The dictionaries are beginning to build up stocks of information about this, and the grammars are beginning to look for differences between British and Australian English, for example. So there are some regional standard differences. And the question now becomes: What do we do with them when we encounter them?

At this point I have to stop generalizing and start giving an anecdote. I was at a seminar a few years ago where an American was talking to us all. It was a multilingual seminar in the sense that there were people from all over the world. At one point the American guy asked for questions and somebody asked him an unusual question, and he stopped and said, "Hey, that was from out of left field!" The person next to said to me, "What does *out of left field* mean?" And I didn't know either. The person next to me started to talk to the next person, and all around the room people started talking. The American guy stopped and said, "What is the problem?" So the person next to me asked the American guy, "Excuse me, what does *out of left field* mean?" And he was completely thrown, he had no realization that this would be a problem. He explained it. It's a metaphor from baseball: if the ball comes from the left field in baseball, it's from an unexpected direction. So *out of left field* means 'That was an unexpected question.' Well, I wasn't letting that pass; I said to the American guy, "We played that with a straight bat." And the American guy said, "Huh? What does that mean?" This, of course, is a metaphor from cricket, which the American did not know. *To play something with a straight bat* means 'to play in a very controlled defensive way'. Here was an example where we couldn't understand the American guy, the American guy couldn't understand the British idiom. Now, what do we do in the rest of the seminar? There are two things that could've happened. We could all have learned the idiom, as indeed we did, and carry on using our idioms as if nothing had happened. In actual fact what happened was this: for the rest of that seminar, the American didn't use another Americanism, nor did we use Britishisms. It was as if we'd all sensed that these idioms were getting in the way of our communication, so we wouldn't use them any more. And suddenly the conversation became culture-neutral. It became a kind of World Standard English without any cultural interference. Afterwards in the bar, we were joking about this, and we were trying to work out how we would all talk about something that had happened if we weren't allowed to use our local idioms. 'We were walking down the road on the...' – I can't say *pavement*,

the American guy can't say *sidewalk*, and the Australian guy can't say *footpath*, because these are three specific terms. So what do we do? 'We were walking down the road on the side of the road where it is safe for pedestrians to walk...' We were joking about it, but there's a serious point behind the joke. And this is that it is possible that the English language might develop in that way, without any cultural baggage from the different communities that use it. Now I don't know whether that will happen, but it's a possibility, and that seminar suggested it to me.

Personally, I think it's rather more likely that we will learn the idioms of the dominant community, which in this case is America. Traditionally, American English influences British English and it influences Australian and Canadian English and so on, and not the other way round. If that is the case, then increasingly British English vocabulary will grow and grow with Americanisms, and that other scenario will not take place. But it's too soon to say.

BELLS: What are the implications of the globalization of English for ELT, especially in terms of university education?

DAVID CRYSTAL: It makes the job more difficult, immediately. It used to be fairly straightforward. There was British English, there was American English; there was standard English, there was non-standard English; there was formal English, there was informal English; everybody knew where they were. Now it's much harder, because there are many kinds of English, gradations between standard and non-standard, and all sorts of complications have come along the way.

When I talk about this with a group of teachers, and I've done it many times, I wait for a consensus to emerge, and the consensus that I've seen most often is this: Everything that is happening to English doesn't alter at all your teaching procedures from the point of view of language production. If you are used to teaching British English and Received Pronunciation, you will carry on teaching British English and Received Pronunciation. Why? Because you are used to it, the materials are there, you know how to do it, and, most important, the exam boards expect you to do it. And you've got to train your students for the exams, otherwise what are you doing? So in terms of language production, nothing much changes.

But in terms of listening comprehension, everything changes. If one trains one's students to grow up to think that the only kind of English

in the world is the English they've been taught, or to grow up to think that other kinds of English are in some way inferior to the English they've been taught, then one is doing one's students no good service at all. One has got to prepare students for the real world of English. And that means, I think, introducing into one's classes, little by little, over the period of their learning, an exposure to the variety of Englishes around the world, so they're not put off when they first encounter them, so they are not scared of them, so they don't react and say, "What is that? That is not English! We were always taught this. How can you use that?"

You can't do that if you are faced with 400 million Indian speakers of English saying *I am thinking of what you are saying. I am remembering what you are doing. I am knowing the answer to your question.* You can't say, "I am sorry, that is not right, because I was taught to say *I know the answer, I think, I remember.* You can't use the Present Continuous in that way!" Well, 400 million people are saying you can. And under those circumstances you've got to respect the reality of varied English around the world. And this is, first of all, a listening comprehension problem, or task, or syllabus, and, secondly, a reading comprehension problem, or task, or syllabus. Because now you look at the literatures evolving around the world and you find that most of these literatures are reflecting these new English norms in their writing. The novels, the poems, the plays are full of these regional Englishes. You take things like the Booker Prize in England. Who wins it every year? Well, as often as not, somebody writing a novel in non-standard English. Take *Trainspotting*, for instance, entirely written in a Scottish variety of English. It's no good saying, "I'm sorry, that's wrong, it's not what I am used to." Well, hard luck! This is the way the English language is going.

The more one can prepare students to encounter these varieties of English in listening and reading comprehension, the better. And it does mean altering the balance of information in the syllabus. A balance between conservatism in language production and creativity in language comprehension is necessary. The reason why it wasn't done for a long time is because it was difficult to get hold of these other Englishes. The Internet, of course, has made it so easy. For all the Englishes in the world, there is now plenty of material on-line, just waiting to be used in the classroom. And because it's the new technology, the students find it cool and they are interested in it. So the teaching job in that respect has been made easier, I think.

BELLS: The electronic communication, especially the Internet, is one of the important factors in the global spread of English. In what ways does the Internet influence language – in particular, the English language?

DAVID CRYSTAL: So far not very much, because it takes time to influence the language. I'm not talking about an immediate influence – you look on the Internet and you find a word or a usage and you think "Oh, it's cool, I like that", you enjoy it, so you mention it to your friend, so for a day or two you use the influence that is there. No, I'm talking about something that is more permanent than that. And it's too soon to say, because the Internet in its realities is, for most of us, ten-fifteen years old, the World Wide Web starting in 1991 only, blogging starting in the early 2000s, instant messaging more recent than that, text messaging from round about 1999. We're talking about things which haven't yet had time to demonstrate their possible impact on languages.

The evidence so far is that these new technologies have had very limited influence on the language as a whole. Of course, they have provided us with new styles of English, or Serbian, or French, or whatever it might be. Certainly, e-mail style is different from chatroom style, which is different from instant messaging style, which is different from text messaging style, and so on and so forth. But that's what you'd expect. Nothing is happening here that is new. When newspapers came along, they introduced us to new newspaper styles. When broadcasting started, it introduced us to new broadcasting styles. Let's ask the question in retrospect: Has broadcasting had an influence on the English language? Is it influencing the kind of English I'm using to you now? Am I sounding like a broadcaster? No, not in the slightest. I'm just talking to you in the way I would talk to anybody. You're not hearing in here sports commentary or weather forecasting language or news reading language or all the other styles of broadcasting language that evolved over the years. No, they exist, and they've made the English language a bigger, a richer language, but they have not influenced the way you and I speak to each other most of the time in everyday conversation. So I expect the same thing will happen when the Internet evolves, that all these new Internet styles will exist, they've made the language richer, there are now more options for people to use, more jokes that can be made when one uses these styles for humorous purposes, more literature is going to grow as a result of these new styles, there are already novels written in text messaging style, for example, and poems written in text messaging style. And this is a lovely flowering of

new varieties of English, and other languages too, which hasn't existed before. Are they influencing the language that you and I speak now? Am I at any point in this interview using any kind of Internet construction? I don't think so. I could do so, I might use a text messaging abbreviation, like LOL, meaning *laughing out loud*, or something like that. But I haven't done so, and it would be very unnatural for me to do it. Some young people do do it. And you do get the occasional use of Internet abbreviation heard in everyday speech, but it's more like local slang. Is that going to be a permanent influence on the English language? Well, even if it was, one new word or phrase, or two, or ten, or twenty – this is trivial compared with the size of the language as a whole.

So I don't actually think it will have that much influence on speech. On writing? Here we have to consider the possible impact of the Internet on spelling. Now, as you know, English spelling system is not all that helpful. Thanks to 600 years of influence from all the different languages, the English spelling system is in some respects highly irregular. Something like 15% of the words in English are very irregular indeed, and this is a problem for everybody. So since the 16th century people have been wanting to simplify the spelling of English, and they've always failed. No spelling reform method has ever succeeded, with just one exception, and that is Webster's revision of certain spellings for American English in round about the year 1800. And that was very limited, very limited indeed. But people still want to simplify English spelling. It would be lovely, they say, if we had a much simpler, phonetic spelling for English, oh, what joy, all the problems would be gone. And there is a Simplified Spelling Society in Britain, and there is one in America, and they meet and argue about how they could simplify English spelling. But none of their efforts have ever succeeded, because you can't impose a spelling change on a country easily. You can try it, as they've just done in Germany, and it's caused a heck of a problem. But you can do it with a language like German, because German is not a world language. But say British spellers decided to change British spelling. Would the Americans follow suit? Would the Indians follow suit? Would the Australians follow suit? A global language cannot be controlled in that way. So there is no way that English spelling will simplify unless the Internet does it. And you see the way in which simplified spellings are beginning to appear on the Internet, and it makes you wonder whether one day some of these spellings might become normal.

I'll give you an example: the word *rhubarb*, *r-h-u-b-a-r-b*. The spelling *r-u-b-a-r-b*, dropping the *h*, is non-standard English, it is an error. If a student used that, you would mark it wrong, wouldn't you? But that

h, you see, came in just because people wanted to reflect the etymology of the word, it didn't have any phonetic value or anything like that. So an awful lot of people think that *rhubarb* is spelled as it is pronounced – not *r-h-u-b-a-r-b* but *r-u-b-a-r-b*. Now, traditionally, they would never get away with it in traditional education, but on the Internet – if they think that's how it should be spelled, they will spell it that way. If you type *r-u-b-a-r-b* into Google, you get 46,300 hits on this day. That has happened over the last ten years. In ten years' time, there will probably be 400,000 hits. And in 20 years' time there may be 4 million hits. And suddenly, *rubarb* without the *h* will be a perfectly legitimate spelling to use in English. Now you may think, "That's rather radical, that's rather dramatic." But no. There are already many alternative spellings in the English language. Do you spell *judgement* with an *e* or without an *e*? Both are possible, the dictionary recognizes both. Do you spell *advertise* or *advertize*? Do you spell *archaeology* or *archeology*? Both are possible. If you go through a dictionary, a college dictionary, and count all the words in the dictionary that have alternative spellings, like these, do you know what the percentage is? Somebody did that a few years ago as a research exercise – 25%, a quarter of the words in an English dictionary have alternative spellings. And you think, "No, that can't be right." Well, let me give you some more examples. Do you spell *moon* with a capital *M* or a small *m*? Do you spell *bible* with a capital *B* or a small *b*? Do you spell *flower-pot* with a hyphen or not? And you suddenly realize, oh, yes, there are thousands of these examples. So



*David Crystal at the Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade,
November 2008*

English already has many alternative spellings. So why not *rhubarb* and *rubarb*, and lots of other simplifications coming into the language? Saying that right now upsets an awful lot of people, because the conservative-minded purist temperament of many people says, "It is a terrible thing that spelling should be variable like this!" But spelling has only been fixed in English over the last 250 years. In Shakespeare's time there was no standard spelling, there was no correct spelling until the 18th century. So this is really just allowing the language to develop as it always used to be before those prescriptive dictionary writers and grammarians came along and said, "Oh, no, no, no, we must have fixed spelling, because that's the only way in which we'll ever be able to understand each other." Well, they're right to a certain extent. If we all spelled as we liked, it would be very confusing. But the language allows a certain flexibility in spelling. All languages do. And it's possible, therefore, that one day the Internet might be the source of English spelling simplification, in which case the answer to your question 'Does the Internet have an impact on English' would be 'yes'. But not yet.

BELLS: How do you see the relation between the study of the English language and the study of literature, especially in foreign language teaching? For example, the curriculum of the English Department at Belgrade University includes both. In your opinion, is that the right option for the 21st century?

DAVID CRYSTAL: Excellent. That's absolutely the best way forward. In some parts of the world it's totally different, isn't it? The literature department is over there, the language department is over there, and they don't meet, they never talk to each other. Once, you know, I went to a university, I was invited by the British Council – they said to the university, "Would you like him to give a talk?" And the literature department said yes, and the language department said yes. So I said, "What do you want to talk about?" And the literature department said, "The relationship between language and literature". And the language department said, "The relationship between language and literature". And I said, "Well, why don't you both come together and we have the same talk?" "Oh, no, no, we can't possibly do that." I had to give the talk twice!

For me, language and literature are two sides of the same coin. Literature is the most wonderful manifestation of language, and therefore all language students need to know where language is going, so that they

can see language at its best. Literature students have to work through the medium of language. They need to know the nuts and bolts of language in order to understand how literature achieves its effects. The more they know about language, the better literary scholars they will be. Robert Graves, the novelist, once said, "A poet has to master the rules of English grammar before he attempts to bend or break them." Now I would generalize that quotation and say – it isn't just poets, but novelists and short story writers and essayists and dramatists have to master the rules of English, or Serbian, or French, or German grammar and vocabulary and phonology and orthography and pragmatics before they attempt to bend or break them. In other words, it's the bending and breaking of rules that makes literature so wonderful. And therefore you have to know what these rules are. Now it is the same for students and literary critics. If your job is to explain literature, then you also have to know about the rules that are being bent and broken. A literary critic needs to know as much as possible about the structure of the language in order to explain the effects that are going on. So it seems to me that we have two directions which ultimately focus on the same thing, that is, the language – how it is, how it works, how it's structured, how it's used. And I think the more one can show how this works in practice, the more convinced literary departments become about how to see the relevance of language and the more convinced language departments become about the relevance of literature.

Now, to give you one example. There is a comedy show on British television called *Whose line is it, anyway?* And in the improvisation that takes place in that stand-up comedy show, one of the games that they played was the game of questions. The game of questions was a game where you are allowed to talk to each other, but you must only ask questions, you must not use statements, you must not use commands, you must not use exclamations. Now Hilary and I will play this game briefly: – *Well, how are you?* – *Why do you want to know?* – *Isn't it of interest to know how you are?* – *Why are you asking me that?* – *Why wouldn't I ask you that?* – *Do you think other people would be interested?* – *My...* Oops, she wins because I'm stuck, I can't think how to do it next. It's a clever game, and it's difficult to play. Now that is not literature. But in Tom Stoppard's *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead*, which is literature, Stoppard asks the question, "What were those characters doing when they were off stage?" The whole story of the play is the story of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern coming to Elsinore and then wondering why they are there and what they are supposed to be doing. And when they are not talking to Hamlet and the King and the Queen, what are they doing? Well, they do all sorts of things,

they talk about life, the universe and everything, in a very funny way, as Tom Stoppard does so brilliantly, and at one point Rosencrantz says to Guildenstern, "What are we going to do?" And the other one says, "We could play questions". And then they play the game of questions for two pages of script. It's very funny, and if you've seen the play, it's one of the best points in the play.

So here is a piece of structured language, the kind of thing any teacher would use in a language teaching class: "Let us exchange questions together, let us train each other, let us have a teaching game, where you ask questions of each other." Nothing to do with literature. And now suddenly exactly the same game is being used in one of the best plays in the English language. Language and literature are the two sides of the same coin. And there are plenty of examples of that kind that one could adduce to demonstrate without the shadow of a doubt that language and literature come together like that.

BELLS: How do you see the future of foreign language and literature university studies? Is that something that young people should opt for?

DAVID CRYSTAL: Oh, yes, I think so, because you can't ignore a world literature. The world literature informs you. Anybody who studied comparative literature, I think, realizes that there are huge benefits to be gained from studying the literature of other countries. George Steiner, the comparative literature professor from Cambridge and Geneva, used to say that you have to learn a foreign language in order to learn how to define the contours and the boundaries of your own language. That's what a foreign language does – it helps you see how your language is unique. The same point, he says, applies to literature. The more you study a foreign literature, the more you see the uniqueness of your own literature. And this applies equally, of course, to endangered languages. Because each language is a vision of the world, and the world is a mosaic of visions. And there are only 6,000 visions in the world, because there are only 6,000 languages. And many of them are dying out. So we are losing visions, week after week after week. So students who are studying their own mother tongue language should as soon as possible learn another language and learn another literature, for two reasons. One, because that is fascinating, it's showing you a different world than the world you inhabit in your own head. And secondly, it's showing you about your own world and making you think about what it means to be who you are. That kind of balance

between looking within yourself and looking outside of yourself is part of what I consider education to be all about. It's called broadening your horizons, to use an old cliché. But that broadening of horizons is best done through foreign language activity and the literature associated with it, it seems to me.

So if I were in charge of the world, I would be wanting everybody to learn another language, from scratch, as soon as possible, as early as possible. In fact, I wouldn't have to do it for three quarters of the world, because three quarters of the world is already bilingual anyway. It is the monolingual quarter of the world, the ex-colonial powers who think that only their language is important and that they don't have to learn anybody else's. And the English in particular, they have to be persuaded that learning another language is a good thing. It is one of the guarantees of peace that multilingualism is recognized and built upon. Most wars turn up when people refuse to accept that diversity is a basic human good. And the more one understands other people's languages and literatures, the more one comes to respect them. This is now a somewhat idealistic romantic vision I'm giving you, but I think everybody recognizes there is some truth in it.

BELLS: What is your most striking linguistic impression from Belgrade?

DAVID CRYSTAL: Well, there are so many. One of the most striking ones: I look out over the rivers from the fortress where I see all the names of Belgrade, from *Singidunum* right down to *Beograd*. And you suddenly see in that vertical alignment of names, different languages, different varieties of languages – it's a panoply of linguistic history, which reflects, of course, the reality of the history of Belgrade, where I come to the hotel and I am given a brochure and in the brochure is listed all the peoples who fought here, all the times Belgrade was beaten up and rose again, and was beaten up again, and rose again. And you suddenly realize that you're seeing here a chronological diversity which is, well, I've never seen anything like it. And to see this now suddenly summarized in however many names it is, six or seven or eight, and on the other side you see the confluence of the Sava and the Danube coming together, and you suddenly realize how central Belgrade always has been to European history. It was one of the most moving moments to look through that eye at those two rivers, through a linguistic perspective. And it dawned on me. I knew theoretically about this, but to see it and to feel it was a most moving moment.

Notes to contributors

Belgrade English Language and Literature Studies (Belgrade BELLS) is an annual peer-reviewed academic journal issued by the Department of English Language and Literature, Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade, Serbia.

The aim of the journal is to provide an international forum for current investigations in English theoretical/applied linguistics and Anglophone literary/cultural studies.

The journal welcomes original research papers, book reviews, scholarly interviews, conference reports, and commentaries.

Manuscripts (up to 10.000 words) should be submitted electronically: belgrade.bells@gmail.com

Submission deadline: 1 April 2010

Contributions should be in English. Contributors whose native language is not English are asked to have their manuscript carefully checked by a native speaker.

Manuscripts should conform to the style sheet available on the *Belgrade BELLS* website.

<http://www.belgrade.bells.fil.bg.ac.rs/>

CIP – Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

811.111+82

BELGRADE English Language & Literature Studies /
editor-in-chief Gordana Korać. - Vol. 1 (2009) - . - Belgrade :
Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade, 2009 - (Belgrade :
Studio Line). - 24 cm

Godišnje

ISSN 1821-3138 = Belgrade English Language &
Literature Studies

COBISS.SR-ID 170838540